

AUSPEX

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Volume Five

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Brian Liechti | Honors Environmental Studies

Anthony Mazza | Philosophy

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Peter Constantinou | Art

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Editorial: A Dialogue of Control

Editors of *Auspex*, Volume V

Auspex, Latin for “augur”: a diviner and priest of ancient Rome who interprets the flight patterns of birds.

What does it mean to be part of a place? What is the nature of truth and knowledge? What are the roots of resistance?

In its four years of existence, *Auspex* has sought to address these questions and others like them by showcasing outstanding undergraduate research produced in the liberal arts environment of Warren Wilson College. Questions such as these are reflective of the Warren Wilson community’s interests and concerns, and it is natural that they would repeatedly crop up in students’ research and essays. This year, however, the editors of the fifth volume of *Auspex* were dissatisfied with this emerging thematic pattern and decided to challenge and redirect it. We wished to take on a new line of inquiry, one that challenges the perceptions of a word, an idea, even a paradigm. In discussing the themes and implications of each piece in this volume, we began to notice a pattern emerging from the authors’ theses that supported this need for a change in pace. We have identified this pattern as one that centers on the theme of control.

“Control” is loosely defined as exercising restraint or direction over something. This definition is broad enough that it can be tied to the notion of connectivity—that each thing creates a series of interactions, which in turn impact those things around it. Connectivity, relationships, interaction—we could have chosen any of these words and made a solid argument for how each relates to the essays within the journal, but we feel that they do not demand the same amount of thought and critical engagement that “control” does. Control lies outside the boundaries of buzzwords; its connotations are often negative—such as domination, loss of agency/equality, etc.—and this is, in part, why we have chosen to bring these pieces to light under the theme of control. We wish to unpack these connotations and claim new ways of recognizing control.

As we worked with the essays being featured, we particularly noticed this theme being centered in reclaiming control over what was once “out of control.” The notion of taking back control in the spirit of improvement—whether that improvement is creating art that better navigates communication with a public, controlling an aspect of our environment to better care for it, or reclaiming control for the sake of empowerment—is the type of control that the writers featured in this year’s edition of *Auspex* explored in their works and the beginning of a dialogue we hope to continue.

The organization of the works appearing in this volume of *Auspex* was left entirely up to chance; in recognition of our chosen theme, we relinquished all control and drew each author’s name from a cup to decide the order of the essays. After weeks of editing, reworking, and abridging, it was freeing to relinquish power and let the pieces fall as they may. It was an exercise in renouncing rigidity and embracing our decision to contribute to the dialogue surrounding the connotations of “control.”

In continuing the tradition of past *Auspex* editors, we invite readers to have their own conversations with the works included herein. We hope readers will take charge of how they read and interpret each piece and how they might continue exploring the dialogues within this volume of *Auspex* with the wider community.

Sincerely,
The Editors of *Auspex*, Volume V



Untitled by Charlie Hayes, 2015, ceramic.

Bolivian Water Wars: An Exploration of Water Governance in an Era of Climate Change

Abstract:

Climate change poses real threats to global water availability. In an era of climate change, conflicts resulting from poor water management become more frequent and severe. In order to avoid some of the worst consequences created by shifts in water availability, it is essential that a supranational, yet context-specific, framework be developed to address and prevent emerging water crises. Namely, as new systems of water management are designed, they must closely examine the complex history and societal significance of water in vulnerable regions. This paper analyzes the 2001 Water Wars in Cochabamba, Bolivia in order to better understand the historical and cultural factors that precipitated one of the world's most famous modern water conflicts. The piece goes on to explore different methods of water management and their viability in the face of climate change. Ultimately, this research argues that there is a clear and critical need for a supranational water management framework should it be possible to combat pervasive water conflict resulting from the acceleration of anthropogenic climate change.

Marissa Bramlett | Environmental Policy

Marissa Bramlett graduated from Warren Wilson College in the spring of 2015, having majored in Environmental Policy and minored in Spanish and Outdoor Leadership. Since graduation, Marissa has been working as an advocacy organizer with environmental organizations like Climate Reality Project and Food & Water Watch. In the



years to come, Marissa hopes to continue to develop a career in environmental organizing and social justice work, which may lead to her pursuit of a graduate degree in Environmental Policy and Law. Marissa also plans to dedicate some time to traveling and studying herbalism.

I. INTRODUCTION

The most powerful metric for a changing climate is water. Devastating droughts in the American west, saline intrusion in Vietnam, receding glaciers in the Andes, and the recent typhoon in Vanuatu all serve as visceral reminders of dramatic global change. Each year, communities around the world better understand the connection between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and severe climatic events. However, one vital connection fails to be widely and explicitly named: climate change is about the management of water. The examples above speak to the varying degrees to which water is affected by this global phenomenon. Be it too much, too little, too fast, or too slow, water distribution becomes the crux of adaptation and mitigation plans. Therefore, creating resilient systems in the face of climate change necessitates the responsible management of water.

Unfortunately, the global political landscape lacks an effective supranational framework through which to address emerging issues in water management. Such a structure would support the creation of resilient water systems and would facilitate discussions regarding climate change. Namely, a supranational water governance framework would help meet four fundamental requirements of water management in the face of climate change. Firstly, it would provide funding opportunities for nations to construct more resilient water infrastructure. Secondly, it would establish methods of accountability for countries regarding basic water needs. Thirdly, it would promote the development of context-specific, equitable, and culturally competent water systems. Lastly, if nations fail to reach agreements regarding transboundary and international water conflicts, such a framework would facilitate negotiation.

Conflicts arising from water will certainly become more prolific in an era of climate change. As systems are developed to avoid widespread water crises, it is critical that the multifaceted

nature of the hydrosocial cycle¹ be deeply understood and carefully considered. Water-related conflicts have defined social and political dynamics for millennia. As a result, there are several fascinating historical and contemporary examples of water conflict that could prove useful in the development of future water management mechanisms. The explosive 2001 water wars in Cochabamba, Bolivia have become a widely known cautionary tale of poor water management. The complex circumstances that precipitated the water wars in Bolivia provide an interesting case study and, when analyzed properly, offer insight into the requirements of responsible and viable water management systems. What many do not realize is that the roots of water conflict in Cochabamba reach far beyond the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and large-scale privatization regimes of the 1990s. When considering social relationships to water, regardless of the specific context, the inquiry must begin in the distant past. In Bolivia, cultural relationships to water (in addition to many other resources) have been shaped by hundreds of years of accumulation by dispossession.²

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BOLIVIAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION

Prior to the colonial period, the Quechua, Aymara, and Incan peoples employed distinct methods of resource management. The term “vertical archipelago” speaks to the social organization of

¹Jamie Linton and Jessica Budds, “The Hydrosocial Cycle: Defining and Mobilizing a Relational-dialectical Approach to Water,” *Geoforum* 57 (2014): 170–180. Linton and Budds root the “hydrosocial cycle” in the broader context of political ecology, defining it as “a socio-natural process by which water and society make and remake each other. Unlike the hydrologic cycle, the hydrosocial cycle reflects water’s social nature. The concept directs attention to how water is produced and how it is made known.”

²David Harvey, “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession,” *The Social Register* 40 (2004): 74. In elaborating upon the Marxist notion of primitive accumulation, Harvey puts forth the theory of accumulation by dispossession. In essence, this concept speaks to the commodification and privatization of the commons, resulting in consolidation of power and the exploitation of land, labor, and communities.

resources in Incan and Andean civilizations that led to the specialization of agriculture in different ecological niches throughout the Andes (including modern day Bolivia), as well as the trade and distribution of agricultural goods.³ Under Incan rule, the region saw tremendous agricultural expansion. Labor-intensive canals and terraces altered the landscape and the lives of Andean peoples.⁴ This infrastructure was generally managed collectively.⁵ Traditional configurations for resource distribution and trade were deeply ingrained in the concept of *ayni*, a Quechua word for reciprocity.

Water was considered to be alive by Andean people, and the value of *ayni* is particularly important in the discussion of traditional water management.⁶ Indigenous communities abided by “uses and customs,” which represent the “communitarian indigenous customary law” that presided over land and water.⁷ Under uses and customs, water sources were defined in three distinct categories: common waters, *mita* waters, and *largadas*. “Common waters” referred to water sources freely available for agricultural use during the rainy season. *Mita* waters, generally sourced from springs and rivers, were distributed on a rotating basis, making water available to families every 23rd or 24th day. *Largadas* were water sources used by multiple communities, and therefore required multi-group management.⁸ Water was viewed as both a right and a gift.⁹ These beliefs shaped the way water was managed. It was clear that the precious resource was not something to be sold or other-

³Sarah Hines, “Water Issues in Cochabamba” (presentation, International Honors Program Climate Change, Cochabamba, Bolivia, April 21, 2014).

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Elizabeth Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization, and Conflict: Women from the Cochabamba Valley,” *Global Issues Paper*, no. 4 (2004): 27.

⁶Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 27.

⁷Nicole Fabricant and Kathryn Hicks, “Bolivia’s Next Water War: Historicizing the Struggles over Access to Water Resources in the Twenty-First Century,” *Radical History Review*, no. 116 (2013): 132.

⁸Hines, “Water Issues in Cochabamba”; Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 27.

⁹Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 27; Oscar Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” *Multinational Monitor*, June, 2000, 16.

wise commodified.¹⁰

Via the *encomienda* system, implemented under the Spanish crown, indigenous Andeans were introduced to the Western paradigm of markets and the subsequent valuation of goods.¹¹ Silver fueled the colonial agenda in Bolivia, transforming the city of Potosí into the “world’s largest industrial complex in the 16th century.”¹² Over the course of Spanish occupation, the mine in Potosí—called Cerro Rico—produced nearly 2 billion ounces of silver. Since its opening in the 1600s, the mine has claimed the lives of approximately 8 million miners, many of whom were indigenous slaves.¹³ As colonialism led to mass violations of both traditional beliefs and of the indigenous peoples themselves, it comes as no surprise that Bolivia was the first country in South America to rebel against Spanish occupation.¹⁴ However, because of its abundant slave labor and one of the world’s most productive mines, Spain would not let Bolivia out of its grasp easily. Despite early resistance, Bolivia did not win independence from Spain until 1825, making it the last South American country to do so.¹⁵

Spanish colonization was but the first chapter in Bolivia’s “modern” history of accumulation by dispossession. Spanish rule, with but a brief intermission, transitioned into a new era of colonialism: contemporary corporate exploitation fueled by Western nations. The vulnerable post-colonial state of Bolivia made this transition easy.¹⁶ Upon gaining independence, the country was overwhelmed by political instability and economic collapse.

¹⁰ Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 16.

¹¹ Hines, “Water Issues in Cochabamba.”

¹² Dan Collyns, “Bolivia’s Cerro Rico Mines Killed My Husband. Now They Want My Son,” *Guardian*, June 24, 2014, accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jun/24/bolivia-cerro-rico-mine-mountain-collapse-miners>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Benjamin Dangl, *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia*. (Edinburgh, UK: AK Press, 2007), 19.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 107.

Working to eradicate the legacy of colonization, Bolivian nationals attempted to rebuild the country as a sovereign nation.¹⁷ Over the next 113 years, Bolivia lost a war to every one of its neighboring states—ceding land in each defeat.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Spanish-American War of 1898 ended Spain's colonial presence in the Western hemisphere.¹⁹ The withdrawal of Spain from “the new world” paved the way for initial incursions of U.S. corporate power in Latin America. As Benjamin Dangl aptly noted:

The logos of Coca-Cola, Nestle, Ford, and the United States Fruit Company were the flags of the new colonizers. In this form of re-colonization, Washington used military regimes to usher in new economic policies, which facilitated US Corporate exploitation.²⁰

In response to neo-colonial influences and in hopes of finally securing popular control over the country's resources, Bolivians advocated for the nationalization of industry. From 1932 to 1938, Bolivia was confronted with yet another war in which they ceded land to a bordering country, in this case, Paraguay.²¹ Out of the Chaco War, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was born. Most notably, allegiances between campesinos²² and miners developed. The party brought together the urban and rural working class, indigenous communities, students, and facets of the privileged elite. Throughout the next decade, miners and campesinos collaborated strategically in order to organize a series of national strikes. They called for pay raises, improved working conditions,

¹⁷Ibid., 89-117.

¹⁸Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia and The Bolivian Government” (lecture, International Honors Program Climate Change, La Paz, Bolivia, April 14, 2014); Klein, *Concise History of Bolivia*, 101.

¹⁹Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 23.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 101, 174.

²²A Spanish word referring to rural, low-income farmers.

and fair access to education and land, and in doing so they effectively halted commerce in parts of the country. The MNR continued to materialize as a result of these revolts, promoting Marxist ideology in response to indigenous and working-class exploitation.²³

In the 1951 election, the MNR finally acquired some formal political power. The party's candidate, Victor Paz Estenssoro, emerged victorious, though the victory was short lived. The military state refused to acknowledge the electoral results. After nearly a year of outrage and organizing, the MNR seized control of the country in April of 1952.²⁴ Estenssoro's presidency would prove extremely important in the shaping of Bolivia's history and the management of its resources. Upon taking office, Estenssoro granted all Bolivian adults the right to vote. In doing so, the indigenous masses were finally recognized in the electorate. Moreover, Estenssoro nationalized the mines. While these actions satisfied some of the demands of the MNR, significant redistribution of land and power never came to pass.²⁵ By failing to meaningfully reallocate national resources, the party began to undermine the marginalized people from which it was founded. Due to attempts to manage wide-scale collapse and the economic repercussions of nationalizing the mines, inflation skyrocketed from 1952 to 1956.²⁶

Just over a year after taking office, Estenssoro began negotiating with the United States and implementing policies encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).²⁷ In 1953, after striking a deal with the US regarding the purchasing of some the country's mineral reserves, the US doubled its Bolivian aid.²⁸ Furthermore, Bolivia started receiving "the highest rate of food aid per capita in the world...[consequently] becoming

²³Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 19-20.

²⁴Ibid., 20.

²⁵Ibid., 21-22.

²⁶Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 216.

²⁷Ibid., 217; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 22.

²⁸Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 217.

dependent on US funds for a third of her total budget.”²⁹ Simultaneously, in 1956, Estenssoro received a bailout from the IMF. While IMF loans were not yet conditional on privatization, they did promote international business agendas and change the makeup on the MNR to include more “corporate and political elites.”³⁰ The integration of such interests into the MNR continued to alienate the working class from the party, while further exposing Bolivia to US exploitation. The United States required Bolivia to draft a new investment code that invited private US investors to capitalize on Bolivian petroleum reserves. Furthermore, in exchange for aid, the US insisted Bolivia reestablish a strong military presence. They complied. Soon thereafter, in 1964, a military coup overthrew the government.³¹

For nearly the next two decades, the country was overwhelmed by military dictatorships, experiencing the most coups of any country in Latin American history.³² This political turbulence did not deter the United States from remaining involved. All along, US political and economic motives in Bolivia complemented one another. In the early years of the Cold War, the US initiated its Latin American foreign aid program. As previously discussed, this rendered Bolivia heavily reliant on the US and, therefore, unlikely to succumb to a communist regime.³³ In order to maintain supremacy in Bolivia, the United States became deeply involved in the electoral and political processes across the region.³⁴ Moreover, the United States provided 1,200 Bolivian officers with military training

²⁹James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia 1952-82* (London, UK: Verso, 1984), 18.

³⁰Benjamin H. Kohl and Linda C. Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2006), 49; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 22.

³¹Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 119, 222; Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 49-50.

³²Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 50; Ledebur, “Bolivia and The Bolivian Government.”

³³Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 49-50.

³⁴Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 23.

at the School of the Americas, based in Fort Benning, Georgia.³⁵ Among their graduates was Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer, who orchestrated the “bloodiest” post-revolution coup and controlled the country from 1971 to 1978 and again in the late 90s.³⁶ Mission Condor, facilitated by the CIA and the US Secretary of State in the 1970s, used violent means in order to further insulate Latin America from Communist influence. In its implementation, leaders of leftist movements and governments were assassinated, and the region was consumed by a state of fear and violence.³⁷

The late 1970s propelled Bolivia into disastrous economic circumstances. Inflation of OPEC petroleum prices and collapse in the value of tin resulted in “a bankrupt public sector and a deeply depressed private economy.”³⁸ Bolivia entered a state of hyperinflation in the mid 80s, reaching inflation levels of 20,000% by 1985.³⁹ Correspondingly, the IMF deemed the country insolvent and the WB refused to lend any money to Bolivia.⁴⁰ With its economy in such a dire state, civil society suffered greatly. In a desperate position, the president followed the advice of the IMF, WB, and the US and began to undergo a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1984.⁴¹ By privatizing industry, weakening trade barriers, dismantling regulations, granting corporate tax breaks, slashing the national budget, and otherwise radically reducing the government’s role in the market, the Bolivian economy was transformed.⁴² Annual inflation rates of 20,000% were reduced to 9% soon after the SAP was implemented, making Bolivia the global poster-child for

³⁵ Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 50.

³⁶ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 229, 239; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 30.

³⁷ Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia and The Bolivian Government,” 2014; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 26.

³⁸ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 240.

³⁹ Ibid., 241; Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 61.

⁴⁰ Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 30.

⁴¹ Andrew Nickson and Claudia Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 21 (2002): 102.

⁴² Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 25.

“successful” neoliberal reforms.⁴³

Such drastic reductions in inflation were inexorably accompanied by dramatic social consequence. In 1985, prior to the implementation of the SAP, 60% of the country's population was employed by the state.⁴⁴ Measures were taken to “protect” the Bolivian people by making temporary jobs available to thousands.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, 20% of Bolivians were left unemployed, including some 25,000 miners.⁴⁶ High levels of unemployment prompted mass migrations to both peri-urban and coca-growing regions, increasing pressures on municipal government systems.⁴⁷ In the years following the adoption of the SAP, Bolivian people continued to suffer. Despite the fact that structural adjustment introduced women into the working class, 70% of the population remained under the poverty line, with an average annual income lingering around \$1,000. The first full decade of neoliberal policies observed economic growth rates of just 4.2%, while the population climbed 2.4%.⁴⁸ Regardless of how widely celebrated the Bolivian SAP was by Western nations, international financial institutions, and some of the Bolivian elite, the economic reforms did not considerably benefit the Bolivian people. As a matter of fact, the SAP and its corresponding policies set the stage for neoliberal resistance and new waves of social mobilization in the 21st century, including the Cochabamban water wars.

However, the roots of resistance begin far before the liberalization of Bolivian markets. The country's modern history tells a story of accumulation by dispossession at the hands of its Spanish colonizers, its neighboring countries, corrupt Bolivian politicians,

⁴³Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 61.

⁴⁴Oscar Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 16.

⁴⁵Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 14.

⁴⁶Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 246; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 30.

⁴⁷Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 246; Francesca Minelli, “Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia: The Case of Cochabamba's Comités De Agua.” (*DADA Rivista Di Antropologia Post-globale*, 2012), 63.

⁴⁸Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 21-22; Nickson and Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation,” 108-109.

and imposed corporate powers. Bolivia's complex relationship with its resources, and the many powers that have tried to control them, construct the nation's political ecology. In short,

Those in power have used repression to sustain a system of exploitation that keeps labor cheap, land in the hands of few and natural resources open for colonial and corporate looting. The region is currently recovering from dictatorships and destructive economic policies introduced during the Cold War. Before looking at Bolivia at the turn of the 21st century, it is important to understand the recent history from which the region is emerging. In many ways, current social movements are a result of state oppression and failed economic policies.⁴⁹

In understanding Bolivia's history, and the power dynamics that define it, the Cochabamban water wars of 2001 can be examined within the context of the country's rich and elaborate past.

III. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN COCHABAMBA

Water is not a substitutable commodity; water is life. For Cochabambinos in the year 2000, the connection between water access and quality of life became particularly pronounced. The simple statement "water is life" transformed from an unequivocal truth into a war cry. While privatization was the flagship of inequity in the Cochabamban water wars, the conflict was convoluted by the city's history of municipal water management; the prevalence of alternative, community-based water systems; and the myriad of stakeholders involved in the discussion. Cochabamba's water crisis makes clear the complexity of managing water and the factors that need to be considered when attempting to do so. Furthermore, critical analysis of the Cochabamban water wars prompts the conversation of water management to push past the public/private binary

⁴⁹Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 23

in hopes of developing comprehensive, resilient water systems. The analysis begins with delving into the systems that were in place prior to privatization, in addition to the aspects of the concession agreement that later catalyzed water conflict in the valley.

Although inflation dropped drastically and the country observed economic growth in the 1990s, Bolivia accumulated \$6.6 billion in foreign debt by the year 2000.⁵⁰ Just a few years prior, in 1996, the WB offered the country \$600 million in debt relief. However, this offer was contingent upon the Bolivian government agreeing to privatize Cochabamba's municipal water system.⁵¹ Needless to say, intense external pressure from the WB broadcast the seeds of water injustice in the valley of Cochabamba. The people's political voice was further jeopardized on August 21, 1999, when Bolivian president Hugo Banzer issued a supreme decree, effectively placing Cochabamba's Municipal water service, Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (SEMAPA), up for sale without popular agreement.⁵² In doing so, Banzer deliberately undermined the agency of the communities to benefit from the privatization of the water sector. Privatization was seen as a way to secure WB finances, ease financial burden on the Bolivian state, reduce government corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, finance large-scale water infrastructure expansion, and remedy the many problems SEMAPA was experiencing.

Municipal Water Services

Prior to the privatization process, the Cochabamba Valley had been struggling with chronic issues of water scarcity upwards of 50 years.⁵³ This could largely be explained by geography, rapid population growth, and widespread poverty. The water law passed in 1942 established that local governments were responsible for providing water services to their urban residents, but SEMA-

⁵⁰"Bolivia—Leasing the Rain," PBS, June 1, 2002, accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/didyouknow.html>.

⁵¹Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 60.

⁵²Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 4.

⁵³Oscar Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 16.

PA wasn't founded until 1967. From its inception, SEMAPA was plagued with problems. Water services in Cochabamba were among the worst in the country. For decades, the city was in a constant state of water rationing, with services only provided for a handful of hours a few times each week. Ten years after agreeing to water quality standards put forth by the World Health Organization and the Panamerican Health Organization, SEMAPA still failed to comply with the minimum safety requirements.⁵⁴ Moreover, after thirty years of water management, SEMAPA only serviced between 55–57% of urban Cochamambinos.⁵⁵ This is largely explained by the relatively low municipal water tariffs in the city, which limited SEMAPA's ability to pay its operational costs, let alone expand water infrastructure. Furthermore, the utility was losing upwards of 50% of municipal water supply due to leakages and clandestine connections. By 1999, SEMAPA had amassed \$30 million in debt.⁵⁶ Lack of investment ability, debt, and the aridity of the valley further exacerbated issues of water quality, quantity, and access.

Political parties became involved in the longstanding water conflict.⁵⁷ In the 1997 election, President Banzer pledged that he would address the crisis by finally moving forward with the construction of the Misicuni Dam, which had long been seen as the silver-bullet solution to persistent water issues in Cochabamba. This dam, first proposed in the 1960s, would theoretically provide Cochabamban residents with fresh mountain water via a 12.5 mile long tunnel, connecting the valley to the dam and reservoir above. The Misicuni Dam would stand nearly 400 feet tall and was predicted to supply drinking water to five municipalities and 25,000 acres of irrigation land, all while producing 120 MW of hydraulic power. The dam construction was estimated at \$300 million.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 101.

⁵⁵Ibid., 104; Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 13.

⁵⁶Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 101-105, 111.

⁵⁷Ibid., 113.

⁵⁸Ibid., 105-106.

Comités de Agua

The promise of a new dam was politically salient. Despite the fact that a task force of government entities rallied to make the Masicuni Dam a reality, the project failed to reach fruition because of insufficient finances. In response, communities around Cochabamba were forced to find other ways to meet their water needs. *Comités de agua*, small cooperative water systems, sprang up around Cochabamba, especially in the un-serviced, peri-urban regions. The organization of *comités de agua* was not a new concept but rather the revival of a traditional water management strategy, rooted in concepts of *ayni* and uses and customs.⁵⁹ That being said, their prevalence in Cochabamba swelled as the city experienced rapid population growth towards the end of the 21st century. In the aftermath of the SAP, campesinos, indigenous peoples, and former miners migrated to the outskirts of Cochabamba, particularly concentrating in an unincorporated area called Zona Sur.⁶⁰ By the year 2000, 200 *comités de agua* existed in and around Cochabamba.⁶¹ Though these systems certainly manifested differently, a *comité* was by definition a group that provided

water and [or] sanitation services in which every service user is also a member and co-owner of the organization. It falls to the members, in fact, to provide the money and labor necessary to construct the water system. This means that member has not only the right of access to water but also the right, and duty, to participate in the decision-making and administration of the *comité*.⁶²

Because of their participatory nature, engaging in a *comité* required significant effort and contribution. The poor, proletarian members of *comités* each paid upwards of \$160 simply to buy ma-

⁵⁹Minelli, "Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia," 64.

⁶⁰Fabricant and Hicks, "Bolivia's Next Water War," 134.

⁶¹Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 25.

⁶²Minelli, "Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia," 65.

terials required for the construction of water systems.⁶³ Even after these initial expenses, many families paid between \$2–5 per month to use the systems, despite the fact that they often provided a small portion of a household’s monthly water demand.⁶⁴ In Zona Sur, for instance, comités provided merely 22.4% of water supply, while an additional 62.2% was purchased via private water trucks known as aguateros, largely due to poor quality or availability of comité water.⁶⁵ Because of their reliance on aguateros and the high costs of comité participation, families in low-income areas of Cochabamba paid disproportionately high rates for water, between 5–10 times more than those serviced by SEMAPA directly. As a result, water accounted for up to 5% of average family expenses.⁶⁶

Procuring water from communal water systems and aguateros required much more than financial contributions alone. The organizational framework applied by the comités was rooted in “the traditional Andean direct democracy model,” which required a great deal of cooperation.⁶⁷ Members were required to participate in general assembly, construction, maintenance, administration, protests, and more. Failure to contribute sufficiently resulted in fines, payable by either money or labor. The consequences for inadequate participation and missing payments differed from comité to comité, but they could be as severe as the permanent termination of services.⁶⁸ Beyond the time commitment required to participate in a comité, families also had to engage in the time-intensive task of purchasing water from aguateros. The water vendors were notorious for their inconvenient service times, requiring families to get up in the early hours of the morning in order to secure water

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 60.

⁶⁵Minelli, “Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia,” 66; Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 13.

⁶⁶Emily Achtenberg and Rebel Currents, “From Water Wars to Water Scarcity: Bolivia’s Cautionary Tale.” NACLA, June 5, 2013, accessed April 5, 2015; Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 13.

⁶⁷Minelli, “Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia,” 64.

⁶⁸Ibid., 64, 67.

for the coming days.⁶⁹ Despite their challenges, comités de agua not only managed to provide much-needed services in peri-urban areas, but they also played an imperative role in the water wars.⁷⁰

The Concession Agreement

Given the poor services provided by SEMAPA, the need for costly investments in the Misicuni Dam and infrastructure expansion to peri-urban areas, and the financial assistance offered by international monetary institutions, privatizing the water system in Cochabamba seemed pragmatic. Prior to putting SEMAPA up for bid, the government arranged for the concession agreement to include the financing of the Misicuni Dam, thereby acting on Banzer's political commitment. While privatization seemed promising it many ways, "pervasive corruption and irregularities marked the privatization process from the very beginning."⁷¹ According to Bolivian law, at least three parties needed to make an offer in order for an auction to be valid. However, only one consortium, Aguas del Tunari (AdT), submitted a bid for SEMAPA. Instead of holding another bidding session, as they were legally obligated to do, the water service regulator granted AdT a 40-year concession contract on September 3, 1999.⁷² This multinational conglomerate was made up of six companies. Bechtel, an American corporation, was the majority shareholder, controlling 55% of the consortium. The Spanish company of Abengoa held the second largest share, totaling 25%. The remainder of the conglomerate was made up of four Bolivian companies, each responsible for a 5% share.

Bechtel is most widely associated with the water wars and, for good reason, is generally considered most responsible for the water crisis. Bechtel has a reputation as the world's largest construction company and one of the wealthiest corporations on the planet.⁷³ While Bechtel is involved in 140 countries around the world,

⁶⁹Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 13.

⁷⁰Minelli, "Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia," 65.

⁷¹Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 4.

⁷²Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 107.

⁷³Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 61.

the company is best known for constructing the Hoover Dam, the US military base in Vietnam, and for its recent involvement in the rebuilding infrastructure in Iraq. Despite Bechtel's tremendous wealth, AdT was only willing to sign the concession agreement if it were based on full cost recovery. In essence, this means that their investments would need to be financed by ratepayers, as opposed to their corporate shareholders.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the company was guaranteed a 15–17% return on their investment. For frame of reference, a similar agreement in the United States would likely yield a 3–4% return.⁷⁵ These provisions regarding cost recovery and high return levels would inevitably place a heavy economic burden on many Cochabambinos. Although the contract only permitted initial tariff increases of 35%, water bills skyrocketed in the first few months of new management.⁷⁶ The WB exacerbated the financial difficulty by strongly discouraging the Bolivian government from subsidizing water tariffs.⁷⁷

A last piece that set the groundwork for water strife in Cochabamba was Law 2029. This law was passed by the central government in October, one month before SEMAPA handed operations over to AdT. The Bolivian Constitution of 1993 dictated that all natural resources would be owned by the state.⁷⁸ In order to forge a legal path for privatization in the country, Law 2029 specified rules and regulations for the privatization process.⁷⁹ The newly established privatization protocol catered to international business interests and dismissed the needs of the people. For instance, Law 2029 facilitated the dollarization of water tariffs, which meant that regardless of Bolivian inflation, ratepayers were required to pay their bills in the boliviano equivalent of a fixed price expressed in US dollars.⁸⁰ It also granted exclusivity rights to private consor-

⁷⁴Ibid., 4, 20.

⁷⁵Ibid., 17.

⁷⁶Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 107.

⁷⁷Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 17.

⁷⁸Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 103.

⁷⁹Kohl and Farthing, *Impasse in Bolivia*, 162.

⁸⁰Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 16.

tiums in saying that,

No natural or legally recognized entity, public or private, civil or non-profit association, business, cooperative or of any other nature shall provide safe drinking water or sewage services in the conceded zones without proper permission given by the Basic Sanitation Superintendence.⁸¹

Between the peculiar provisions agreed upon in the concession agreement and the promulgation of Law 2029, AdT was effectively given *carte blanche* over water resources in Cochabamba.

IV. “THE WATER IS OURS, DAMMIT”: THE COCHABAMBAN WATER WARS

Upon taking control of Cochabamba’s water and sanitation services in November, AdT announced the seizure of all non-centralized water systems.⁸² This was to be implemented prior to connecting un-serviced areas to the network.⁸³ Subsequently, peri-urban communities were stripped of their traditional uses and customs and their water supply. *Comités* were joined in their indignation by campesinos across the region, who also felt as though their traditional and rightful water uses were under threat from the concession. Together, indigenous and farming communities across the valley began to mobilize in AdT’s early months of operation. On December 28, 1999, 15,000–20,000 protesters gathered in the center of the Cochabamba.⁸⁴ Among them was Oscar Olivera, who emerged as the primary leader of the quickly growing resistance against AdT. Soon, the campesinos and indigenous peoples were joined en masse by Cochabambinos across cultural, socioeconomic, and geographic boundaries.

On January 1, 2000 AdT implemented tariff hikes. As pre-

⁸¹Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 20.

⁸²Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 17.

⁸³Nickson and Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation,” 111.

⁸⁴Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 17-18

viously mentioned, the utility was approved to raise rates by up to 35%. Although reported rate hikes vary, tariffs were increased 30–400% for households within the city.⁸⁵ Such dramatic rates would likely cause upheaval anywhere, but they were especially potent in Bolivia—one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere.⁸⁶ In a country with an average per capita income of just \$1,000, these hikes forced some families to pay 20–30% of their net income on their water bills.⁸⁷ The severity of the problem is well articulated by one Cochabamban woman:

You can still live if you use significantly less electricity. You can find alternative transportation if the fares go up. You can live without a telephone or a plane trip and even when basic food costs go up, women find ways to save and keep their families well fed within their limited possibilities. But when the cost of water goes up immeasurably and inexplicably, and when the right of use and property of water sources upon which community life and daily family life depend are affected, the problem becomes one of life or death.⁸⁸

In light of these tremendously difficult circumstances, many families were simply unable to pay their water bills, and refusal to pay became a tactic of protest.⁸⁹

Mobilization intensified in the first weeks of the new millennium. In response, police presence grew. In the early weeks of

⁸⁵Ibid.; Nickson and Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation,” 111; Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 20.

⁸⁶Ledebur, “Bolivia and The Bolivian Government.”

⁸⁷Elisabeth Rosenthal, “In Bolivia, Water and Ice Tell of Climate Change,” *New York Times*, December 14th 2009, accessed April 1, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/science/earth/14bolivia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Fabricant and Hicks, “Bolivia’s Next Water War,” 134.

⁸⁸Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 31.

⁸⁹Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 25; Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 17.

the protests, the government used tear gas on the protesters for the first time in eighteen years. However, by January 10, protesters had successfully shut down the Oruro-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway with comprehensive blockades, threatening commerce countrywide and cutting off access to the local airport.⁹⁰ It was in the best interest of the central government to handle the situation tactfully and quietly so as to not discourage other potential foreign investors. Therefore, on January 13, representatives from the federal government arrived in Cochabamba to discuss making revisions to the contract with some of the movement leaders. The government would not consider lowering tariff rates. However, they suggested that they would amend some of the inflammatory features of Law 2029. In front of the building in which the negotiation was held, police employed punitive measures in order to silence the protesters. The negotiations floundered as the movement's leaders were unwilling to engage in conversation so long as their people were being targeted with police force. Outside, under a large banner reading "El Agua es Nuestra, Carajo" or "The Water is Ours, Dammit," the people remained united. The next day, the government agreed to revise the concession agreement and Law 2029. However, they made no concrete commitments and used vague language to suggest that modifications would not be implemented for months to come. For Cochabambinos, this answer did not suffice. Protests raged on:

Thousands and thousands of people, young people, even children, high society women and women in t-shirts, old men without any more arms than their indignation and their voice of protest, faces painted with baking soda and many covering their faces with handkerchiefs with vinegar bottles in hand to counter the effects of tear gas... A real world panorama, sounds of shots, shouts, people running, broken bottles in the streets, religious people (nuns) of various churches helping the injured, women

⁹⁰Ibid., 31; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 63.

throwing paper and water out of their windows to reinforce the blockades.⁹¹

In response to the crisis and the growing media attention, water tariffs were reduced 20% on February 3.⁹² Again, the people were not satisfied by such insignificant action. On February 4, Oscar Olivera orchestrated a symbolic and peaceful action, taking over Cochabamba's central plaza.⁹³ The 30,000 people who joined him in the streets were immediately met by 1,000 police in riot gear.⁹⁴ In addition to their usual use of rubber bullets and tear gas, police discharged live ammunition.⁹⁵ Between February 4 and 5, 175 people were injured and another 135 imprisoned.⁹⁶ Out of the violence and chaos came the government's agreement to revise the contract and Law 2029. The government promised to freeze tariff increases until November, when the revision of the contract would be complete. Furthermore, government representatives met with movement leaders who demanded that dollarization be removed, traditional water uses be respected, individual systems be redistributed, and methods of democratic control be clearly established.⁹⁷ While the government entertained some of these ideas, they were unwilling to discuss the complete cancellation of the concession agreement. In the end of March, movement leaders facilitated public meetings and conducted a popular vote. Of 50,000 participants, between 94–98% voted in favor of canceling the contract with AdT.⁹⁸

With the overwhelming support of the masses, Oscar Oli-

⁹¹Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 32.

⁹²Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 110.

⁹³Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 18.

⁹⁴Ibid.; Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 64.

⁹⁵"Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt," PBS, June 1, 2002. Accessed April 29, 2015. <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html>.

⁹⁶Ibid.; Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 110.

⁹⁷Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 18; Nickson and Vargas, "The Limitations of Water Regulation," 110.

⁹⁸Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 18.

vera called for the “final battle” against the water consortium.⁹⁹ On April 4, with actions of solidarity popping up around the country, Cochabambinos entered the streets once more.¹⁰⁰ Protesters again blockaded the roads, but “this time they were better prepared. The people prepared for it like for a war. They prepared Molotov cocktails, barbed wire fences, things to puncture tires, masks, everything.”¹⁰¹ On Thursday, April 6, the government agreed to meet with movement leaders to cancel the concession agreement, but the meeting was a trap. Upon arrival, the central government arrested Olivera and other movement organizers. Additionally, the government rescinded prior statements, claiming to have never considered canceling the concession agreement.¹⁰² With the arrests, the revolts were only further impassioned. The people insisted that their traditional and community water uses, customs, and organization be respected. Moreover, they called for the rejection of the water law, the modification of drinking water and sewage systems, and the absolute termination of the contract with AdT. In an attempt to manage the growing rebellions, the president declared a state of siege (the Bolivian equivalent of martial law) on April 8.¹⁰³

Severe violence occurred on April 8 and 9. Following the declaration of a state of siege, 3,000 riot police flooded the city’s center. Exposed to the violence and injustice, many soldiers and police officers began withdrawing from the street battles, unwilling to take lives in order to “benefit foreign enterprises.”¹⁰⁴ Even the military commander disobeyed his orders to fire at the people.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, six civilians were killed over the course of these two days. In one particularly tragic example, a sniper trained at the School of the Americas shot and killed a 17 year old boy named

⁹⁹Nickson and Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation,” 110.

¹⁰⁰“Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt.”

¹⁰¹Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 18-19.

¹⁰²Ibid; Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 33; “Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt.”

¹⁰³Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 32.

¹⁰⁴Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 33.

¹⁰⁵Olivera, “The Fight for Water Democracy,” 19.

Victor Daza. This action enraged the people tremendously, especially as Daza was not involved in the protest and had simply been walking across the street prior to his murder.

In light of the chaos, violence, and the perseverance of the protesters, AdT agreed to leave the country on April 9.¹⁰⁶ Despite this victory, the future remained unclear and the people remained outraged. The next day, 80,000 demonstrators gathered in the square, threatening to overthrow the government unless they enacted comprehensive water reforms. With mounting pressure, the state officially announced the cancellation of the concession agreement that same day. On April 11, the people removed the blockades, and SEMAPA was reinstated as the regional water manager. However, in its new form SEMAPA was required to involve movement leaders in the decision-making processes of the utility.¹⁰⁷ The protests were not officially disbanded until parliament approved amendments to Law 2029 on April 15.¹⁰⁸

V. DEFINE VICTORY: THE AFTERMATH OF THE WATER WARS

In 1999 and 2000, tens of thousands of Cochabambinos united in the streets, waging war on the privatization of water rights. Their fight represented an important step forward for both the country and the world. The water wars have been foundational in the country's recent efforts to distance itself from neoliberal initiatives and establish itself as a truly sovereign state. Moreover, the conflicts informed global discussions regarding the problems of privatization and the interference of international financial institutions. One cannot dismiss the victory made possible by the power of the people. However, the Cochabamba case study is inaccurately touted as an exemplary situation in which people prevailed over corporate powers in order to create strong, viable systems. Unfortunately, the expulsion of AdT did not solve the pervasive problems that caused Cochabamban water crises in the first place. Fifteen

¹⁰⁶Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 67.

¹⁰⁷Olivera, "The Fight for Water Democracy," 19.

¹⁰⁸Peredo Beltrán, "Water, Privatization and Conflict," 34.

years later, the city is still extremely vulnerable and water insecure. As a matter of fact, some predict that further water wars are on the horizon.¹⁰⁹

Community Water Systems

Community-based water systems are extremely important models of social organizing. In Cochabamba, comités de agua achieved new levels of “water democracy” and encouraged the development of culturally-aware methods of resource management. Their accomplishments continue to influence conversations about water governance beyond the borders of Bolivia. While they highlight the importance of incorporating community-based and culturally grounded systems into future water management strategies, romanticization of these systems can be deeply problematic. Comités de agua alone do not offer sufficient solutions to managing Cochabamba’s water in an era of climate change. Firstly, despite the common discourse regarding community systems, these systems still remain fundamentally private. Involvement requires significant time and financial investment. Furthermore, members are not guaranteed water. Scarcity or failure to meet their responsibilities could lead to the termination of their water services. Even under successful functioning, most participants get the majority of their water from private vendors. This issue is exacerbated by poor infrastructure. Community water systems in Bolivia lose up to 35% of their water as a result of leaks and illegal connections.¹¹⁰ Because of this inefficiency, dependence on private water vendors, and the absence of municipal water systems, the lowest income brackets are paying the most for water. Limited finances make implementing proper water treatment and expanding connections extremely difficult. The situation is further complicated by the fact that many community water systems in Cochabamba are not legally recognized and have relatively limited political power.

Municipal Water Systems

Bolivia remains one of the poorest nations in the Western

¹⁰⁹Fabricant and Hicks, “Bolivia’s Next Water War,” 130-143.

¹¹⁰Achtenberg and Currents, “From Water Wars to Water Scarcity.”

hemisphere. Water infrastructure is costly to maintain and more expensive to expand. Since SEMAPA was reinstituted, the utility has made leaps and bounds at improving the water situation in Cochabamba, but the services are still lacking.¹¹¹

Much of the difficulty SEMAPA has faced, historically and contemporarily, stems from low cost recovery, low efficiency, and high investment cost for municipal water systems.¹¹² In 2010, the company was riddled with financial instability and corruption, having accumulated another \$3,000,000 in debt due to government negligence. Moreover, recent attempts to build the Misicuni Dam and invest in resilient water infrastructure have proven unfeasible. The utility has also failed to improve municipal water quality. Even in water-privileged areas of the city, it takes twenty minutes of treatment for piped water to be safe for drinking and cooking.

Privatized Water Systems

While municipal and community-based water systems will play critical roles in future water governance, privatization is not a viable option for water management, especially with accelerating changes in climate. As frameworks for the future management of water are developed, strategies rooted in neoliberal rationale such as privatization must be avoided. Under current paradigms, privatization is understood to be a sensible method for managing water. The logic argues that water is an

increasingly scarce resource, which must be priced at full economic and environmental cost if it is to be allocated to its highest-value uses, and managed profitably by private companies whose accountability to customers and shareholders is more direct and effective than attenuated political accountability

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Karen Bakker, "The 'Commons' Versus The 'Commodity': Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization And The Human Right To Water In The Global South," *Antipode* Vol. 39, Issue 3 (2007): 430-55.

exercised by citizens via political representatives.¹¹³

Proponents of privatization make compelling arguments. For example, they argue that water should be managed in a way that bypasses government corruption, facilitates the expansion of water services to low-income areas, and sees to the conservation and responsible use of the resource. However, countless case studies prove that such theories hold little weight in application: “In most cases when governments privatize water systems, corporations have failed to implement promised changes in infrastructure, and raised connections and monthly fees beyond most citizens’ budgets.”¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, private water managers service 13% of the world’s population.¹¹⁵

One of the hallmarks of privatization rationale is that market mechanisms will aid in responsible management. Yet, when competition is not a factor and utilities are offered monopolistic circumstances in which to operate, market rationale is nullified. Even still, exclusivity is a foundational provision in concession agreements around the world as it “reduces revenue risk and so encourages private sector participation in projects with high capital costs and long amortization periods.”¹¹⁶ Oftentimes, in order to further encourage investment, concession agreements offer companies exclusive rights to water infrastructure for 30–40 years. Long contracts are necessary for companies because water utilities require the highest level of investment of any utility while providing the lowest rates of returns. Consequently, water utilities have received less investment than any other public utility sector globally.¹¹⁷ Water is a good for which price signals do not function appropriately. Private water services are almost always more expensive than mu-

¹¹³Ibid, 432.

¹¹⁴Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 61.

¹¹⁵Karen Bakker, “Neoliberal Versus Postneoliberal Water: Geographies of Privatization and Resistance,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 103, no. 2 (2013): 256.

¹¹⁶Nickson and Vargas, “The Limitations of Water Regulation,” 112.

¹¹⁷Bakker, “Neoliberal Versus Postneoliberal Water,” 254–255.

nicipal counterparts.¹¹⁸ From a market perspective, a private water distributor would need to either increase its supply or increase the price of the good in order to generate healthy returns and funds to put toward large-scale investment. Especially within the context of climate change, one cannot make the assumption that there would be an infinite or predictable supply of water with which to expand services. Therefore, prices for water will increase.

Furthermore, “a return on investment also requires general economic, political, and social stability over that period; yet, in many developing countries this is far from a given.”¹¹⁹ Contradictory to the fact that political and environmental stability are key aspects of “functioning” private systems, privatization is advertised as being a way to sidestep government corruption. However, privatization still requires government to play a regulatory role. It is up to the state to enforce conditions of concession agreements and to ensure utilities are behaving responsibly: “Rather than de-regulating the water sector, privatization has resulted in a profound re-regulation of the water market and the emergence of a considerable quasi-governmental regulatory structure.”¹²⁰ Clearly, private regimes do not surpass government corruption; they rely on it. They also convolute existing means of democracy and accountability, distorting the avenues through which citizens can advocate for their needs. In the context of climate change, dispossessing people of their water is more problematic than ever.

The story of the Cochabamban water wars and the city’s current water management circumstances demonstrate flaws in the management strategies ranging from privatization to municipal utilities and water cooperatives. Privatization is not a viable option for managing water in an era of climate change. While municipal and cooperative water could play primary roles in the future of water management, these systems are still imperfect and left particularly vulnerable as a result of climate change.

¹¹⁸James Salzman, “Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water,” *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities* 18, no. 3 (2006): 20.

¹¹⁹*Ibid*, 23.

¹²⁰Swyngedouw, “Dispossessing H₂O,” 90.

VI. IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN BOLIVIA

In 2004, Bolivia was responsible for just 0.35% of global carbon dioxide emissions. While the country is among the world's least significant emitters, it suffers some of the most severe effects of climate change.¹²¹ One of the chief climatic concerns for Bolivia is decreased water security. Bolivia is home to 20% of the world's tropical glaciers, which are central in supplying water to Bolivians during the dry season. Now, the dry season is longer and more arid and the glaciers are no longer providing an adequate buffer to compensate for the change. Between 1970 and 2006, Bolivian glaciers shrank by 30%, and melting trends have been accelerating quickly over the past several years. One glacier near the city of El Alto was predicted to disappear by 2020, yet it vanished in 2009.¹²² A study conducted by the WB in 2008 determined melting glaciers in the Andes could "threaten the existence of 100 million people."¹²³ With regard to food production, 90% of Bolivian farmland receives water solely from precipitation, aquifers, and glacier runoff. In addition to the loss of glacial water resources, the country will likely experience a 30% reduction in precipitation.¹²⁴ Reduced rainfall, the absence of glaciers, and rising temperatures have lowered water levels in Lake Titicaca, upon which 2.6 million people depend, by nearly a meter.¹²⁵ People throughout Latin America will face the alarming consequences of a warming planet. According to the IPCC, 60% of Latin America will experience drier conditions, leading to the desertification of 50% of the region's agricultural lands.¹²⁶ Even within

¹²¹Christian Winters, "Impact of Climate Change on the Poor in Bolivia," *Global Majority E-Journal* 3, no. 1 (2012): 36.

¹²²Fabricant and Hicks, "Bolivia's Next Water War," 139.

¹²³Rosenthal, "In Bolivia, Water and Ice Tell of Climate Change."

¹²⁴Christopher A. Scott et al., "Water Security and Adaptive Management in the Arid Americas," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 103, no. 2 (2013): 286; Winters, "Impact of Climate Change on the Poor in Bolivia," 41.

¹²⁵Achtenberg and Currents, "From Water Wars to Water Scarcity," 2013; Climate Justice, "Predictions for Climate Change in Bolivia," Class Lecture, International Honors Program Climate Change, Cochabamba, Bolivia, April 30, 2014.

¹²⁶Scott et al., "Water Security and Adaptive Management in the Arid Americas," 284.

the context of these regional predictions, Cochabamba is expected to become particularly arid and water scarce.¹²⁷

The political and ecological ramifications of the aforementioned projections will be astronomical. Some predict the Bolivian city of El Alto to be the first large urban center to collapse as a consequence of water insecurity.¹²⁸ Perhaps Cochabamba and other Bolivian cities will follow if appropriate precautions are not taken. Future water conflict in Bolivia will be of “a dual cause: climate change and greater competition. The result is an extremely grave threat to this culture.”¹²⁹ Climate change will lead to a heightened cost of living and will expedite revolt among the world’s poorest and most marginalized communities.¹³⁰ This sentiment is reinforced by climate scientist Dirk Hoffmann, who specializes in Bolivian climate change: “These are populations at the brink of surviving anyway, and then you have the extra stress of climate change, and you have huge social problems.”¹³¹ This could be particularly true in Bolivia. “Given the combative nature of Bolivia’s social movements, popular and regional conflicts over water shortages, and their impact on Bolivia’s water politics, [future conflicts] could be far more explosive than the Cochabamba Water War.”¹³² One can only hope that future conflict will be avoided. The creation of a supranational water management framework could be a major step in preventing and addressing water crises caused by climate change and competition.

VII. SEEKING SOLUTIONS: SUPRANATIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF WATER MANAGEMENT

The current water crisis has been described as a “crisis of water governance” rooted in poverty, power

¹²⁷Peredo Beltrán, “Water, Privatization and Conflict,” 13.

¹²⁸Fabricant and Hicks, “Bolivia’s Next Water War,” 141.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 139.

¹³⁰Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 58.

¹³¹Rosenthal, “In Bolivia, Water and Ice Tell of Climate Change,” 2009.

¹³²Achtenberg and Currents, “From Water Wars to Water Scarcity.”

and inequality. Nevertheless water governance is a vague concept that invites a variety of sometimes contradictory policy recommendations. The principle difficulty being that it is often presented as a depoliticized technical instrument transferring so the focus from rights and entitlements to efficiency and sustainability [sic] A different approach to water governance (water democracy) concentrates instead on distributive fairness, involvement of all actors in policy making and acknowledgement of social, cultural, and traditional rights.¹³³

Communities around the world have successfully managed water for millennia. However, accumulation by dispossession (through vehicles such as colonialism, state corruption, and neoliberalism) has imposed ideology onto water management that limits community empowerment and control over this crucial resource, and the reality of water inequity becomes even more apparent in an era of climate change. These injustices underscore the importance of creating a supranational framework of water governance which would support equitable and resilient water systems. However, in order to be successful in co-creating these systems, this framework would need to diverge from the failures of past methods of water management and international governance. Over the last century, the IMF and the WB have applied one-size-fits-all policies across broad contexts without critically considering the political, cultural, and environmental implications of their recommendations. Moreover, many western nations have used neoliberalism in order to advance their own political agendas. The case study of the Cochabamban water wars proves that “when a new management regime fails to respect popular conceptions and expectations, it will fail.” Therefore, new methods of water management must align with the needs and experiences of the people, which are often rooted in history and culture. In addition to highlighting the importance of history, culture, and power dynamics in water management, the

¹³³Minelli, “Communitarian Water Management in Bolivia,” 61-62.

Cochabamban case study also questions what successful water governance may look like internationally.

The nascent role for a supranational water governance framework is clear. A structure is necessary through which countries around the world could meaningfully address issues of climate change to create resilient water systems. Bolivia is joined by many nations in its struggle to finance public water systems. While water infrastructure is costly, it is essential that it be appropriately funded. Given the political and economic strife that can result from limited water access, investing in resilient water systems should be among the top global priorities for climate adaptation and mitigation. In providing financial resources for countries to construct robust water infrastructure, a supranational governance framework could help avoid massive conflict. However, to some degree, water conflicts will be inevitable. This inevitability is hard to deny given numbers like those released by UNESCO, which project that “47% of the world population will be living in areas of high water stress and...more than two thirds of the world population may still be without improved sanitation” by 2030.¹³⁴

While some water conflict can be expected, a supranational water management framework could also initiate mechanisms of accountability which hold governments responsible for providing water for their people, thereby decreasing the chances of pervasive water struggles. Furthermore, this framework could facilitate dialogue between nations involved in transboundary water conflict. Most importantly, future water management structures would promote the development of context-specific and culturally competent water systems. Unlike past schemes, such a framework would be separate from organizations like the IMF, WB, WTO, and other Western agendas. Rather than applying overly broad policies, this supranational structure would support countries in developing their own contextually rooted systems. This far-reaching and inclusive organization would bring together diverse players and ensure

¹³⁴Adam D. Link, “The Perils of Privatization: International Developments and Reform in Water Distribution,” *Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal* 22, no. 2 (2010): 379.

that communities have what is required for them to build resilient and successful systems in the face of global uncertainty and change revolving around water.

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Spiral of Life by Maya Heubner, 2013, woodcut.

#Latinx: Rejecting Representation and Reclaiming Identity Through Social Media

Abstract:

This paper contributes to an increasingly relevant scholarly body of research and literature on Latina identity in the United States by analyzing the extent to which American media portrayals of Latina women are rejected and reappropriated through social media platforms in the reclamation of a diverse Latina identity. This identity takes shape through the construction of an active and supportive community under the new, innovative, and inclusive tag, #Latinx, online. Through a comprehensive examination based on participant observation of social media sites, quantitative data obtained through a survey questionnaire, as well as qualitative survey response data obtained from 650 self-identified Latinx, the use of social media in reflecting and rejecting stereotypes and misconceptions of Latina women is discussed. Drawing from the evidence and analysis of this material, it is asserted that hyper-sexualized representations of Latina women in American media are discussed and rejected by the Latinx community in digitalspaces of social interaction. Through these spaces young Latinx instead, voice their frustrations, question their experiences, and demonstrate group solidarity in the formation of a shared, yet diverse Latinx identity. This analysis concludes that the growing Latinx community online is rejecting stereotypes in an effort to reclaim their Latinidad from the popular media portrayals that seek to fetishize, homogenize, and contain them. In so doing, this community demonstrates the relevance of social media networks as an important site of identity construction and the experience of contemporary social life, and simultaneously reflects the importance of recognizing the diversity and fluidity of Latinx identities in the United States.

Christina Brown | Global Studies



Christina graduated in 2015 with a degree in Global Studies and Spanish. While these interests were originally inspired by her travels in Peru and Nicaragua, Christina's passion was piqued when she sought to better understand the diverse Latino/a/x cultural identities here in the United States. Since graduating, she has been serving as an AmeriCorps member with Asheville Area Habitat for Humanity. As a construction site supervisor, Christina leads groups of volunteers building much needed affordable housing for the greater Asheville area.

I. INTRODUCTION

“You can’t create new words,” one Tumblr user posts in response to the increasing use of the term “Latinx” on social media and micro-blogs.¹ Pointedly yet eloquently, bloggers of the page *ThisIsNotLatinx* respond, “Yes, actually we can....Languages change as the culture and people change.”² As these micro-bloggers reflect, “Latinx” is much more than a word. It is an evolving culture, it is a diverse people, and it is a communal language of individuals expressing and constructing their identities on social media. This, and other such micro-blogs on the social media networks of Twitter, Tumblr, and Facebook are increasingly being used as platforms of important contemporary social interactions among self-identified Latinx individuals in shaping their personal experiences. This space is marked by female identified Latinx bloggers rejecting stereotyped representations of Latina women, and simultaneously reclaiming this identity from the hyper-sexualized homogeneity as it has been appropriated in popular media. Through social media, these Latinx women are able to voice their frustrations, find solidarity, and participate in the construction of an active, diverse online community. I propose that exploring these digital spaces of social life through which young Latinx women in the US reflect, reject, and reappropriate the trope of the Latina female in American popular media will contribute to a larger discourse on the construction of the Latinx identity, or *Latinidad*, in the US.

Throughout this research I discovered multi-faceted reasons why the term “Latinx” is used so heavily on social media. It is first and foremost a term used to reflect those living in the Latin American diaspora of the US. However, the increasingly popular use of this term in the construction of identity for young people of Latin American heritage living in the US points to a globally relevant shift away from border-bound identities towards the formation of a more transnational community. The Latinx identity is claimed by individuals from diverse racial and national backgrounds as a

¹Brianna, “FAQ,” *ThisisnotLatinx* (blog), Feb 4, 2014 (9:36pm), <http://thisisnot-latinx.tumblr.com/faq#5>.

²*Ibid.*

means of opening up a space in the US for the recognition of that diversity alongside the commonalities that accompany how one experiences their Latinidad or Latinx identity.

In addition to shaping this cultural shift, the term replaces “Latina” and “Latino” with the intentionally gender neutral “x” in an act of language innovation that allows the community to open itself to all identities within and outside of the binary. This research focuses primarily on the female identified individuals within this community, and as such heavily employs the gendered term “Latina” to identify those individuals. However, the Latinx community on social media is employing that space for empowering dialogue addressing and challenging many complex societal norms and representations related to gender binarism as well.

In contributing to the current discourse on Latina identity in the United States, I will engage with the existing theories on this theme as proposed by Chavez (2013), Beltrán (2009), and Molina-Guzmán (2013). These scholars dissect the trope of the hyper-sexualized Latina in American media, and the influence that this popularized image has had on the daily lived experiences of Latinas in the US. I will further explore the concepts of self-presentation and the micro-celebrity in computer-mediated communication as proposed by scholars of social media ethnography Hallet (2013), Marwick (2010), Page (2012), and Marshall (2012). This paper thus explores the existing theory surrounding both Latinidad in the United States and the use of social media as a platform for community building and identity work.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

I'm so sick of not seeing Mexicans or latinxs or Hispanics anywhere in our movies or tv shows and when I do see them we're the gardeners or housekeepers or so overly sexualized I can't even watch the scenes with my parents. Can't I just see my culture and heritage properly displayed for the diverse and powerful people that we are!!!! ugh #rant

Latinidad

While social media has only recently become a platform for the exploration of Latinidad and the subsequent formation of a networked community, the Latina feminine identity has long been a site of fetishization and harmful stereotypes in American popular media outlets. The above post from Latinx Tumblr user *embarrassmental* demonstrates how these portrayals of Latina bodies affects the way that individuals construct their Latina identity and react to the social and cultural environment that allows such pervasive images to take hold in the media. The conversation surrounding Latinidad in American media is being taken to the web; however, in order to understand the implications of this movement, the larger conversation itself must be contextualized in the existing scholarly body of work on Latina identity in the United States.

In seeking to explore the construction of Latina identity in the United States it is necessary to understand the concepts and discourse surrounding Latinidad. In her examination of Latina stars throughout American film history, Mary C. Beltrán defines Latinidad as “referring to Latina/o identity formation through lived experiences by Latina/os themselves.”⁴ She later expands and pluralizes the term to what she calls “Latinidades” in an effort to reflect the diversity of the Latina communities and potential cultural identities. What is most notable in her initial definition, however, is that Latinidad emphasizes the agency of the Latina community in constructing their own identity.

Beltrán and many of her contemporaries have attributed personal agency to the construction of Latinidad, and have even acknowledged increased diversity of those identities through the pluralization of the term.⁵ Beltrán further argues that it is instead

³Taylor Lopez, Tumblr Post, *embarrassmental* (blog), March 7, 2015 (5:09pm), <http://embarrassmental.tumblr.com/post/113021106245>.

⁴Beltrán, Mary C., *Latina/o Stars in U.S. Eyes: The Making and Meanings of Film and TV Stardom*, (University of Illinois Press, 2009), 3.

⁵*Ibid.*

a process of Latinization, the process of Latina cultural production, that removes agency from the individual identities of Latinas, describing this process as the “commodification and appropriation of aspects of Latin cultures without a broadening of American cultures in general.”⁶ The interaction between these two opposing and interwoven concepts plays a crucial role in understanding the interplay between structures of appropriation of the Latina cultural trope and the agency of the Latinas themselves in negotiating and deconstructing these structures.

The appropriation of Latina culture and Latina bodies in American media generates the perception of an homogenous identity that threatens American cultural hegemony. In Leo Chavez’s *The Latino Threat*, these media portrayals and their role in reinforcing fears of an “other” is analyzed through the trope of the hyper-sexualized Latina. The “threat” of Latinidad is played out on the bodies of women, taking the form of the Latina temptress whose sole purpose is to serve as an object of the white male gaze.⁷ Chavez asserts, “What ‘hot Latina’ means has always been constructed in relation to other taken for granted assumptions about normative behavior of non-Latina whites.”⁸ The assumed stereotype of the “hot Latina” is thus more a reflection of the expectations of white sexuality than the realities of Latina sexuality. This observation mirrors Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, which asserts that the construction of an exoticized “other” on the part of Western media actually reveals more about the West than it does about the “other” that is being portrayed.⁹

Mary C. Beltrán’s theory of “deactivation” argues, “Non-white star images must resonate with white notions of ethnicity

⁶Beltrán, Mary C., “The Hollywood Latina Body as a Site of Social Struggle: Media Constructions of Stardom and Jennifer Lopez’s ‘Cross-over Butt,’” *Quarterly Review of Film and Video* 19, no. 1 (2002): 80.

⁷Chavez, Leo, *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation* (Stanford University Press, 2013), 70-95.

⁸Ibid., 76.

⁹Said, Edward, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” *Cultural Critique* 1 (1985): 89-107.

in order to achieve cross-over success.”¹⁰ The Latina female body is both a fetishized site on which the white mainstream projects anxieties about sexuality as well as an object with which the “Latina threat” can be stripped of its revolutionary potential and neutralized in so far as it affirms assumptions of the exotic “other.”¹¹ Furthermore, Chavez argues that the emergence of an alternative Latina trope of the hyper-fertile mother in American media, coupled with the hyper-sexualized portrayals, constructs the most potent form of that “Latina threat.”¹² He describes the image of the abnormally fertile and decidedly “backwards” Latina mother, stripped of her sexuality and dedicated to the sole job of birthing and raising Latina children.¹³ These two constructs combined paint a picture of a sexually deviant culture aimed at frequent reproduction.

Engaging Beltrán, Isabel Molina-Guzmán argues that it is specifically the potential for racial ambiguity of the brown skinned Latina that serves to neutralize her revolutionary potential in deconstructing the dominant white standards of beauty.¹⁴ “Mainstream television representations of Latinidad in the United States depend on this unstable ethnic and racial space,” Molina-Guzmán argues, “not white and not black but ambiguously and unsettlingly brown.”¹⁵ She identifies a category within American popular media of “symbolic whiteness” in which certain Latinas—because of physical appearance, language, or cultural capital—are afforded the freedom to at times step outside of the stereotypes ascribed to Latinas while remaining still within the white gaze as the unidentifiable exotic “other.”¹⁶ For many Latina women the weight of this ascribed racial ambiguity denies them the ability to fully claim their Latinidad.

¹⁰Beltrán, “The Hollywood Latina Body,” 79.

¹¹Ibid., 79-80.

¹²Chavez, *The Latino Threat*, 70-95.

¹³Ibid., 72.

¹⁴Molina-Guzman, Isabel, “Latina Ethnoracial Ambiguity in Postracial Television Narratives” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 146-160.

¹⁵Ibid., 153.

¹⁶Ibid., 148-150.

Computer Mediated Communication

In seeking to understand how Latinidad is reflected and constructed through social media platforms, it is necessary to examine the existing theories that shape the way ethnography is being conducted in cyber spaces. Ronald Hallett and Kristen Barber explore the importance of adapting ethnographic methods in an increasingly cyber dependent society through what they refer to as computer-mediated communication (CMC).

Few, if any, parts of society have remained untouched by CMC, and so, ethnography as a whole (not just cyber-ethnography) needs to respond, adapt, and reflect these shifts to more fully capture and understand the multiple spaces—both physical and digital—where people experience contemporary social life.¹⁷

Building on this concept of social media as a site evolving methods of identity construction, Marshall (2012), Marwick (2010) and Page (2012) employ computer-mediated communication to analyze shifts in narrative techniques.¹⁸

The “imagined audience” theory as discussed by Alice Marwick outlines how the perception and construction of one’s audience when participating in computer-mediated communication affects self-presentation and content of postings. “While anyone can potentially read or view a digital artifact,” Marwick argues, “we need a more specific conception of audience than ‘anyone’ to choose the language, cultural referents, style, and so on that comprise online identity presentation.”¹⁹ Once the user has imagined and constructed this audience that is otherwise intangible to them, their own posts—the language they use, the references they make,

¹⁷Hallett, Ronald E. and Kristen Barber, “Ethnographic Research in a Cyber Era,” *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 43, no. 3 (2013): 311.

¹⁸Marwick, Alice, “I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience,” *New Media and Society* (2010): 2.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

and the hashtags they follow or employ—will reflect the values and cultural cues that they perceive as desirable to their audience.²⁰ David Marshall further argues that this perceived audience contributes to a need to perform within the cultural constructs of one's environment. According to Marshall, "What we are witnessing now is the staging of the self as both character and performance in online settings. The props and accoutrements of the stage can now be translated to the various profiles, images and messages that are part of a Facebook site."²¹ This form of presentational media mimics that of celebrity cultural production and becomes a platform for the construction of a micro-celebrity identity and the commodification of the self.²²

Ruth Page further explores self-branding through social media by analyzing alternative forms of narrative being carried out in the micro-blogging world of the internet. She argues that the self-presentation that occurs through social media narratives situates both the audience and the author within online social structures that cross between the private and public spheres.²³ Page claims that this new form of ethnographic research presents a "complex variety of stories that continue to proliferate in every form of social media that has been developed thus far."²⁴ This assertion forms the methodological framework on which the following study was built.

III. METHODOLOGY

Casandra @ gringatears: "So #LatiniWave is set for 4/11. But for those who do not identify as and reject the terms 'Hispanic/Latinx' we're using #BrownAnd-

²⁰Ibid., 1-20.

²¹Marshall, David, "The Promotion and Presentation of the Self: Celebrity as Marker of Presentational Media," *Celebrity Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012): 40.

²²Ibid., 35-48.

²³Page, Ruth, *Stories and Social Media: Identities and Interaction* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 10-15.

²⁴Ibid., 10.

Navigating Social Media

This research employs both secondary and primary source material. The secondary source material to which I will turn is outlined above: the works of Leo Chavez (2013), Mary C. Beltrán (2009), and Isabel Molina-Guzmán (2013), who have each employed the analysis of primary sources in the form of American media images of Latinas. Using a methodology drawn from these authors I also examine and analyze American media images of Latinas in Hollywood film and television. I do this using primarily the in-print and online celebrity and popular culture magazines *People*, *People en Español*, and *Latina Magazine* to track the appearances and references to known female Latina stars. In my interpretations of these publications I consider key recurring words, themes, and imagery used to describe those Latina stars in contrast to broader non-Latina celebrity coverage.

This study also uses quantitative and qualitative ethnographic methods to more effectively represent the Latina identified community. Using participant observation I examine the social networking sites of Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr as venues for the construction of Latinidad on both the individual and communal levels. In an effort to systematize my research I spent one hour every day for two weeks (2/1/15–2/15/15) making observations on each site, employing different techniques depending on the venue. I then repeated this observational procedure at a later date (3/8/15–3/22/15) to account for the fact that the data I collected could at any point be influenced heavily by a current event shaping the conversations occurring on social media. Furthermore, I have been an active member of these networking communities since December 2014, and have informally remained an engaged “follower” of relevant micro-blogs since that time.

On the micro-blogging sites Twitter and Tumblr, I simply searched using the following hashtags: Latinx, Latin@, Latina, Hispanic, and Chicanx/@/a. These terms revealed themselves to be the

²⁵ Cassandra, Tumblr Post, gringaxtears (blog), March, 9, 2015.

most relevant to my research while remaining broad enough that I was not at risk of pigeonholing my search. In the research results, I took note of context, sentiment, language, and location (if possible), username, and frequency of posts. In assessing Twitter use, I also employed a Twitter Sentiment Analysis tool that was able to both aggregate and assess the most recent posts made on Twitter based on my keyword search.²⁶ Facebook differs as a social media site in that it is not possible to search by individual words used in posts, and content is made more private, which is why I chose to search Facebook by “Groups” of interest.

In an effort to systematize my observations and obtain more data points, I employed in this research a relatively new tool known as Twitter Archiving Google Spreadsheets (TAGS). This tool allowed me to place a search on a particular hashtag of my choosing and run the program 24/7 through my computer as it filtered in tweets containing that specific hashtag to a spreadsheet in my personal Google Drive account. The results of this program yielded over 1500 tweets containing “#Latinx” in a spreadsheet that included not only the text of the tweet itself, but also the poster username, the time and date, the language of the user, and even the amount of times that tweet had been “liked” or “retweeted.” This aggregation of data allowed me to obtain numerous and diverse tweets, search within these tweets for emergent themes, and identify micro-blogs that have amassed particularly large followings.

Through my participation in these social media platforms and observations of TAGS data, I was able to distribute a survey of ten questions to 650 willing users. Initially, I attempted to distribute my survey solely through my own personal Tumblr and Twitter accounts, though this proved largely unsuccessful as I have very little clout on these platforms amongst the Latinx community—I had very few followers and no clear strategies to acquire more. Realizing that my own blogs were insufficient, I employed the data I had obtained through participant observation and TAGS. I identified

²⁶Kouloumpis, Efthymios, “Twitter Sentiment Analysis: The Good the Bad and the OMG!” (presentation, Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, University of Edinburgh, 2011).

the micro-blogs most heavily followed by other Latinx individuals and reached out to them personally, identifying myself, my work, and my survey, and asking for their help in distributing it. They agreed to help, and within a matter of hours my survey gained over 200 responses. This experience demonstrates both the importance of intentional networking in digital ethnography also the valuable role of bloggers within the Latinx community.

My survey questioned participants about their experiences with Latinidad and their use of social media quantitatively in multiple choice and sliding scale questions. The survey also employed a qualitative element in the use of several open-ended questions in which the responses varied from ten word answers to 150 words. These responses reflected an exploration of the Latina tag as employed by each user individually, a discussion of how they feel they embody what it means to be Latina, and how this differs from or reflects their perceptions of Latina women in American media. I engaged users with these more individualized questions so as to later dissect how these portrayals are received and interpreted by Latinas themselves. The survey responses I received ground my conceptual interpretation of primary and secondary sources in the real lived experiences of Latinas.

Before delving into their individualized responses it is important to understand who these respondents were, in order to more fully contextualize the larger trends I note. The 650 respondents represent 39 states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico; 97% are in the age range from 18–30 years old; and 85% identify as female. Of these respondents, only 51% identify solely as Latinx/a, while the rest augment this identity with individualized, often nation and race-based identities. These range from Mexican-American, to Mestiza, to Afro or white-passing Latina, for example. When asked what factors influenced them in naming their identity as such, 67% of respondents cited language as a major factor; 63% felt that their “home environment” influenced this identity heavily; 96% cited “Familial Heritage;” and 47% felt that their “Social Community” played a role in how they choose to identify. Of these respondents, 61% speak at least some level of Spanish, with many stating explicitly that their ability or lack of ability to speak the

language influence in some way how they experience their ethnicity and identity, although inability does not negate one's Latinidad.²⁷ On average, 93% of respondents use Facebook, 91% use Twitter, and 94% use Tumblr, with 68% citing their Tumblr use as "Multiple Times per Day," with only 15% and 20% stating the same frequency of use on Twitter and Facebook respectively.²⁸ When prompted about what they use those social media sites for generally, 87% said "Communication," 83% stated "Sharing of Personal Opinions," and 67% said "Sharing Photos of Self," among several other reasons cited.²⁹ Using the quantitative data gathered through this survey in combination with the open-ended individualized responses offered by survey participants, I was able to better understand and visualize the live experiences of these Latinx respondents.

Which Social Media?

As my investigation deepened, I noticed certain trends in the variation among social media sites. By limiting users to 140 characters or less, Twitter forces the user to post efficiently and employ catch-phrases, keywords, or hashtags that best express the intended message to the intended audience. This site is thus more often used for the representation of day to day activities through a series of hashtags and frequently attached images. Twitter is also used for transnational organizing around a common cause or ideal, heavily employing a commonly understood hashtag that emerges as an emblem of the movement or cause.

In contrast, Tumblr allows more extensive blogging in which users create personal pages or collaborative group pages around a single issue or communal identity. These pages employ more lengthy posts sharing personal stories, multimedia, or "re-blogs" from other users. The hashtag is still relevant on Tumblr, though much less heavily relied upon than on Twitter. Tumblr is a site of more extensive posturing around political or activist

²⁷Brown, Christina, "Latinx Identity on Social Media," Survey, Survey Monkey Inc., Web, Feb 16, 2015.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

discourses that are constantly evolving in an ongoing conversation between users. The “imagined audience” of Tumblr is slightly more tangible, and the relationships formed here perceived as more substantial, because this platform is used for more extensive self-branding and sharing of personal stories. These connections allow users to follow and contribute to ongoing, often political conversations that fuel the socially active environment of Tumblr.

The third site, Facebook, proved to be distinct from both Twitter and Tumblr in its use and in my own methods of observation. In contrast to other social networking sites, Facebook does not allow individual users to “follow” other users that they have not explicitly approved as a “Friend.” Thus, as a researcher, I do not have access to nor can I objectively identify Latina users pages if I do not already know them. This limits my ability to explore Latinidad on this site strictly to open “Group” pages which are either established previously as public or which I had to request access to from the administrator. In these spaces I found that groups often function as sites of local organizing as Facebook is more geographically bound than Twitter and Tumblr in that the majority of one’s network consists of “Friends” from their offline social groupings. Groups employing Latina/o/x in their title or biographical information disseminate local news, job postings, community events and activism. This is in contrast to the more transnational solidarity of Twitter and Tumblr. Alternatively, Facebook Groups specified for Latina identified individuals can take on a more transnational sphere of influence among followers using cultural “Latino-isms,” often humorously, for example through short videos and images that hyperbolize stereotyped traits of Latinidad, creating a sense of solidarity for those self identified Latinas that have experienced those stereotypes.

IV. FINDINGS

Overview of Media Portrayals of Latinas in 2015

@Latina: Add these exercises inspired by @JLo’s

booty to your #WorkoutWednesday.³⁰

As young Latina women growing up in the United States seek to construct their own feminine identity, depictions of the Latina body in popular media discourse become increasingly difficult to ignore. Social media serves as an alternative stage on which celebrities and network news media sources commodify themselves to increase their following. The advent of this new site makes the values and concepts these icons reinforce much more prevalent for the average user. For young Latinas, this means facing an increasingly pervasive flow of often pejorative images and articles meant to represent Latinidad in the US. From Dolores del Rio of the 1920's to Sofia Vergara of 2015, stereotyped images of Latina women—be it in magazines, television series, or tweets—necessitate attention in any attempt to better understand the Latina experience in the US.

US media portrayals of Latina women and the popular culture discourse that surrounds Latina identified celebrities reflect a hyper-sexualized stereotype. This trope is typified by a curvy body and appropriately tan skin—dark enough to exotify, but not so dark as to pose a threat to white hegemony—and is often accompanied by certain signifiers in language, dress, or environment. Isabel Molina-Guzmán outlines the stereotypes, “The advertising industry’s consistent use of the traditional large family, the color red, heat metaphors, tropical settings, and salsa music to signify Latina/o identity and culture is an external force that shapes how Latinidad is understood by audiences.”³¹

There is a dualism to this Latina stereotype manifested in images associated with motherhood and fertility that similarly dominate popular media representations of Latinidad. In contrast to the hyper-sexualized Latina *mami*, there is the hyper-fertile Latina mother. Audiences are presented with this dichotomy to construct their notion of Latina femininity—two shallow options, with very little dynamism therein. Bernadette Calafell in her rhe-

³⁰Latina Magazine, Twitter Post, March 11, 2015.

³¹Molina-Guzmán, Isabel, *Dangerous Curves: Latina Bodies in the Media*, (NYU Press, 2010), 10.

torical critique of empowerment and representation of Latinidad in *Latina* magazine reflects this choice, “Latinas are still defined by the traditional/nontraditional/virgin/whore dichotomies. Sexuality becomes problematic for Latinas in their relationships with their families. A break from the traditional is seen as deviant.”³² While representations of Latina women in television and print often reflect these widely accepted stereotypes of a homogenized Latinidad, there exists as well a space for certain Latina identified celebrities to avoid these roles.

Though popular culture images of Latina celebrities frequently fit the understood trope of a sultry spitfire or unstoppably breeding Catholic, many Latina stars capitalize on the increasing desire of Hollywood film and television producers to widen their audience in accordance with globalization. In recognition of the fact that ethnic and racial diversity exist in American society, films and television series increasingly feature celebrities whose phenotypes allow for ethno-racial ambiguity outside of the dominant white-black binary. Isabel Molina-Guzmán notes, “[Demi] Lovato’s ambiguity does not decenter whiteness. Instead, her ethnic ambiguity and whiteness afford her the flexibility to signal Latinidad only when it is economically or culturally profitable for her to do so.”³³ Celebrities such as Jessica Alba rely on other cultural signifiers to express their Latinidad at will, such as in her recent poolside tweet in which she hash-tagged “#BuenosDias #morning #almondmilk-capp #LaSeduction #vacay.”³⁴ Alba’s casual use of Spanish in this post codes her Latinidad for her followers.

A majority of young Latinas perceive that they are being overwhelmingly represented in pigeonholed portrayals. When prompted to describe how they perceive Latinas to be represented in the media one survey respondent, a twenty-four year old Dominican-Latina reflects, “We’re either servants or seductresses, which I don’t identify with at all. I’m not a stereotype. None of the

³²Ibid., 22.

³³Molina-Guzmán, “Latina Ethnoracial Ambiguity,” 150.

³⁴Jessica Alba, Twitter Post, Jan 3, 2015, <https://twitter.com/jessicaalba>.

Latina women in my family or in my social circle are.”³⁵ Women such as this are increasingly turning to social media as a platform to flood the dominant discourse with representations of their lived experiences.

Performing Latinidad

neyruto: “white kid: if ur mexican why cant u speak spanish fluently :/

me: lemme hear u speak some of that 11% finnish
2% scottish 45% italian 31% dutch, 100% puta.”³⁶

The deeply ingrained expectations of a hot, sexy, Spanish-speaking Latina culture compose a limited toolset for the outward expression of one’s Latinidad. For some, expressing their Latina identity may well involve the deployment of these signifiers, and a sense of pride in their applicability to their experience as a Latina. For many others, openly expressing their Latinidad is far more often about denouncing these assumed markers through reconstructed representations of diverse Latina identities. Through these varied self-representations of Latinidad on social media young Latinas may actively perform their Latinidades, the process of reclaiming this identity, and the construction of a complex networked community built on a sense of solidarity.

Several survey respondents claim to express their Latinidad online through intentional tagging of their daily activities and experiences as Latinas, and of articles or blog posts that deal directly with issues that may affect members of the diverse Latina community. One respondent reflects, “I am Dominican, so showing photos of myself and tagging it latina will take away from awful stereotypes that people usually think of when it comes to us.”³⁷ Additionally, #Latina is frequently employed alongside blogs, news articles, and

³⁵Brown, “Latinx Identity on Social Media.”

³⁶Neyruto, Tumblr Post, Feb 26, 2015, <http://neyruto.tumblr.com/post/111938225511/white-kid-if-ur-mexican-why-cant-u-speak-spanish>

³⁷Brown, “Latinx Identity on Social Media.”

memes to identity that the post is relevant to discussions concerning Latinidad. One respondent notes, “[Social media] provides a space to expand the possibilities for imagining what it means to be latinx. Simply reblogging a photoset or a song can help me to express something that I connect to, ethnically or politically.”³⁸ Posting can be a tool in the personal construction of an identity, so that the very act of manifesting one’s Latinidad online is itself defining that Latinidad. One user states, “I’m an artist, so i try to promote other latinx artists. That can include original artwork, music, and even selfies. On top of that, I try to raise awareness in latinx social issues. I try to represent myself as a die hard advocate.”³⁹

While posting and reblogging play an important role in the self-presentation of one’s Latina identity, something as basic as the language of posts is itself a powerful piece of cultural capital to employ in performing Latinidad online. When asked what influences their ethnic or racial means of self-identification, 67% of survey respondents cited language as being a significant factor in claiming their identity. In addition to posting articles and “reblogs” originally written in Spanish, many Latina users employ Spanish in their online profile descriptions, personal posts/blogs, or usernames. One respondent states, “I post things in Spanish or that other Latinxs will identify with. My Instagram name has “bruja” in it, which means “witch” in Spanish.”⁴⁰ This use of Spanish serves the dual purpose of allowing a space for some self-identified Latinas to construct their identity through an etymological relation to their heritage or home life, as well as to demonstrate this identity to their perceived audience.

Many Latina identified users of social media in the United States employ a mix of both English and Spanish, recognizing and perhaps catering to a specific audience. This form of code-switching draws attention to the fact that while these individuals wish to express their identities by demonstrating a working knowledge of the Spanish language, they also recognize their target or perceived

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

Through iconic image sharing, personal story reflections, and open question forums, a safe space is being created in which an online community can thrive off the shared, yet diverse, Latinidades of users. Iconic imagery—paintings, photographs, graffiti, GIFs—can take the form of historic figures such as Frida Kahlo, more contemporary Latina heroines like Selena Quintanilla, or simply photos capturing the diversity of everyday life across Latin America. These images assert the user’s cultural knowledge of Latina identities, and forge connections between users. Many of those iconic images are continually reblogged, “liked,” and commented upon as a demonstration of solidarity amongst some Latina users. Often, these images will even serve as profile pictures for Latina identified users or group-administrated blogs, in an intentionally public display of one’s close association to Latinidades or as an indication of the blogs content relating directly to Latina experiences. One user comments on this community, “I reblog news about what is going on in Latin America or anything that affects Latin Americans living in the United States, Latin American art and history, and also I share a bit about my own life and how it is related to my culture.”⁴³

Telling one’s story to a community of followers on micro-blogging sites allows others to relate to those experiences and deepen social media bonds. These stories can be reblogged, commented on, and expanded to create a sort of ongoing communal narrative that makes tangible the imagined audience of social media platforms. This diverse Latina narrative creates a sense of community amongst those seeking to upset the dominant discourse of media misrepresentations. Latina participants find affirmation in sharing their own story, and relating it to the stories of others, as one participant notes:

My race and ethnicity gives me a certain perspective on the world and I face a lot more injustices and can easily view injustices because of that. So my heritage, my skin, my life only validates issues I see other

⁴³Brown, “Latinx Identity on Social Media.”

people facing, and so I will stand in solidarity and do my best to educate myself and others via social media.⁴⁴

This user demonstrates how, in online communities, some take on roles as community resources in educating others who are grappling with their identity.

In a survey of over 600 respondents geared toward Latina users of social media, only 51% of respondents claim their identity as some derivative of Latinx.⁴⁵ The others varied greatly from such responses as Mexican, mestiza, and Hispanic, to Mixed Race, Mex-American, and white-passing. When prompted about why they chose to identify as they did, respondents demonstrated sentiments ranging from great pride in the term they chose to deeply seeded anxiety about an inability to claim any other identity. It is largely because of this range of sentiments about one's identity that the online community of Latinx individuals has formed platforms for dialogue, posing questions, and receiving support.

The ability to safely ask questions about being Latinx and receive productive responses is an integral part in the formation of the Latinx community of social media, as it strengthens an overall sense of solidarity and simultaneously aids in the processes of identity construction for individual users. These questions often take the form of seeking clarification on vocabulary frequently used in the Latinx community, such as the term "Latinx" itself. It can also take the form of more sensitive dialogue concerning one's anxieties about their experiences of Latinidad, or their confusion regarding their belonging to a certain identity, community, or culture. Many Latinas turn to these venues to express their frustrations and anxieties in being misidentified. Reflecting this sentiment, one user questions, "So I'm white passing, but am not white and I get really angry and upset if people do call me white. Am I overreacting? It just feels like my culture and identity are getting stolen from me

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

when I am called white.”⁴⁶ From these frustrations solidarity arises within the online communities of Latinxs, particularly through the prideful deployment of cultural markers to construct one’s identity. “Nah, I get angry too when people call me white since I speak English well. So then I ride around blasting some bachata or merengue to remind everyone that I’m not white.”⁴⁷

Pride and Shame

@TheLatinaTag: “English-speaking Latina problems
*forgetting Spanish for a moment and reading ‘Hola’
as ‘How-lah.’”⁴⁸

While expressions of pride in one’s identity plays a major role in the conversations and posts produced within the online Latinx community, many Latinx individuals feel a great deal of anxiety related to their identity for reasons related most notably to race, language, and visibility on social media. Many Latinx survey respondents and micro-bloggers demonstrated this dichotomy between pride and shame in expressions of their discomfort for supposedly not looking Latinx enough to claim that identity with ease. One respondent notes, “I think I’m too white to identify just as latina so it’s always ‘white latina.’”⁴⁹ In addition to skin color often creating anxieties in relation to one’s ability to identify with the Latinx community, many also feel that being raised in a “white culture” has similarly affected their relationship to Latinidad. One survey respondent notes how these cultural forces shaped her understanding of Latinidad:

I learned growing up that I am “half-Mexican.” That

⁴⁶ *ThisisnotLatinx*, Tumblr Post, Feb 23, 2015, <http://thisisnotlatinx.tumblr.com/post/111924360745/so-im-white-passing-but-am-not-white-and-i-get>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ TheLatinaTag, Tumblr Post, Nov 15, 2014, <http://reclaimingthelatinatag.tumblr.com/post/102692755105/english-speaking-latina-problems>

⁴⁹ Brown, “Latinx Identity on Social Media.”

was literally all I knew about my Mexican heritage...I was born in Tennessee and brought up in white communities. I was too brown for white family reunions and too white for Mexican ones.⁵⁰

The influences of race on one's feelings about their *Latinidad* take on more tangible forms in certain formal or legal contexts. One Afro-Latina survey respondent described the process of formally claiming her individual racial and ethnic identity. "Well, nothing on forms says Afro-Latina...so I circle African-American. My mom is from Panama and also puts down black, but would prefer to put down Latina but people used to question it."⁵¹ These experiences of individuals' inability to fully claim their *Latinidad* formally or informally because of their race, skin color, or racial cultural backgrounds reflects the anxieties and shame that emerged as a prominent theme throughout this research.

Language presents a cornerstone of this pride/shame dichotomy as it can often either affirm or obstruct one's Latinx identity. Only 61% of survey respondents speak some level of Spanish, and 67% claim "Language" plays an important role in their decision to identify as they do—as Latinx, Mexican-American, Mixed Race Latina, etc. However, a current conversation on social media seeks to break down the stereotype that every Latinx individual speaks Spanish, and as such iterates that it is not necessary for any Latinx to speak Spanish in order to claim that identity. Despite this assurance, many Latinx survey respondents claimed a great deal of shame in their inability or lack of proficiency in Spanish.

Growing up, I didn't speak much Spanish. It wasn't until I started taking Spanish in high school and college did I really start feeling comfortable identifying as Mexican rather than as "American with my family coming from Mexico." This largely came about from the teasing I got from school, since I was often told

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

“What kind of Mexican are you if you can’t speak Spanish?” I felt connected since my family still kept some contact with our heritage, but I felt as though I couldn’t identify as it because I couldn’t speak the language.⁵²

This survey respondent’s sentiments of anxiety related to language are not isolated. Many respondents and bloggers I observed alike felt a sense of shame or discomfort in their Spanish speaking abilities, for not having a good enough accent, not practicing enough, or not ever having learned Spanish at all.

Similarly, many Latinxs feel guilt in not being more expressive or open about their identity online. One survey respondent notes feeling particularly uncomfortable because of their complex and at times confusing experiences of their Latinidad.

I feel like I don’t know how to express my Latina identity online. I have been ostracized from my family for so long. I never learned how to cook my food. I barely know my language anymore. I blend in with white people, but I am not one of them. It is very frustrating and confusing. I feel lost and alone and try to do everything I can to connect with my heritage.⁵³

This individual’s feelings of confusion in proudly and openly expressing their Latinidad reflects the pride and shame dichotomy that emerged in many responses from the Latinx community. These anxieties are often further heightened depending on the social media platform being discussed, as many respondents felt less able to express their Latinidad on Facebook in particular. One respondent reflects, “On Facebook I don’t express my Latinidad at all because I’m afraid to receive discrimination/racism from others, but on tumblr I express openly because of the anonymity and the Latinx

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

communities that give me support.”⁵⁴ This respondent demonstrates that the pride/shame dichotomy experienced by many individual Latinx can be articulated, discussed, and relieved in the supportive community of Latinx online.

Latinx users of social media are increasingly participating in the formation of online solidarity networks and communities in an effort to better understand and construct their own identities. The dialogue that takes place in these communities has the potential to deconstruct the dominant representations of Latinxs in the media. In upsetting this hegemonic discourse, Latinxs are able to reclaim the identity and reject the stereotypes that serve to contain Latinidad. Taking back the Latina tag from the misrepresentations that have held it in that state of containment is thus a task of monumental importance in the social media community of diverse Latinxs.

#ReclaimingtheLatinaTag

misandrypossum: “The latina tag is super gross. Like I only see a fucking bunch of porn actresses??? n whenever I tag my selfies w #latina, I end up in porn blogs, liked by them, followed by them. Like fuck i was reblogged in one when i was underage.... n if that doesn't tell u how fucked up r racial fetishes n oversexualization of latin girls..idk what will #latina-tag #latina #latinx #woc #poc.”⁵⁵

A significant portion of the computer-mediated communication world is appropriated for pornography distribution. These pornographic images and invitations employ stereotypes to fetishize the Latina body as a commodity to be consumed by online audiences. Thus, many Latinas have found it difficult to assert that identity on social media platforms without being grouped into sexual fetish searches, or even having their profiles and images

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Misandrypossum (blog), Tumblr Post, Feb 1, 2015, <http://misandrypossum.tumblr.com/post/106950267365/the-latina-tag-is-super-gross-like-i-only-see-a>

redistributed in association with pornography. In an effort to jointly subvert this dominant discourse surrounding Latina bodies, many Latinxs use hashtag and image tools to demonstrate their Latinidades online and simultaneously avoid commodification by pornography trollers.

One survey respondent calls this strategy of subverting pornography “bombing the Latina tag,” a tag which has otherwise been manipulated by pornography users. This “bombing” of positivity is often organized around a particular day of the week, a particular blog, or even a massive organized day of action taking place across social media platforms. The act involves posting a “selfie” and tagging it specifically with #Latina, so as to tip the balance between the number of #Latina images attached to pornography and those attached to self-identified Latinas seeking to express their diversity of experiences and subversion of stereotypes. By tagging their images #Latina, users are able to both assert their pride in this identity and associate themselves with a larger community of varied Latinidades banding together on social media:

ReclaimingtheLatinaTag: “Hey lovelies! Its Latina Tuesday, so please feel free to submit your pictures, and if you’re feeling extra generous, a brief description of where you’re from and what you’ve been up to! (Doesn’t have to be too personal) Now show us those gorgeous latinxs faces! Don’t forget to tag it with selfie, and Latina! (Latinx/latin@).”⁵⁶

The collective action taken in reclaiming the Latina tag is reflective of the influence of social media platforms in constructing a space for Latinx identities to celebrate their diversity. Reclaiming the tag is seen as a form of activism amongst Latinx social media community members that has become one of the most tangible aspects of this community.

⁵⁶ReclaimingtheLatinaTag (blog), Tumblr Post, Feb 3, 2015, <http://reclaimingthe-latinatag.tumblr.com/>.

V. #CONCLUSION

When I began this research I had little concept of how to even pronounce the term “Latinx,” let alone the vast and diverse identities that could be encompassed within it. However, through the voices of over 650 Latinx individuals, the ways in which this term is a reflection of a much larger phenomenon taking place on social media has become abundantly clear. #Latinx has created a digital space for the construction of a shared, yet diverse Latinidad. This conceptualization of Latinidad rejects the normative stereotypes associated with the Latina female body in popular media, and in so doing reclaims that identity against the homogenizing forces that have attempted to contain it. This community is not a negation of the individual identities that are experienced by individuals of Latin American ancestry. Rather it is a space in which those personal identities, in all of their diversity, can be expressed and explored in a community that shares a history of oppression and stereotyping. An individual’s #Latinx identity serves to augment their personal, at times nationalistic, identity. As this research has demonstrated, social media creates the space for this individual and communal identity construction to take shape.

There do exist some limitations in digital ethnography as a form of research, and in my specific methodology. First, reflecting an inherent limitation to social media, I chose the searches and hashtags to observe, which automatically made my work to some extent selective. Because I am not a part of the community I sought to study, I do not possess the necessary cultural capital to know what searches would yield the most accurate and encompassing data. Furthermore, I cannot know how much the physical and digital identities of respondents and observed users vary. There was also a statistical bias in my respondents towards Tumblr use over other forms of social media, which does not necessarily reflect national trends. Finally, while I did a great deal of observations on Facebook, I felt the least comfortable making here, as the searching process is even more selective and the community is not one that you can observe without necessarily being a part of it.

These limitations do not negate the relevance of the data I obtained or the community that I observed. Online identity con-

struction and community building has the potential to empower individuals in the physical social environments in which they live. The active and dynamic Latinx voices developed through blog posts and tweets, with the support of the their digital communities, may transpose conversations and ideas from their computer screens to their household, school, local government, and much more. Latinx in the US have been combatting media born stereotypes of Latinidad for generations, and social media has presented the opportunity to grow this movement. The internet generations, as hundreds of Latinx have demonstrated throughout this research, are far from apathetic. They indeed have the potential to join in and magnify the efforts of parent generations in deconstructing stereotypes and social inequities by connecting online.

Through social media Latina identified women in the United States have found a platform through which the typical “imagined audience” of the internet becomes wholly tangible in the form of a supportive and active community. It is a space for the construction of the diverse individual Latinx identities and the demonstration of community wide solidarity. As one survey respondent notes, “Social media provides a space to expand the possibilities for imagining what it means to be Latinx. Simply reblogging a photoset or a song can help me to express something that I connect to ethnically.”⁵⁷ This Latina is among the many turning to their preferred networking site to understand, negotiate, and construct their Latinidad. On social media Latinx can, together, reject the representations of Latinidad in American popular media, and reclaim that identity from the homogenized stereotypes that clearly can no longer successfully contain these Latinx.

⁵⁷Brown “Latinx Identity on Social Media.”

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The Road to Victory Square: George Orwell and the Politics of Futility (Abridged)

Abstract:

Though a prolific journalist, critic, and satirist whose career spanned nearly thirty years, George Orwell is most often remembered for two novels written near the end of his career: *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. A central theme of both of these novels, and of Orwell's career as a whole, is that of the individual's futility in the face of a larger political organization. In "The Road to Victory Square: George Orwell and the Politics of Futlity," I sought to explore these themes of futility in the late period of Orwell's career (beginning with the 1938 publication of *Homage to Catalonia* and ending with Orwell's death in 1950). The focus of this exploration was on the evolution of Orwell's attitudes toward futility as he transformed from a passionate idealist to an unrepentant cynic. In this abbreviated draft, I focus primarily on two texts—*Homage to Catalonia* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*—the former of which I see as the turning point in Orwell's career, the latter of which serves as a culmination of his ideas at the end of his life. I believe that these two texts, in comparison with each other, more thoroughly demonstrate the extent of Orwell's transformation and display the trajectory of ideological growth than any other pair of his publications. This analysis also explores the political events that influenced Orwell's thoughts on human beings and their relationship with futility.

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EDUCATION OF ERIC BLAIR

The resemblance to Don Quixote was appropriate, for in many ways Orwell can only be understood as a quixotic man.... He defended, passionately and as a matter of principle, unpopular causes.

—George Woodcock

Eric Arthur Blair was born in late June, 1903 in Motihari, India. He adopted the pseudonym George Orwell sometime later. He grew up in a “lower-upper-middle-class” (*The Road to Wigan Pier* 121) home and was educated in England. Blair’s education has been the topic of much discussion in academic circles since the posthumous publication of his essay “Such, Such Were the Joys,” an essay that describes, at great length, the horrors he experienced as a student at St. Cyprian’s Preparatory School. The essay has been a focus of debate for some time now, in part because the detached, sarcastic tone with which Orwell narrates the essay is frequently overlooked in critical analysis and in part because the essay is treated as a serious contemplation, rather than as a somewhat autobiographical work with satirical elements in it.¹ This is not to say that any grievous misinterpretation of the essay has occurred in the discourse of academics. Quite the contrary, despite all of the disagreement about accuracy in Orwell’s reflection, “Such, Such Were the Joys” is widely considered one of the most informative texts about the political awakening of Eric Blair. In reading “Such, Such Were the Joys,” one theme becomes abundantly clear: that of survival in the face of futility. Orwell writes,

¹“Such, Such Were the Joys” primarily satirizes the works of Charles Dickens and *The Education of Henry Adams*. Orwell plays up such Dickensian tropes as the vicious schoolmaster, the wicked rich, and the aesthetic comparison of the school to a poorhouse as a means of conveying his perception of the school as a child. And while Orwell takes several jabs at Henry Adams’ melancholic, introspective writing, he mimics Adams with somewhat remarkable accuracy in order to explain the essay for what it is: a reflection on the development of Orwell’s political beliefs.

But this sense of guilt and inevitable failure was balanced by something else: the instinct to survive. Even a creature that is weak, ugly, cowardly, smelly, and in no way justifiable still wants to stay alive and be happy in its own fashion. I could not invert the existing scale of values, or turn myself into a success, but I could accept my failure and make the best of it. I could resign myself to being what I was, and then endeavour to survive on those terms. ("Such, Such Were the Joys" 1324)

This paragraph could easily have come from any of Orwell's "late-period"² works, and it is fitting that it comes from what might be considered his most personal essay. The essay was composed over the course of almost a decade, between 1939 and 1948 (Crick 587-588), when Orwell's struggles with his political identity were at their most difficult. The conflict that defines Orwell's late-period work—that of the individual spirit in futile opposition to the political machine—is present in his writing from the moment he returned to Britain from Spain in 1937 until the final letters and essays he wrote in the weeks leading up to his death in 1950. But this conflict is not stagnant in Orwell's writing; he does not repeat himself. Rather, it seems that George Orwell spent the last twelve years of his life attempting to better understand the nature of futility in order to overcome it.

II. OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SPANISH FRONT: *HOMAGE TO CATALONIA* IN CONTEXT

[*Homage to Catalonia*] is about disillusionment with Communism, but it is not a confession.

—Lionel Trilling

²The "late-period" is considered the period from 1938-1950, during which many of Orwell's most prominent works, including *Homage to Catalonia*, "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius," and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, were published.

While some might argue that Orwell's memoir of his time spent on the front during the Spanish Civil War, *Homage to Catalonia*, does in fact meet the qualifications of a confessional autobiography, there is little in the text to suggest that Orwell is confessing to anything. The tone, substance, and structure of the work differ greatly from other memoirs that would be considered confessional. *Homage to Catalonia* lacks the philosophical ruminations of Augustine's *Confessions* and Henry Adams' *Education*, and the text does not suggest any emotional or ideological maturation on Orwell's part. The final chapter of the memoir suggests that, while Orwell has not thus far undergone the sort of transformation so frequently described in confessional works, his return to England will ultimately instigate the psychological change that informs his later work. The memoir is not a confessional, but is rather an overture to the events in Orwell's life that would normally constitute the content of a confessional. To truly understand *Homage to Catalonia* and how it relates to Orwell's later works, one must approach it for what it is: a book about one man's disillusionment with Soviet Communism. While the text is still littered with remnants and fragments of the idealism Orwell had prior to the Spanish Civil War, it is a far cry from *The Road to Wigan Pier*—a work published only a year before *Homage to Catalonia*. The former book reads like propaganda, and its final lines only emphasize this comparison:

Yet I believe there is some hope that when Socialism is a living issue, a thing that large numbers of Englishmen genuinely care about, the class difficulty may solve itself more rapidly than now seems thinkable. In the next few years we shall either get that effective Socialist party that we need, or we shall not get it. If we do not get it, then Fascism is coming [...]. But if we do get it there will be a struggle, conceivably a physical one, for our plutocracy will not sit quiet under a genuinely revolutionary government. And when the widely separate classes who, necessarily, should form any real Socialist party have fought side by side, they may feel differently

about one another. And then perhaps this misery of class-prejudice will fade away, and we of the sinking middle class [...] may sink without further struggles into the working class where we belong, and probably when we get there it will not be so dreadful as we feared, for, after all, we have nothing to lose but our aitches. (*The Road to Wigan Pier* 231-232)

Though he considers the possibility that his own cause will fail, Orwell speaks in utopian terms of belonging and camaraderie about the potential for a Socialist England. This hope is reiterated by the language of the final sentence, which directly alludes to the conclusion to *The Communist Manifesto*: “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win” (Marx and Engels 120-121). While the intended audiences of the authors are different (Orwell writes to the middle class, Marx and Engels to the working class), the desired effect is the same. By mimicking the most influential piece of propaganda literature ever written, Orwell hopes to rally the spirits of an otherwise discouraged or apathetic group of people, to fight off the forces of oppression, and to inspire a revolutionary mode of thinking. But only a year later, he writes,

Down here it was still the England I had known in my childhood: the railway-cutting smothered in wild flowers, the deep meadows where the shining horses browse and meditate, the slow-moving streams bordered by willows, the green bosoms of the elms, the larkspurs in the cottage gardens; and then the peaceful wilderness of outer London, the barges on the miry river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket matches and royal weddings, the men in bowler hats, the pigeons in Trafalgar Square, the red buses, the blue policemen—all sleeping the deep, deep sleep of England, from which I sometimes fear that we shall never wake till we are jerked out of it by the roar of bombs. (*Homage* 231-232)

The tone at the conclusion of the latter work is filled with a bitter nostalgia and an air of defeated uncertainty as he remarks on the lethargy of the English countryside and the complacency of London. Orwell ends his memoir with a reflection on the idleness he perceives in the English people, both in the pacific countryside of his youth and in the bustling hub of capitalism that is London. His message is clear: any hope for a Socialist uprising in England is foolish, on the grounds that the English people lack the passion and motivation to work for it.

And Orwell, too, had lost his passion. Christopher Hitchens notes in his book *Why Orwell Matters* that, in a literal sense, 1938 nearly stripped Orwell of his ability to speak out: "Orwell barely had a voice left when he left Catalonia; a fascist bullet had torn through his throat and damaged his vocal chords" (Hitchens 68). But the bullet alone cannot be blamed for the shift in Orwell's demeanor, so what was it that caused such a transition from the energetic idealism of *The Road to Wigan Pier* to the scornful bitterness and disillusionment of *Homage to Catalonia*?

It is not simply the case that the betrayals within the Republican cause were the cause of Orwell's disillusionment with Communism, but there is truth to the claim. In his memoir, Orwell spends a great deal of time writing about the external forces that would cause the total collapse of the anti-Francoist effort in Spain. He correctly identifies the right-wing Communists' association with the U.S.S.R. as the cause of the political backstabbing that ultimately cost the Republicans the war (*Homage* 53-70). Russian interests were not compatible with the spirit of unification that brought the Anarchists, Liberals, and Socialists to fight side-by-side. It was the agenda of the Stalinist Right to eradicate any symptoms of Trotskyism in Spain, as doing so would, in theory, crush the power of the Left Opposition both in the Soviet Union and abroad. The Communists also intended to hold off on revolution in Spain, allegedly so that they could gather more sympathy to the Communist cause before engaging in an uprising. However, Orwell's writing suggests that, rather than being immediately discouraged by the success of the Stalinist forces in quelling the potential for a revolution of

the Left, he was able to hold on to hope for the Republican cause. Orwell identifies the Right's efforts as misguided and "mistaken": "I have given my reasons for thinking that the Communist anti-revolutionary policy was mistaken, but so far as its effect upon the war goes I do not hope that my judgment is right. A thousand times I hope that it is wrong.³ I would wish to see this war won by any means whatever" (*Homage* 70). Though skeptical, Orwell maintains hope for the success of the fight against Fascism. There are many suggestions in the text that Orwell's hope for the success of the Republican cause, in spite of the external forces at work to destroy it, is reflective of a state of deep denial and that he was at least somewhat conscious of how futile his support for the Republicans truly was. But at the time of *Homage to Catalonia*'s publication, the war was still on, Orwell apparently still held onto some level of hope for the Republican effort, and the political backstabbing that took place behind the scenes in the Spanish Civil War was still on-going. The betrayals the Stalinist Right perpetrated against the anti-Francoist resistance certainly had some influence on Orwell's discouragement, but given the circumstances under which *Homage to Catalonia* was published, and given the text itself, it is unlikely that these betrayals were the sole cause of Orwell's discouragement. It is worth considering also that the way in which the Spanish Civil War and the circumstances surrounding it were represented in the newspapers came as a source of great distress for Orwell and contributed greatly to his disillusionment with the Communist party.

The inner conflict of Orwell's ideology is perhaps the most defining feature of his later works. This conflict first becomes apparent in *Homage to Catalonia*, as the author simultaneously grows more fervent in his beliefs and more paranoid about corruptions of those beliefs. As his career progressed, he became more conflicted and dualistic in his thought. Orwell's writings during World War II are characterized by two opposite but equally prominent traits: his national pride (mixed with a moral obligation to crush Fascism)

³Over the course of several previous pages, Orwell has explained why he believes that the Communists' tactics will cost the Republicans the war.

and his skepticism about the British wartime government.⁴ Orwell sees the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists as dangerous forces in need of quelling, and he believes that Britain is the nation best equipped to do so. However, Orwell also wrote scathingly about the British ruling class—the class of politicians and aristocrats that would effectively decide Britain’s role in resisting Fascism—and about their intentions in fighting the war. In his 1941 essay “The Lion and The Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius,” a lengthy critique of English culture and attitudes towards the war and a proposal for a method of implementing Socialism in England, Orwell writes, “The British ruling class are fighting against Hitler, whom they have always regarded and whom some of them still regard as their protector against Bolshevism. That does not mean that they will deliberately sell out; but it does mean that at every decisive moment they are likely to falter, pull their punches, do the wrong thing” (“The Lion and the Unicorn” 322). Orwell’s criticisms of England’s upper classes and government serve to promote what he believes would be a stronger system of government to suit the needs of the masses; they are not idle complaints. And through these criticisms Orwell’s inner conflict reveals itself: he loves his country but is wary of the direction in which it is headed. Furthermore, the fact that Orwell would spend time writing such an elaborate critique in order to promote a Socialist agenda suggests that Orwell’s disillusionment with Communism was not a disillusionment with the ideology itself, but rather with the individuals responsible for corrupting the Communist cause.

III. THE RISE OF A CYNIC: A GLIMPSE INTO ORWELL’S LATE PERIOD

He could not blow his nose without moralising on

⁴For a fuller exploration of Orwell’s ideology during WWII, one may find it helpful to consult Bernard Crick’s *George Orwell: A Life and Hitchens’ Why Orwell Matters*, although Orwell’s own writings—in particular, “My Country Right or Left,” “Money and Guns,” and the weekly “As I Please” articles he wrote for *Tribune*, which offer extensive insight into Orwell’s personal opinions on the state of Britain—should be adequate in conveying the author’s thoughts.

conditions in the handkerchief industry.

—Cyril Connolly

Five years prior to the publication of *Animal Farm*, a book in which Orwell expresses a great deal of guilt for his own complacency as the forces of Stalin's government gradually corrupted Marxist ideologies, Orwell spent many pages of his essay "Inside the Whale" criticizing the apathy and irresponsibility of prominent authors such as Henry Miller towards the political turmoil raging throughout Europe in the 1930s. In his diatribe about the moral responsibilities of writers, Orwell invokes the parable of Jonah and the whale, referring to a passage of Miller's own book *Max and the White Phagocytes*. Orwell writes,

The book includes a long essay on the diaries of Anais Nin [...]. [The] interesting passage is one in which he compares Anais Nin—evidently a completely subjective, introverted writer—to Jonah in the whale's belly. In passing [Miller] refers to an essay that Aldous Huxley wrote some years ago [...]. Huxley [...] professes something peculiarly horrible in the idea of being in a 'visceral prison'. Miller retorts that [...] there are many worse things than being swallowed by whales, and the passage makes it clear that he himself finds the idea rather attractive. ("Inside the Whale" 242)

Orwell goes on to note that the whale's belly is a metaphor for being comfortable, that the reason English-speaking people "invariably [speak] of Jonah and the *whale*" (242) rather than Jonah and the some-other-aquatic-creature is that whales are large and their bellies are spacious and comfortable. To Orwell, Henry Miller is a "willing Jonah," one who "feels no impulse to alter or control the process that he is undergoing" (243). Miller, along with those writers with similarly apathetic political views, is comfortable to the point of irresponsible complacency and, worse yet, acceptance of

his condition.⁵ That Orwell writes such a passionate diatribe against complacency and acceptance a mere five years before accusing himself of being complacent is intriguing yet unsurprising. As a journalist during World War II, he witnessed the corruption of truth more times than one could reasonably count, and as a propagandist, he watched as his own words were twisted to satisfy views with which he vehemently disagreed. Above all, his conflicted sense of national identity came into conflict with his very strongly defined sense of morality. Orwell was a reluctant patriot and an avid moralist, much like Jonathan Swift before him.

IV. THE REVOLUTION DISCOURAGED: *NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR* AND POST-WAR FUTILITY

What it is really meant to do is to discuss the implications of dividing the world up into “Zones of Influence.”

—George Orwell

There is no “last hurrah” in literature more significant than *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Just seven months after the publication of the novel, Orwell would be dead of complications from tuberculosis at the age of forty-six. His final book was, in many ways, a manifesto: a densely packed collection of the author’s thoughts and fears about politics, culture, psychology, and existential anguish. In it, he reflects on the nature of futility with regards to a nation full of discouraged persons; he does not limit the reflection to the individual’s struggle against futility.

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell abandons any pious notions he’d previously had about speaking out for the good of the people. The protagonist, Winston Smith, is utterly self-serving in

⁵Orwell expanded his argument for moral and political responsibility in writing—particularly in journalism—in numerous essays, including “Politics and the English Language,” “Writers and Leviathan,” and “A Prize for Ezra Pound.” Orwell’s views on the morality of writing and art are entirely too intricate to spend too much time getting into here, but they deserve at least a few forty-page analyses of their own.

his antipathies for the ominous “They” of the novel, the Inner Party. He makes no attempt to lead the proletariat to insurrection. Quite the contrary, it is Winston’s belief that the proles must stir up their own rebellion, that no dissenting Party member could ever hope to lead a successful revolt: “If there was hope, it must lie in the proles, because only there, in those swarming disregarded masses, [...] could the force to destroy the Party ever be generated. The Party could not be overthrown from within. Its enemies, if it had any enemies, had no way of coming together or even identifying one another” (*Nineteen Eighty-Four* 71). Winston’s belief that the proles must work to overthrow the Party recalls one of the opinions expressed by Orwell in “The Lion and the Unicorn”: one group (i.e., the proles) must act in opposition to another group (i.e., the Party) in order to change the circumstances of the present. As an individual, Winston is powerless. His anger, his fear, and his dissidence are all deeply personal.

That the protagonist’s motivations throughout the novel are based in a need for self-preservation is vitally important in understanding one level of the novel: the story of one man’s futile opposition to the world around him. Winston Smith is not a Messianic figure sent to liberate the oppressed peoples of Oceania and bring them to freedom. He is a single political dissident struggling to exist inside a system that censors dissident thought. Alone, Winston Smith lacks the ability to incite rebellion. Even in partnership with his lover and fellow dissident, Julia, he is unable to effect any noticeable change in the political body of the Oceanian government. The idea that the Outer Party and its members are powerless to aid the proles in an overthrow of the Inner Party stands in direct opposition to Orwell’s early and mid-period work and to the writings of Karl Marx. In the latter half of *The Road to Wigan Pier*,⁶ Orwell appeals to the English middle class to reform labor conditions for the working class, not only on monetary or idealistic terms but on humanitarian ones. He opens his argument by playing into middle class prejudices and acknowledging the social differences between the middle and working classes. He writes,

⁶Said latter half could easily and accurately be renamed *The Socialist Manifesto*.

Every middle-class person has a dormant class-prejudice which needs only a small thing to arouse it; and if he is over forty he probably has a firm conviction that his own class has been sacrificed to the class below. [...] In his eyes the workers are not a submerged race of slaves, they are a sinister flood creeping upwards to engulf himself and his friends and his family and to sweep all culture and all decency out of existence (132).

This statement by Orwell may at first seem hyperbolic, but the reality it reflects is what the author sees as an injustice caused by complacency and snobbishness. In his attempts to divert the middle class from its tendency toward apathy, Orwell does not seek to empathize with those who might discourage his call to arms. Earlier on in the book, he successfully trivializes such protestors' arguments against middle class Socialism by reducing the difference between the classes to four words: "*The lower classes smell*" (127; italics Orwell's). What he goes on to argue is that the members of the middle class have an inherent duty to protect the working class. Much in the way that Marx challenged Proudhon's beliefs about the role of the middle class in enabling Communism, Orwell challenges Marx's claims about bourgeois Socialism, that "the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class" (Marx 114), and proposes a barebones form of Socialism that engages the financial interests, the desire for self-preservation, and the fears of the middle class simultaneously. Of particular note are those fears, of which Orwell writes, "What [those who claim an ideological opposition to Socialism] are afraid of is not the things that are going to happen in their own lifetime, but the things that are going to happen in the remote future when Socialism is a reality" (*Wigan Pier* 186). In other words, the greatest fear of the anti-Socialist factions of the middle class is that the future will be radically different than the present. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell imagines what such a world would be like. The world of the novel is a manifestation of the most horrific possible outcome for a pseudo-Socialist England; it is the culmina-

tion of all the fears of the Socialism-resistant middle class.

Roughly halfway through the novel, when the happiness shared by Winston and Julia reaches its peak, Orwell writes, “Both of them knew—in a way, it was never out of their minds—that what was now happening could not last long. There were times when the fact of impending death seemed as palpable as the bed they lay on” (154). The futility of their love, of their resistance, is an inescapable truth, one which neither Winston nor Julia can fully ignore, despite their best efforts:

But there were also times when they had the illusion not only of safety but of permanence. So long as they were actually in this room, they both felt, no harm could come to them. Getting there was difficult and dangerous, but the room itself was a sanctuary. [...] Often they gave themselves up to daydreams of escape. Their luck would hold indefinitely, and they would carry on their intrigue, just like this, for the remainder of their natural lives. [...] Or they would disappear, alter themselves out of recognition, learn to speak with proletarian accents, get jobs in a factory, and live out their lives undetected in a back street. It was all nonsense, as they both knew. In reality there was no escape (154-155).

Earlier in the novel, Orwell’s narrator identifies the copulation of Winston and Julia as “a blow struck against the Party [...], a political act” (129); however, the act itself is hardly dissident in comparison to the hope that Winston and Julia are able to maintain in

their “sanctuary” (155).⁷ The last attribute of Winston’s personality removed from him during his rehabilitation is not his love for Julia, but rather his hope of resisting the Party. During the final torture scene, Orwell writes, “To think, to think, even with a split second left—to think was the only hope. [...] The mask was closing on [Winston’s] face. The wire brushed his cheek. And then—no, it was not relief, only hope, a tiny fragment of hope. Too late, perhaps too late” (296-297). Winston’s sustained hope, even when a cage of rats is being lowered onto his head, that he can think up some way to escape his torture and, in doing so, resist the Party is replaced by a hope that he might be able to alleviate his suffering. At this point, as Winston pleads with his torturers to “Do it to Julia!” (297), Orwell makes clear that Winston’s sole motivation throughout the novel is self-preservation, not love or political dissent. And at this point, Winston abandons all hope for revolution. He hopes instead

⁷The irony of the “sanctuary” must not be overlooked. It is in the room that Winston and Julia were able to momentarily delude themselves that their love was not doomed, and in the room that makes them feel safe that they incriminate themselves and are arrested. It is when they are comfortable enough to become complacent that they are captured. This sentiment that passivity and comfortableness lead to one’s destruction is reminiscent of the concluding paragraph of *Homage to Catalonia*, in which Orwell describes the lethargy of the English countryside and the familiar tedium of London while expressing his fears for the future of his country, and of the opinions espoused in “Inside the Whale.” However, in contrast with the doomed love of Winston and Julia are their fantasies that “they would disappear, alter themselves out of recognition, learn to speak with proletarian accents, get jobs in a factory, and live out their lives undetected in a back street” (155). This is a curious line when considered in context, but it is more curious still when placed along with the rest of Orwell’s late-period writings. Within the text itself, this fantasy comes just before Orwell writes, “It was all nonsense, as they both knew. In reality there was no escape” (155), suggesting that Winston and Julia have already reached a level of complacency that would prevent them from ever being able to act on their own behalf to evade the Party. But the fantasy of escape by joining with the proletariat also reflects ideas expressed in Orwell’s earlier work—in particular, *The Road to Wigan Pier*. The recognized futility of the lovers’ fantasies implies an ideological separation from Orwell’s earlier work. The unity of middle and working classes that Orwell proposes in *The Road to Wigan Pier* is something that he considers hopeless in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

to die, which suggests that he has abandoned even his desire for self-preservation (308). Unlike Dante in the *Inferno*, Winston Smith is not motivated by love, so when he reaches the deepest levels of torment, he is unable to go on. The only hope that remains is in the proles—a collective that does not include Winston and Julia. The appendix to the novel, “The Principles of Newspeak,” suggests that the proles are eventually able to convert said hope into real rebellion against the Party and that they succeed in overthrowing the despotic totalitarian regime.

That Orwell goes on to blatantly contradict his youthful idealism about cooperation amongst the classes in his later work suggests a major change in attitude toward his political beliefs. At the time he wrote *The Road to Wigan Pier*, Orwell had not yet undergone his great disillusionment with Communism. His argument was directed toward the middle class, and he focused on the moral obligations of the middle class to the proletariat. But after his experiences in Spain, during which he saw a proletarian militia fighting for the good of both the working and middle classes while right-wing, middle class Socialists and Communists worked to prevent the success of a Marxist uprising, Orwell’s approach to Socialism changed. The middle class in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*—those Outer Party members who rarely interact with the proles—is incapable of leading the proletariat to freedom. The compulsion of the middle class to preserve itself outweighs the moral obligation to the proletariat. There is no implication in the novel that this middle-class compulsion is likely to change. The weight of revolution is placed solely on the shoulders of the proles.

In the appendix, which resembles an academic essay written by a middle class intelligentsia-type, there is no direct mention of the proletarian uprising implied by the abandonment of “Newspeak” and the dissolution of Oceania. The implied author of “The Principles of Newspeak” distances himself from proletarian values, suggesting that even in a future not governed by totalitarian regimes, the barrier between the middle and working classes still exists. The ending of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, though happier in tone and content than the rest of the novel, is still not utopian. Such a completely uplifting ending would be disingenuous to Orwell’s

vision. By 1949, his hopes for a utopian Socialist or Communist system of government had been discouraged and replaced by hopes for something only slightly better than the present state of affairs. The erasure of proletarian efforts from the historical narrative implied by the appendix suggests that the apathy and self-importance of the middle class continues to exist after the fall of the Inner Party. The ending of the novel, while optimistic, is skeptical about the future, and its optimism comes from the belief that a group of proletarians could overthrow a totalitarian regime; it does not imply a proletarian-run government, but rather suggests a return of the Capitalist system in place before the rise of the Inner Party.

Orwell's commentaries on the nature of futility and his speculations about how a functional form of Socialism could exist without corruption are not purely theoretical, though. Through Winston Smith and Julia, Orwell explores themes of futility within individual and interpersonal contexts. Through class relationships, Orwell explores ideas of political futility and resistance to futility. But the novel also comments on futility with regard to a population of discouraged people. One way in which this commentary is accomplished is through the various characters of the novel and the symbolic identities they assume. The characters in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* help ground the novel in the time period in which it was written rather than in some near future, thus suggesting that the novel is meant to be taken as a kind of social and political commentary on its own time. This suggestion is reinforced by the mood, atmosphere, and language used by Orwell to present the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

The iconic opening line—"It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen" (*Nineteen Eighty-Four* 1)—has become a kind of formula for establishing scene in the literature of dystopia. The discomfiting combination of the adjectives

“bright” and “cold,” emphasized by the identification of April⁸ as the temporal occasion for the beginning of the novel, immediately creates an air of uneasiness around the setting. The immediate association with military timekeeping and the twenty-four hour clock suggests an atmosphere of warfare and violence. Furthermore, traditional superstitions involving the number thirteen and the fact that clocks with bell towers strike a maximum of twelve times suggests a degree of uncanniness and alienation. This highly effective opening sentence immediately establishes the atmosphere, mood, and setting of the novel as ominous and foreboding.

The most iconic image Orwell presents in the opening pages of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is one of the most famous from the novel: the poster of Big Brother. The poster is described as “colored [...], too large for indoor display [...]”. It depicted simply an enormous face, more than a meter wide: the face of a man of about forty-five, with a heavy black mustache and ruggedly handsome features. [...] **BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU**, the caption beneath it ran” (1). The immediate assumption most readers make is that the image

⁸The month of April is frequently associated with turmoil, in part due to the violent atmospheric changes associated with spring. Many religious traditions see April as a time of rebirth, a celebration of the virility of spring. In the Christian tradition, the celebrations of both the death and the resurrection of Christ are frequently held in April, thus signifying a kind of tumult and disruption of the standard pattern of physical life ending in death. The juxtaposition of April, a month often associated with hope and celebration, with the deadness of Airstrip One is meant to create an unsettling contrast.

The connotations of April with T.S. Eliot’s poem *The Waste Land* cannot be neglected here: “April is the cruelest month, breeding / Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing / Memory and desire, stirring / Dull roots with spring rain” (Eliot 1-4). Eliot’s poem employs a similar narrative to that of Orwell’s final novel: a solitary, discomfited man in search of some sort of fulfillment or rejuvenation of hope is confronted and nearly defeated by the harsh, industrial world around him. The positive note that concludes *The Waste Land*—a repetition of the blessing “Shantih” (433)—is similar to the “happy” ending implied by the appendix to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and Orwell’s appendix is reminiscent in tone and style of the extensive notes by Eliot that follow the text of *The Waste Land*. It is not only likely but highly probable that the ending of *The Waste Land* was influential on Orwell in composing the appendix to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

of Big Brother is meant to resemble Stalin, but while this may be true in part, the poster is more reminiscent of the British Army recruitment posters, featuring an oversized depiction of the head of Lord Kitchener and a finger pointed accusingly at any passersby, that were ubiquitous in England during World War I. Winston's account in his journal of going to the movies (8-9) and the narrator's account of the Two Minutes Hate (11-15) bear remarkable resemblance to the pro-war propaganda films and the pre-film newsreels, which were a form of propaganda in their own right, that dominated British cinemas during World War II.

What makes the parallels between British wartime propaganda and the propaganda of Oceania particularly horrifying to Orwell's initial audience is that the Britishness of Oceania is intertwined with undeniably Soviet connotations. There is no way of discerning whether the face on the posters is that of Stalin or of Kitchener. Orwell writes of three-year plans, party uniforms, and four Politburo-esque bureaucratic ministries ruled by a political entity known only as "the Party," thus forcibly associating the history of the Inner party with that of the Stalinist regime in the USSR. Most important, though, in tying the propaganda of Britain to Stalin is the Trotsky figure, Emmanuel Goldstein:

Goldstein was the renegade and backslider who once, long ago [...], had been one of the leading figures of the Party, almost on a level with Big Brother himself, and then had engaged in counterrevolutionary activities, had been condemned to death, and had mysteriously disappeared. The program of the Two Minutes Hate varied from day to day, but there was none in which Goldstein was not the principal figure (12).

Goldstein's role in the Two Minutes Hate is similar both to the way Trotsky was portrayed in the propaganda of Stalin's Russia and to the way Hitler was portrayed in the propaganda of Churchill's England. Hitler, too, was the clear villain. His supporters and colleagues were pushed to the background in order to make him look

weaker, as if he were alone in his cause and had only come to power by means of shrewd manipulation and a series of unfortunate accidents.

Neither Britain nor Russia can definitively be said to be the sole influence for Oceania, as the histories of both countries are similar enough for Orwell successfully to have blurred the lines as to which image is meant to signify which country. The implications of these parallels, if they were not clear enough from the opening chapter alone, are laid out in the text of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in the fictional political tractate *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*, allegedly written by Goldstein himself. Within the novel, it is unclear who actually wrote the dissident work. The title page says “Emmanuel Goldstein,” but during Winston Smith’s reformation, his torturer and betrayer, O’Brien, claims at least partial authorship. Given the context and atmosphere of the third part of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, it is more likely that the work was, in fact, written and disseminated by the Inner Party to weed out dissidents. But it is shortly after O’Brien convinces Winston of the tractate’s true authorship that Winston is convinced, again by O’Brien, that two plus two equals five. An equally plausible reading of this sequence of events is that O’Brien is deliberately lying to Winston about the authorship of the tractate in order to make Winston less certain of his own understanding of the world, thus allowing O’Brien to be more successful in his attempts to reform the dissident. The former reading of the scene is more congruent with the rest of the novel, but the latter reading makes more sense in relation to the Pavlovian conditioning tactics employed by O’Brien in his reformation of Winston Smith. The lack of clarity here may also be a rhetorical strategy on Orwell’s part to challenge the reader’s notions of reality and force the reader into the practice of *doublethink*. Both readings, though contradictory, make equal sense within the logic of the novel, but neither reading can be assumed to be the “correct” reading.

The unidentifiable author of *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism* establishes that there are virtually no differences, structural or ideological, between the governments of the three totalitarian superstates (i.e., Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia)

apart from their names and zones of influence. Oceania is comprised of the Americas and Great Britain; Eurasia takes up Russia, most of Europe, parts of Africa, and a fair amount of Asia; and Eastasia is made up of Japan, most of continental Asia, Australia, and the remaining territories in Africa (189-190). The fact that Britain, Russia, and Japan are all directly identified in the text of the novel as parts of their respective superstates implies that these places are of particular importance in developing an understanding of Orwell's commentary on political structure and ideology of the time; the reader is meant to associate Oceania with Britain, Eurasia with Russia, and Eastasia with Japan and by extension should associate the real world political entities in control of these countries with the political entities in control of the superstates within the novel. If the Ingsoc Party is meant to represent, or at least draw connections to, the British government under the rule of the post-war Labour regime, and if Eurasia and Eastasia are meant to reflect Russian Stalinism and Japanese Fascism, respectively, it is implied that the politics of the Attlee ministry⁹ were comparable to the politics of Stalin's government in the Soviet Union and the imperial Fascism of Japan or, for closer comparison, Nazi Germany. This comparison is particularly pointed when taking into account the fact that, historically, both Stalinism and German National Socialism assumed to call themselves Socialist ideologies, but in Orwell's mind, both schools of thought more closely resembled Fascism than recogniz-

⁹i.e., the post-war Labour regime

able form of Socialism.¹⁰ The indistinguishability of the three super-states, or “zones of influence,” in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* suggests that, to Orwell, Labour Socialism, Stalinism, and Fascism were virtually indistinguishable, too, and for the British Labour Party under the direction of Clement Attlee to call itself Socialist merely constituted a variation of the same lie told by Hitler and Stalin.

That Orwell chose to begin his novel with an indictment of Labour Party politics through comparison with Stalinism suggests a heightened degree of importance to his commentaries on the state of Britain in the post-war era. That he chose to reiterate the comparison in greater detail later in the novel suggests that these commentaries are not only important, they are crucial to understanding the novel as a whole. In Orwell’s own opinion, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is a discussion of the Zones of Influence model in world politics (“Letter to Roger Senhouse, 26 December 1948”). Though themes of the futility of the individual in conflict with a totalitarian collectivist regime and the grim imagery of a future world under a bureaucratic dictatorship often get more attention in discussions of Orwell’s final novel, it is the commentary Orwell offers on the British political system in 1948, that the brand of Socialism endorsed by the Labour Party under the Attlee Ministry was comparable both to Stalinism and to Fascism, that contribute to a better understanding of the text and its relation to the topic of futility.

The commentaries Orwell offers in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

¹⁰No footnote or citation can adequately explain Orwell’s arguments about the Fascist natures of Stalin and Hitler. These arguments are spread over many essays and pamphlets throughout the post-Spanish War period of Orwell’s career. What is evident is that Orwell believed Stalin and Hitler to be Fascists under the guise of Socialism. While most of the Western world has come to agree with Orwell with regards to Hitler, there is still some debate about whether or not Stalin’s policies were in fact Fascist or if they were merely the result of some corrupted form of Socialism. Orwell’s essays “Inside the Whale,” “The Lion and The Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius,” “Literature and Totalitarianism,” “Wells, Hitler and the World State,” “Catastrophic Gradualism,” “Marx and Russia,” along with his review for the English translation of *Mein Kampf* and a political-biographical essay about Arthur Koestler, do a particularly good job of illuminating Orwell’s thoughts about totalitarian government, Fascism, Socialism, Hitler and Stalin.

regarding the culture and politics of his own present day reveal a broader and more intricate statement on the nature of futility. Though the efforts of Winston Smith to undermine the Party's regime are damned, pointless, and selfish from the start, his cause does eventually succeed. "The Principles of Newspeak"—the "scholarly appendix" (Pynchon xxiv) about which much has been written and little included—refers to the totalitarian government of Oceania and its primary language, Newspeak, exclusively in the past tense and with a fair amount of critical distance, suggesting that the reign of Big Brother and the Inner Party has been over for quite some time, given that "Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak" (1984 54). Thomas Pynchon points out,

Moreover, it is our own pre-Newspeak English language that is being used to write the essay. Newspeak was supposed to have become general by 2050, and yet it appears that it did not last that long, let alone triumph, that the ancient humanistic ways of thinking inherent in standard English have persisted, survived, and ultimately prevailed, and that perhaps the social and moral order it speaks for has even, somehow, been restored (Pynchon xxiv).

The quick disposal of Newspeak, along with the implied restoration of pre-Oceanian value systems, is perhaps the novel's most hopeful aspect. Not only does the totalitarian oligarchy fail to achieve its goals and to maintain itself, but it also does not last long enough to have any significant impact on the course of British history. The most elaborate history of Newspeak is a mere appendix that often goes unread; the attempts of the Inner Party to control the future were more futile than Winston's hope for a proletarian revolution or his desire for self-preservation. What Orwell seems to say in his last great message to the peoples of Britain is that, though the present state of affairs may seem bleak, history has a way of dissolving even the most horrific of regimes. Put simply, efforts made in attempt to destroy all hope of what Orwell saw as a better future are as futile as those made in attempt to preserve it.

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
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Alexandra by Peter Constantinou, 2015, transfer on wood with
decollage 3x3 ft

Effects of Cattle Grazing and Mowing on Soil Carbon Evolution

Abstract:

Rotational, management intensive grazing is a common method of sequestering carbon by building soil organic matter, a vital tool in an era of climate change. Although the positive effects of grazing compared to mowing are supported by research, the mechanism is not fully understood. The short-term effects of rotational cattle grazing and mowing on the carbon content of rhizospheric soil associated with perennial ryegrass (*Lolium perenne*) were studied on the Warren Wilson College Farm in Swannanoa, North Carolina. No significant difference in soil carbon or nitrate produced during a 24-hour incubation was observed among the grazing, mowing, and control treatments, or for other soil characteristics measured. Linear regression analyses comparing soil carbon evolved and C:N ratios, total soil C, and gravimetric soil water content revealed patterning by field. These observations lead to the conclusion that either: 1) there is no significant difference in short-term carbon evolution as a result of grazing or mowing; or 2) a difference in field history confounded any treatment effect.

Brian Liechti | Environmental Studies



My passion for environmentalism and sustainable agriculture grew out of summers spent gardening in the suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio on the shores of Lake Erie. This passion led me to transfer from Ohio State to Warren Wilson in search of a program and community that aligned with my passions and interests. I

put my Honors ENS degree to work by returning to Wilson as an admissions counselor, helping the next generation of high school students realize the same dreams that I realized as a student here.

I. INTRODUCTION

While the beneficial effects of well-managed grazing on plant health, vigor, and resiliency are well established in the scientific and agricultural communities (Bardgett & Wardle, 2003), there is greater recent interest in the broader ecological effects of herbivores on animal-plant-soil-microbe interactions (Hamilton & Frank, 2001; Hamilton et al., 2008; Mikola et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2006). In fact, herbivory can not only benefit the defoliated plant and its associated rhizospheric microbiological community, but also the neighboring plants as well through root sugar and growth factor exudation (Bardgett & Wardle, 2003).

Large grazing herbivores influence beneficial ecological processes in three ways: first, they return more chemically available organic matter than the original plant material; second, they return more nutritionally concentrated organic matter, increasing decomposition rates; third, they increase the prevalence of soil labile carbon, the chief food source of soil microorganisms (Hamilton et al., 2008). The transformation of carbon compounds from living plant tissue to exudate/detritus to microbe to soil organic matter is often referred to as soil carbon evolution.

However, many studies drawing conclusions on grazing actually performed simulated grazing by mowing or cutting in a laboratory. One study, performed by Mikola et al (2009), found significant differences between grazing, mowing, and control treatments on a rotationally-grazed, grass-based dairy in Finland, with grazing having the greatest positive effects on plant and soil health despite equal manure applications under each treatment. In other words, a field study found significant differences between mowing and grazing, though most “grazing” studies actually used mowing as a substitute for grazing.

Dr. Kristine Nichols, Chief Scientist of the Rodale Institute of Kutztown, Pennsylvania, hypothesized that these differences are the result of mowing being an inappropriate substitute for grazing—plants respond to mowing as they would a wound, a response which differs from that which occurs in grazing (personal communication, September 25, 2014). Could this reasoning explain the observed differences between grazing and mowing?

The answer to this question might lie in soil respiration and microbial activity as a measurement of grazing system health. Soil respiration is an effective measure of soil fertility (Haney et al., 2008), and soils with both a high level of organic matter, the chief food source for soil microbes, and respiration, the chief measurement of soil microbial activity, tend to have higher plant health indicators (Altieri & Nicholls, 2003). Therefore, measuring soil respiration represents both an inexpensive and effective measurement of the soil carbon cycle, soil microbial activity, and plant health. Mikola et al. (2009) could not explain the significant difference between grazing and mowing treatments within the parameters of their study. This study will explore if a difference exists between grazing, mowing, and control treatments by comparing soil microbial activity in the rhizospheric soil beneath each treatment.

II. METHODS AND MATERIALS: SETUP AND TREATMENTS IN THE FIELD

The experimental design consisted of three different treatments: (1) a control treatment with no defoliation because cattle had been excluded (C plots); (2) a mowed treatment with mechanical, human-induced defoliation to a height of four inches and no physical exposure to cattle (M plots); (3) a grazed treatment with defoliation caused by grazing cattle to a height of four inches (G plots). The grazing and mowing heights were consistent with the Warren Wilson College Farm's grazing management goals, not determined by the experimental designers.

The G plots were representatively sampled post-treatment and marked with stakes. Grazed samples were not taken within one meter of visible signs of excreta. The C and M plots were identified and excluded prior to treatment within representatively selected one meter by one meter exclosures of four T-posts, insulators, and polywire. These exclosures prevented the physical presence of cows, as well as any possibility of sample contamination by excreta. In order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the exclosures, the sampling areas for all treatments were limited to within ten meters of an electric fence line and treatment samples were representatively taken within this ten-meter perimeter.

The G and M treatments were applied when the cows entered a new paddock. Cattle were free to begin grazing the G treatment. The M treatment was applied within the electrified enclosure and was mowed to a height of four inches when the cattle entered the paddock. In this way, each treatment would have the same amount of time from the treatment event until sampling.

Samples were taken 6–24 hours after treatment. This is the timeframe in which the greatest effect of root exudation on microbial activity and carbon evolution occurs (Haney et al., 2008.)

Sampling Procedure

For each treatment, rhizospheric soil was collected from within each one meter by one meter plot from grasses of the same species, using the method of Hamilton et al. (2008). Each sample used the rhizospheric soil from five individual plants, all perennial ryegrass (*Lolium perenne*), for approximately 500 g of soil per sample. A portion of this initial soil sample was tested for field soil moisture content, using the method of Gardner (1986). The remainder of the soil samples were then air-dried at room temperature and stored in plastic bags. These air-dried samples were then analyzed for total carbon and nitrogen content and soil respiration.

Site Selection and Description

This experiment took place on the Warren Wilson College (WWC) Farm in Swannanoa, North Carolina (35°36' N, 82°26' W) between October 31, 2014 and November 12, 2014. Consisting of approximately 275 acres, the WWC Farm contains a mixture of semi-improved upland permanent pastures and rotationally cropped, improved bottomland pastures. The permanent pastures are primarily mixtures of improved fescue (*Festuca arundinacea*), matua (*Bromus willdenowii*), wild and improved white clover (*Trifolium repens*), red clover (*Trifolium pretense*), plantain (*Plantago major*), dock (*Rumex crispus*), and other various grasses, legumes, and forbs. The bottomlands spend three years of the five-year rotation in improved grass and legume forage—primarily alfalfa (*Medicago sativa*), perennial ryegrass (*Lolium perenne*), white clover, red clover, and chicory (*Cichorium intybus*)—the fourth year in corn (*Zea*

mays), and the fifth in barley (*Hordeum vulgare*). Cow-calf (*Bos taurus*), beef, ewe (*Ovis aries*), and lamb herds rotationally graze these forage fields, while the grain crops are primarily fed to the poultry (*Gallus gallus domesticus*) flocks and swine (*Sus domesticus*) herds.

The fields chosen for this experiment followed the management-intensive grazing rotation of our yearling beef herd through the pastures. The first of these pastures is Back Bottom, an approximately ten-acre bottomland field in its second year of forages in the five-year crop rotation. Its soil is classified as alluvial loamy sand and as prime farmland. The soil complexes are Biltmore loamy sand, Dellwood-Reddies complex, Iotla loam, Rosman fine sandy loam, and Statler loam, with the latter comprising almost half of the ten acres. These soil series are very similar in structure, texture, hydrology, and agricultural capacity.

The Back Bottom paddocks ranged from 1 to 2 acres, which, with 22 maiden heifers (~1000 lbs/head) and 51 short yearling calves (~600 lbs/head), approximately had a stocking density of 27–53,000 lbs/acre/day, or 27–53 animal units/acre/day. One sample was collected from each treatment in one paddock per day.

The second pasture was Homecoming, a permanent pasture approximately seven acres in size. Similarly to Back Bottom, Homecoming is significantly characterized by alluvial loam soils. These classifications are Dillard loam, Iotla loam, Statler loam, and Tate loam, with Dillard and Iotla loams characterizing over 90% of the pasture (USDA NRCS, 2015).

The paddocks in Homecoming were approximately two acres, which equals a stocking density of approximately 27,000 lbs/acre/day, or 27 animal units/acre/day.

The third and final pasture site for this experiment was Big Bottom, a bottomland and crop rotation field in its third and final year of pasture in the five-year crop rotation. Approximately 23 acres in size, Big Bottom shares the same characteristic alluvial sandy loam soils as the previous two sites. These complexes include Biltmore sandy loam, Dellwood-Reddies, Dillard loam, Iotla loam, Rosman fine sandy loam, and Statler loam. The Biltmore sandy loam, Dillard loam, and Rosman fine sandy loam comprise nearly

85% of the 23 acres (USDA NRCS, 2015). Again, the stocking density of the Big Bottom paddocks was approximately 27,000 lbs/acre/day, or 27 animal units/acre/day, as each paddock was approximately two acres in area.

The soil texture, pasture composition, and stocking density of each of these pastures were similar and were accounted for in this experiment as possible extraneous factors.

Testing Procedure

The methods of Gardner (1986) were used to test field soil moisture content. For total soil C and N analysis, an Exeter CE 440 Elemental Analyzer and standard procedures were used (Exeter Analytical, 2014). For the measurement of soil CO₂ evolution through soil incubation, NaOH base trap, and HCl back titration, the methods of Haney et. al (2008), with modifications given the short-term (24 hour) incubation period were used. The concentrations of NaOH, HCl, and Ba(NO₃)₂ used were .3 M, .3 M, and 10%, respectively, to account for lower rates of carbon evolution as compared to longer term incubations.

Methods of Statistical Analysis

A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare the mean 24-hour soil respiration rates, in milligrams of CO₂ evolved per kilogram of soil, for each of the three treatments. Similarly, a Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was performed to compare the mean 24-hour respiration rates of the three different pastures. These were performed using SPSS data analysis software.

Linear regressions were performed to assess the relationships between CO₂ evolved and total soil carbon, CO₂ evolved and C:N ratio, and CO₂ evolved and gravimetric soil water content. These were performed using SPSS data analysis software.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The ANOVA comparing the means of the 24-hour soil respiration for the three treatments—grazing, mowing, and a control—yielded a p-value of .899, indicating no significant differ-

ence in mean respiration among the three treatments. Under the conditions of this study, there was no difference between the three treatments (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Comparison of Soil Respiration Between Treatments

The ANOVA comparing the means of 24-hour soil respiration among the three pastures—Back Bottom, Homecoming, and Big Bottom—yielded a p-value of .000, indicating there is a significant difference between at least two of the fields, as shown in Figure 2. A post-hoc analysis of Mann-Whitney U pairwise comparisons, corrected with a Bonferroni factor, was performed to determine between which fields the significant differences occurred. Values between all fields were statistically significant, indicating that the mean 24-hour soil respiration rates—across all treatments—were different among all the fields, with Homecoming having the highest, followed by Big Bottom, and then Back Bottom, as shown in Figure 3.



Figure 2. Comparison of Soil Respiration Between Fields

Each node shows the sample average rank of 1=BackBottom,2=Homecoming,3=BigBottom.

Sample1-Sample2		Test Statistic	Std. Error	Std. Test Statistic	Sig.	Adj.Sig.
1	Back Bot.-Big Bot.	-10.400	4.073	-2.553	.011	.032
	Back Bot.-Homecoming	-23.000	4.554	-5.050	.000	.000
3	Homecoming-Big Bot.	12.600	4.073	3.093	.002	.006

Figure 3. Soil Respiration Between Fields

The linear regression analysis of CO² evolved and total soil carbon revealed a moderately correlated relationship between the two variables ($r^2=0.525$) (See Figure 4). This was the strongest correlation observed, with comparisons of CO² evolved and C:N ratio, and CO² evolved and gravimetric soil water content yielding weaker relationships ($r^2=0.230$ and $r^2=0.433$, respectively) (See Figures 5 and 6, respectively).




Figure 4. Comparison of Soil Respiration and Total Soil Carbon




Figure 5. Comparison of Soil Respiration and C:N Ratio




Figure 6. Comparison of Soil Respiration and Soil Water Content

The results of the linear regression comparing CO₂ evolved and C:N ratio combined with the results of the ANOVA comparing CO₂ evolved across treatments between the three fields, indicate the 'field effect' was stronger than any effects resulting from the treatments. In the regression analysis, three distinct clusters are apparent, each of which approximately belongs to a specific field: the top right cluster is Homecoming, the bottom left is Big Bottom, and the bottom right is Back Bottom. This, when combined with the significant differences in mean CO₂ evolved among all the fields, suggests that the three different pastures had a greater effect on soil rhizosphere properties and processes than the treatments.

This possibility has validity given that each field has a different short- and long-term agricultural history. Big Bottom and Back Bottom, though both cropping fields and of the same soil type and texture, are at differing stages of the five-year crop rotation employed on the Warren Wilson College Farm. Homecoming, also of the same soil type and texture, is a permanent pasture, cropped only for hay. Perhaps more significantly, it is and has been a site for overwintering certain sub-herd populations; recently, these have been yearling calves eating stored baleage. This concentrates nutrients and organic matter in this field more so than cropping fields.

IV. CONCLUSION

My research suggests that any difference in soil respiration as a result of grazing and mowing either does not exist or was not detected. If the latter is true, this is because the difference is very subtle and was not detected with statistical significance, or because the difference in field history between the fields had a stronger effect on rhizospheric soil properties and processes than either treatment.

Previous research, particularly that performed by Mikola et al (2008), found significant differences between grazing, mowing, and control treatments. However, that study was performed over a three-year period and included numerous laboratory analyses unreasonable for this study, given its time and financial restraints. Additionally, that study was performed in the same fields for those three years, instead of following a rotationally grazing herd. These differences in experimental design likely influenced the outcome of this study.

If this research is continued in the future, I would make several suggestions. Firstly, I would use one field for treatment during and throughout the growing season. My research took place at the end of the growing season and beginning of winter. Using one field in the growing season could have multiple impacts. These include eliminating any possible differences between fields as a source of externality. Additionally, repeated defoliations and recoveries throughout a management intensive grazing rotation during the growing season could reveal possible longer-term differences in soil respiration between treatments that were not possible during my research. Additionally, this would simultaneously increase the replications within a single field. Greater root exudation during the growing season, the time when forage plants are putting maximum photosynthetic energy into recovering for reproduction, could also affect the results. I would also suggest, if feasible, to sample multiple times per treatment per day to increase the replications of each paddock. This would give more statistical strength to outcomes and conclusions.

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Public Art Paradox: Involving the Public in Public Art

Abstract:

Public art has a unique relationship to its viewer. As art designed for a public space, its criteria is bound by its wide range of viewers. Public art reflects a space that is lived in and is often funded through public taxes. This then begs the question of public art: how should and how does artistic expression alter when the criteria involves creating art for a public population and setting? There is a paradox in public art: it is thought to be designed for public betterment, but most often the designated public is not informed or asked about these pieces prior to or after installation. Artistic expression within public art has not been repurposed to fit the needs and desires of the population who interact and live with these pieces. Private artists are hired on the expectation to exhibit their signature and innovative style, but are seldom asked to represent the public. Richard Serra's *Tilted Arc* is used to exemplify this popular but paradoxical process of public art. A decade-long court case over its removal illustrates an individual who uses a public space as their own private canvas to express private and partisan political feelings. To contrast Serra's case, Mya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial exhibits a democratic and inclusive process of design, where a neutral political aesthetic enables healthy political discourse. In order of fulfill its function, public art must be repurposed to fit the needs of its designated public through a democratic design process that encourages public involvement.

Anthony Mazza | Philosophy

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I. INTRODUCTION

Before I begin discussing public art, I think it is important to attempt to define what exactly we mean by this facet of artistic expression. When I began my research, I started casually asking people what public art meant to them; often they responded with something to the effect of “art in a public space” with little else to say on the matter. Although they are not at all wrong, I began to realize that the term “art” was being used as an umbrella for creative expression. Art has a reputation for being a very personal endeavor, where the expression of the artist holds no bounds for subject matter beyond their own creativity and intention. Elusive of definition, art’s value changes as quickly as its viewer. This then begs the question of public art: how *should* and how *does* artistic expression alter when the criteria involves creating art *for* a public population and setting? My paper aims to point out the lack of community engagement in contemporary public art practices and the problems that arise as a result. Furthermore, I show examples that illustrate the benefits of a more democratic public art process where art goes beyond conventional aesthetics to serve the function of political discourse in communities.

In exploring both public and private art, I found that the primary difference between the two is the relationship of the artist to the audience. Consider the difference between walking into a museum to view individual works of art versus walking through a public park and coming upon a sculpture. Both scenarios can be articulated as art for viewing by the public, but the system of value and appreciation are very different. In a museum, one expects and values the work based on the private expression and style of its producer. However provocative or taboo a piece may be, it is unlikely one will find an offended viewer complaining that it must be taken down from the museum walls. They simply don’t have to enter the museum or the section therein. It is not the same for public art. Public art is inherently political because of its public statement to its residents and visitors; it is inherently more personal to the spectator as an experience of a space they live in and fund through their taxes. It might be no surprise to see controversial and provoc-

ative art in museums (pornography, violence, etc.), but it would be strikingly inappropriate to find this in a public park.

It may have occurred to you that museums and parks are both often public spaces; the type of public space we refer to through “public art” should be better explained less it become unclear. My use of the term public art refers to work commissioned to have a place in a public space which otherwise would *not* necessarily be designated for artful purposes. Public art is an aesthetic experience added to an otherwise utilitarian public space: public plazas, parks, building exteriors, etc. Their location and funding are intimately linked to public life. The public works I am discussing are publicly owned or are financed by tax-payers. In short, I am attempting to illustrate that public art is more intimately tied to representing, and therefore involving, its resident public because of its cultural and fiscal ties. There is an implication that the artist hired to make these pieces is less involved with their own personal expression than is typically practiced in other forms of art because the value of its design is meant to take into account a specific population.

Much of the focus of an artist’s value is in their unique ability to portray a feeling; art is looking to find an autonomous act that captures an artist’s private expression.¹ This often means that provocative art is valued art. Art’s challenging nature entails that it often becomes political. As the previous paragraph discusses, the function of art changes for the artist when they are asked to make public pieces because art will lose its value in a singularly subjective and challenging form; it has to be appropriate for a public setting and provide for the interest of that public. Should public art not then transgress the typical valuations of private art, where challenging and innovative content are often the primary criteria? Public art serves a different function than other art practices and therefore cannot be generalized as simply “art in a public space.” It serves the function of public interest and therefore must move beyond the aesthetics of contemporary private art.

¹Hilde Hein, *Public Art: Thinking Museums Differently* (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2006), 1.

The *public art paradox* I have identified occurs when the value of private expression collides with the function of public art. The public art paradox arises when a private artist is hired to make public works of art but fails to properly serve or represent the designated public. As I experienced in my discussion with Asheville, North Carolina's Public Arts and Cultural Commission, the typical concern for government bodies who commission public artwork is the stylistic merit and reputation of the artist they hire. When an artist is hired on this expectation, the voices of the public sphere are often muffled. The focus becomes the artist and their expression, and not the function of the art for its community. Should public art not have clear and distinct criteria because of its unique political relationship to the public's interest?

Two complexities are at the source of this issue: the artist's responsibility to the public, and how we define the body of people we call "public." Although public art issues have gained some traction in the realm of philosophy, these questions have not been talked about or established enough to witness a restructuring of public art design through municipal bodies. A few questions must be answered to develop the discussion of these issues: What is the purpose of public art in representing or serving the public? And what do we mean by "the public"? These questions aim directly at my primary inquisition in restructuring public art: defining the responsibility of the private artist to the public in creating a public art piece. My investigation has shown me that there is seldom a dialogue between the artist and the public. The solution to the public art paradox lies in a democratic process whereby we involve members of the public in a discussion and/or vote for the function and design of public art work. The reason I emphasize function as well as design is that community engagement can provide an element beyond aesthetics.

Recent decades have provided a number of examples illustrating the public art paradox. Two pieces from the 1980s, Richard Serra's *Tilted Arc* and Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial, are landmark cases that have great bearing on the issue. Both provide grounds for the philosophical investigation of an artist's responsibility to the public. It is in investigating how these two artists com-

municated with their designated public that I frame my ideas for a more involved and democratic process for citizens.

With controversial or unpopular works of public art, parties try to assemble a solution after a problematic piece is installed, failing to analyze the rudimentary policies that may have allowed an unwanted piece to be installed in the first place. In the majority of cases a legal summons (a court case to debate the removal of a piece) is used to decide the value of a public art piece. I believe that a court hearing is a warranted measure, but it has yet to resolve the conceptual problems. I have discovered that these court hearings often grant an artist the right to argue for their work on the grounds of the First Amendment's freedom of expression. It is a paradox that the existing framework for public art entitles the government (therefore the public) property rights over these works but still enables artists their own private and political interest in the debate. This is evidence of the conceptual paradox that grants the private artist precedence over the design of a piece despite a legal acknowledgement that the public has ownership. The ex post facto legal responses have yet to target the preemptive strategy of putting the artist in communication with the public, or having the public realm use their democratic right to discuss their interest in public art's design.

Managing singular cases ex post facto is a temporary fix; it does not redefine the responsibility of art (and therefore the artist) within the context of public art in order that the paradoxes no longer lead to controversy.² The artistic and ethical responsibility of the artist is inseparable from the political controversies we will examine because of public art's relationship between artist, government, and public. Serra's *Tilted Arc* exemplifies key problems of the public art paradox and the inadequate solution that results from reactionary measures of law. Conversely, Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial shows us an example of effective work of public art that serves to create an art piece functioning for the complexity of public interest and productive political discourse.

² Barbara Hoffman, "Law for Art's Sake," *Critical Inquiry* 17, 3 (1991): 541.

II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC ART

Prior to the 1960s, the vast majority of government-commissioned public art was commemorative or functional work. It was designed to further instill the regional, state, or federal climate of the government.³ This era of public art often brings to mind bronze statues of our forefathers or memorials that are meant to symbolize the strength, unity, or success of the United States (i.e. the Lincoln or Iwo Jima Memorial). It was in the 1960s, at the beginning of what is deemed the Modernist movement of art, when the government sought to change what public art meant by commissioning art that was more aesthetically driven. Most of the pieces were abstractions of modern art from museums, plopped into busy community centers. In the likeness of Modernism, these abstract shapes and colors were not representative of a public. They were *not* designed to accent the space they were placed in or to capture the essence of the history and demographic that lived there. They were void of site-specific or historical context. Second, they demanded an appeal to Modernist art that was seldom found outside of artistic communities and museums. It was leading into the 1970s that public art became commissioned with site-specificity. Site-specificity is a contested term but is typically regarded as an attempt to aesthetically accent the architecture and landscape of public spaces and/or to symbolize the historical significance of the resident demographic. This is the form that contemporary public art has taken and where the aforementioned public art paradox is occurring. Site-specific public art attempts to create a dialogue between its space and the people who reside there.⁴ This is due to a heightened awareness of social issues regarding political representation. Public art has been evolving toward a more democratic and localized vision.

The modern era of art has given value to those most innovative and unique; leading art often seeks to challenge what has

³ Ibid.

⁴ Stefan Gaie, "Public Art and the Space," *Philosophy and Geography* 5, no. 1 (2002): 169.

become considered normative conceptions of art or politics. This is the standard for many of the private artists hired to create public art because there is no paradigm or policy in place that accentuates a different responsibility (i.e. to the public interest). It has seemed counterintuitive to excise the individual from their artistic expression and therefore unnecessary to create a policy that limits the private expression of an artist. Site-specificity can be seen as a step in the right direction but has not alleviated the problems of the public art paradox that has been identified. The solution to the public art paradox obligates the artist to look beyond self-expression. In order to articulate this solution, other questions must be answered first: What do we mean when say “public”? And accordingly, how can the artist reflect and comprehend an assigned population?

III. DEFINING THE “PUBLIC”

It is instructive to refer to Hilde Hein’s notion of the “public sphere” because she has been a leading voice in the contemporary conversation on public art’s role and purpose. In *Public Art: Thinking Museums Differently*, Hein explains, “The public exists today in fractionated form, dissociated as countless individuals. It is a fiction that has survived through centuries of redefinition.”⁵ This fiction she refers to is the idea of a singular and collective identity denoted by the term *public*, which enables us to passively bracket a population based on its shared geography. Hein emphasizes the plurality of the public sphere by describing it as a number of competing *publics*; it is a conglomerate of political perspectives all competing for their own interests. However, this definition alone does not seem to inform an artist of their duty and in fact seems to make it harder for them to comprehend exactly what they mean to represent among the plurality of opinions.

To describe the optimal function of a public sphere, I like to use Hannah Arendt’s notion of the *public realm*. Arendt denotes an arena in which members of the public meet to exchange competing values and expectations, and therefore where any and all goals are

⁵ Hein, *Public Art*, 42.

open to discussion and modification.⁶ Essentially, consensus is not a possibility. Arendt's notion resists the representation of the public through any one view. This is an important subset of Hein's public sphere, particularly when discussing the duty of an artist to the public. In contrast to consensus, the public realm aims to be inclusive but recognizes that there is not a shared set of interests, identities, and goals. In "Law for Art's Sake," Barbara Hoffman states, "In the absence of a political public, and with the collapse of the conception of a public realm defined by critical dialogue, government-sponsored art can only be understood by its audience as government-imposed art."⁷ The notion of a government-imposed art is the danger that the public art paradox offers when its designated public is not involved with the vision of the private artist hired.

IV. RICHARD SERRA'S *TILTED ARC*

Serra's *Tilted Arc* was erected in 1981 in the Federal Plaza of lower Manhattan, situated in front of the Jacob K. Javits Federal Building.⁸ The General Services Association of the Federal Government (GSA) commissioned Serra to design a sculpture for Federal Plaza. *Tilted Arc* is a steel wall, 120 feet long and 12 feet high. It forms a slight curvature end to end, while traveling against the grain of the plaza's tiles.

This site was specifically chosen because it represents an area of great consumer and commercial power within the city. Many important federal government agencies, including the FBI's New York City field office, the Court of International Trade, as well as the district field office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, are located inside the Jacob

⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), Section 2.

⁷ Hoffman, "Law for Art's Sake," 542.

⁸ Gregg M Horowitz, "The Spectacle of the *Tilted Arc* Controversy," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54, no. 1 (1996): 8-14.

The Federal Plaza is surrounded by high-rise buildings made of industrial materials like steel, concrete, and glass. *Tilted Arc* reflects the production methods and materials similar to those used in the construction of the buildings around Federal Plaza.¹⁰ Serra is associated with the Minimalist movement that sprang out of the 1960s. His works are site-specific, and they aim to use materials and forms that respond to their environment. He claims that his piece was an attempt to bring awareness to the industrial environment and its inseparable relation to capitalism's alienation of the individual.¹¹ His piece was a jarring structure that couldn't be overlooked; the idea was that the "traffic" of Federal Plaza would have their attention reverted to the sculpture and be drawn away from the mindless commute he observed on the site. The steel was in essence a remark on the capitalist's development of people into automatons at work.¹²

There was immediate opposition to the piece upon completion. Just two months after the installation of *Tilted Arc*, over 1300 signatures from federal employees in and around the Federal Plaza filed a petition to remove it. This didn't provide grounds for removal, but it gave recognition of the unpopularity the piece held for some employees who entered the plaza daily. Public opinion, primarily in the form of newspaper articles, let the community know that the piece was a sore subject for many of the residents of Lower Manhattan. It wasn't until three years later, in 1984, that Serra was brought to the Supreme Court by a summons from William Diamond, regional administrator of the GSA. Diamond generated 4,000 signatures supporting the removal of *Tilted Arc* in order to support the summons.¹³ It is noteworthy that GSA was the same group who commissioned and accepted Serra's design yet were the

⁹ Ibid., 10.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Gaie, "Public Art and the Space," 12.

¹² "Richard Serra's *Tilted Arc* (1981)." http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/martin/art_law/tilted_arc.htm

¹³ Ibid., 4.

primary motivators for the court hearing against him. This sets us up to understand the limitations of ex post facto reactionary law and why the conditions for the design must be more stringent in the make-up of the contract.

Serra argued in court that his sculpture's removal violated his rights of due process under the Fifth Amendment, federal trademark and copyright laws, and the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the GSA argued that Serra's due process was fulfilled through his court hearing, which allowed him to argue for *Tilted Arc* to remain. This was the fulfillment of the Fifth Amendment, so this part of his argument was nullified. The crux of his argument then lay on the site-specificity of the piece, which would entail that it be obsolete (no longer *Tilted Arc*) upon removal. Contractually speaking, removal would be a breach in policy due to the federal trademark and copyright laws. It was written in the policy that destruction of the piece after completion was not allowed.¹⁴ The GSA was able to override the contract for two reasons. First, their primary responsibility is to the welfare of the public. It was their claim that the public was being violated on their aesthetic and non-aesthetic welfare, and that they were paying for the violation through their taxes.¹⁵ Secondly, the GSA took official ownership of the piece when the contract was signed. This meant that they had the right to remove the piece on the grounds that they not destroy it. They argued that Serra never properly articulated that removal of the piece would be in essence destruction of the piece; its site-specificity was noted as a designing feature but the work was never articulated as becoming destroyed without its site. The final move in Serra's defense of *Tilted Arc* was to fight on the grounds of the First Amendment's freedom of expression.

The contemporary assessment of freedom of expression in regards to art is contingent upon whether a piece's removal is content-neutral. Content is referred to exclusively as a political state-

¹⁴ Richard Serra: *The Case of Tilted Arc*. http://cfa.arizona.edu/are476/files/tilted_arc.htm.

¹⁵ Ibid.

ment, which by law cannot be infringed upon. If the work contains any political significance that is intentionally compromised through federal censorship, federal law is breached. Although political, Serra's argument for personal expression did not suffice to convince them. The piece was too minimal to be deemed an obvious political expression. It was the content-neutrality that overruled Serra's defense of the First Amendment. The GSA's ownership of *Tilted Arc*, its public site, and its content-neutrality nullified Serra's argument.

Barbara Hoffman, like many others, uses *Tilted Arc* as a paradigmatic example of the inadequacies involved in public art policy, particularly surrounding the First Amendment. Furthermore, the case failed to articulate the future framework of public art analysis or the interests at stake in the relevant parties (the public, the artist, and the government). She argues that this piece was an invitation to better articulate the specific values and interests inherent to the public art paradox that is consistently reappearing.¹⁶ Her argument focuses directly on the First Amendment and the relevant principles underlying an artist's rights. While she was correct in calling *Tilted Arc* an invitation to change First Amendment policy, I take issue with this focus. I believe that a more just focus and simpler solution lie in a philosophical investigation that puts in place a preemptive strategy for defining the function of public art.

Every argument that Serra had, besides the First Amendment, was in direct response to the policies written in his contract. The First Amendment argument was the only one not directly addressed in the contract and the one that allowed for the most conceptual investigation on behalf of the government and Serra's lawyers. The primary issue was that the ability to fight under the First Amendment implies that the artist still holds ownership of the piece they created, yet it was clearly defined in the contract that the GSA owned the piece upon completion. Furthermore, public art is set on public land financed and owned by taxpayers. How is it the case that the GSA officially owned a piece and yet could be argued against by the individualized notion of the First Amendment? If we properly understand the function of public art to be for and of the

¹⁶ Hoffman, "Law for Art's Sake," 548.

public sphere, and serve the public realm's necessity for political discourse, then should a single individual be granted First Amendment rights over a publicly owned space, or ever have the illusion to do so? Serra may even have had good reason to argue under the First Amendment because of the nature of the contract.

Of course, Serra did not win the case. However, his argument's validity allowed for the discourse in court to take place and for the government to win on the grounds that his piece was content-neutral. What if his piece was blatantly political? The government's duty is to protect the welfare of the people; Serra was contractually granted that his piece not be destroyed; the government owned his piece and the space to the degree that enabled a breach in contract. Who really owned the piece? I don't believe the question can be answered and consequently there cannot be a single solution through the First Amendment. To me it is clear that this contradiction in preliminary policy cannot be reformed by reactionary and arguably arbitrary assessments of the First Amendment. The long-standing history of First Amendment issues regarding its variability and ambiguity should be a reminder that the First Amendment does not restrict these occurrences but rather attempts to assemble the broken pieces into a legally feasible solution. The current legal solution, as Hoffman has pointed out, does not solve this issue.¹⁷

In my view, neither Richard Serra nor the GSA were wrong in their dispositions. The cause of this controversial case begins and ends in the contractual agreement which essentially gave rights to *Tilted Arc* to both the GSA (theoretically the public) and the private artist. The only reason that this case become controversial and constantly referred back to the ethical implications surrounding the First Amendment is that art was placed in the framework of individualism and personal expression. Serra was aggressively concerned with the personal statement that his artwork evoked, particularly to those concerned with art and the esoteric meaning

¹⁷ Ibid.

of Minimalism.¹⁸ He openly expressed that his work was designed for art's own function and as an exclusive installment to the site that created its own context for the viewer and the surrounding buildings. Serra had little concern for the site's aesthetic harmony with *Tilted Arc*, and he did not consider the needs and desires of those who had to live with his work as a part of their daily space.¹⁹ This is where the simple definition "art in a public space" does not suffice to define public art. The artist has a responsibility to the public because of the role and space it inhabits. Modernist art in its subjective and challenging nature cannot support the public art facet because of its relationship to the public. If the function of art in public art was originally excised of its privatism, it would also stand to reason that the private artist would not fight under individual freedom of expression, nor be granted the contractual right to do so. Moreover, the inclination of the artist to do so would not be present if the public sphere were involved in the design in the first place. Regarding *Tilted Arc*, Barbara Hoffman writes:

...the artist had been duly selected and contracted by a panel of art experts and a government approved process. He met the stipulations of his contract. Moreover, most art professionals believe that public art is and must be challenging and that if the public is the guardian of what is selected for public art, the sphere of what will be shown will be severely narrowed and much contemporary (and thus less accepted) art styles will be censored.²⁰

The only information that the public received about the design of the piece prior to its installation was a small model in the Jacob K. Javits building which did not explain the actual size or meaning of the piece. Even upon installation and during the court hear-

¹⁸ Richard Serra: *The Case of Tilted Arc*. http://cfa.arizona.edu/are476/files/tilted_arc.htm.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

ings, there was no information or explanation regarding the public purpose of *Tilted Arc*. It was accepted that the design was for and of Serra alone.

Tilted Arc's modern aesthetic on top of Serra's intention to provide solely for the function of his artistic philosophy tells us that there is an obvious incompatibility with a detachment of the public sphere from the intention, process, and formation of a public art piece. Had there been public consent and conversation regarding the piece before or during the case, there might have been a change in sentiment toward the piece that could have prevented the controversy. Once again it appears that reactionary amendments would serve less to rectify the public art paradox than a system which created a relationship between the artist and the public.

Following the court ruling, the Arts-in-Architecture program that prompted the GSA's Federal Plaza project had been given a new set of standards: an integration with architectural concepts; participation by the local community, the artist, and the architects; and expanded participation of the NEA in the GSA's decision-making process. Despite having public relation policies prior to Serra's installment, the GSA had virtually no contact with the public and followed little of the preemptive guidelines that served the public's interest. The attenuated conceptions of what an artist has to provide and what the deciding panelists believe art should look like greatly undermined the function of the public realm.

Serra's case demonstrates why reframing the function of art and the artist within the context of public art could alleviate the recurring issues at hand. It is obvious that the public art paradox is a blatant miscommunication between an artist's responsibility to the public interest and to their own interest. The underlying problems of the public art paradox lie in the preliminary conceptions outlined in contractual agreements and not in the reactionary measures of the courtroom.

V. MAYA LIN'S VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL

In a similar beginning to the story of Serra's *Tilted Arc*, Maya Lin was chosen for her individual vision by a small panel of art experts. What was different from Serra's work was that veterans of the

Vietnam War assisted the panel of art experts and collaborated with Lin until installation. It was a group of veterans who raised the money, chose the jury that selected Lin's design (of 1,421 alternatives), oversaw the construction, and led the dedication ceremony.²¹ In order to avoid the need for congressional approval, there were no Washington politicians involved in the decision-making until they needed paperwork for contracting the site.²² It was in getting the land granted that the project began heating up because it was at this point that the memorial could be granted approval or declination by the government officials involved. Moreover, government recognition of the project increased its publicity and the idea of its permanence. Opposition by the public and federal employees mostly arose from what they called an unpatriotic aesthetic. Those who disliked the piece did not want to pay taxes for it. However, Vietnam Veterans Memorial was in majority funded privately, or non-governmentally, through a direct-mail campaign. Anyone was able to support the piece who chose to.²³ This generally neutralized the public funding angle, but opposition to the piece continued.

In an interesting turn of events, opponents of the piece were led by Ross Perot to make a piece very near the Mall called *Three Fighting Men*. This piece is of three stoic and heroic-looking American soldiers of varying ethnicities. One holds a gun over his shoulder, and the others stand there in posture that illustrates the pride and resilience of men who fought valiantly. In typical fashion of American memorials, our history is made to look successful and just. This, however, was exactly what Lin and the veterans involved were attempting to avoid. The issue with a piece that resembles a joyous victory was that looking on it, one would become far less justified to discuss the complexity of the war; you would be reserved to commemorating the honor of our American soldiers. Discussing the potentially unethical violence of the Vietnam war crimes would feel unpatriotic standing in front of *Three Fighting*

²¹ Michael Kelly, "Public Art Controversy," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54, no.1 (1996): 18.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

Men.

By the nature of democracy and the plurality of opinion with which we must regard the public sphere, patriotism must be afforded a multiplicity of perspectives. Current connotations of the term “unpatriotic” are synonymous with “un-American.” In this right, a public art sculpture commemorating a nation does not have to be joyous or command acceptance for acts of a nation’s past; one of political neutrality and contemplation may better represent a nation in a time as tragic and controversial as the Vietnam War. Moreover, Lin made it very clear that this was a veterans’ memorial, meant to commemorate the soldiers themselves and not the war as a whole. Regarding Lin and the veterans who volunteered with her:

They were politically astute in recognizing just how complex the American people’s feelings are about that war. Evidence of this astuteness is that one of veteran’s conditions on the design of the memorial was that it ‘make no political statement regarding the war or its conduct,’ but rather dedicate the memorial to the veterans, not to the war itself – hence the name, Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Another principal condition was that it “be reflective and contemplative in nature,” allowing the surviving veterans to meditate on the Vietnam War, individually and collectively, in all its tragic complexity.²⁴

The primary opposition to the piece by government and public citizens alike was its lack of patriotism and seemingly dismal aesthetic. Most public art relating to an American event or hero, or public art in Washington for that matter, has an aesthetic that lends itself to pride and accomplishment. Lin’s piece did not serve this function. In fact, the success of this sculpture was its intentional representation of “publics”; it has the ability to dissolve a very controversial polarity into aesthetic neutrality that allowed for discussion. Its political neutrality did nothing to hinder the emotional and historical

²⁴ Mitchell, “Public Art Controversy,” 19.

engagement of the piece, however. Lin had 58,196 names of dead American soldiers engraved on the walls, ordered in a temporal progression of soldiers' deaths. The site names spanned from 1959 to 1975, with "visitors' experiences of this time frame ... further heightened by the fact that the names start from the middle of the apex, go out to the right end, then continue back in the middle, concluding at the end."²⁵ This method discourages the viewer from filing past the names one end to the next. Moreover, the sculpture is set into the ground almost ten feet on a gradual decline so that a visitor enters its space and becomes engulfed by its energy. In my experience with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Lin's design was able to draw the viewer into a calm and respectful atmosphere. On a sunny and bustling day at the Mall, Washington feels alive and energetic. However, as soon as one begins to descend into the memorial, things begin to quiet and everyone around seems to move a little slower. The piece commands respect and contemplation in the sense that a church does. It enables the inexperienced mind to better understand the magnitude of lives lost.

Lin's site-specificity differs from Serra's in several important ways. Lin's piece is meant to serve the function of the public realm through transcendent democratic discourse with a piece that neutralizes political polarity. *Tilted Arc* aimed to alienate the viewer in their space and critique the very people who fund and interact with the space. While Serra was concerned with designing his work to suit his stylistic merits with no public dialogue, Lin worked alongside her targeted demographic to collaborate. And while Lin designed to have the Vietnam Veterans Memorial become ergonomic to the landscape and its visitors, Serra claims that *Tilted Arc* was meant to draw attention directly away from the architecture and the flow of the space to create a jarring aesthetic. Concisely put, Lin harnesses a sensitivity to the function of the public realm and the public's space where Serra failed. Serra uses his "traffic" as the subject for his art, whereas Lin uses her art as a subject for the public.

W.J.T. Mitchell explains Serra's *Tilted Arc* as either "a classic instance of the high modernist transformation of utilitarian public

²⁵ Kelly, "Public Art Controversy," 14.

space into an aesthetic form” or “a signal that modernism can no longer mediate public and private spheres on its own terms, but must submit itself to a social negotiation.”²⁶ The problem with the modernist aesthetic of the contemporary age is that it values private expression over public interest so that the term public art still holds on dearly to this definition of art. The redefinition of art in the context of public art is exactly what Mitchell implies when he says it must submit itself to social negotiation.

As a function of the public realm, Lin’s memorial is a tribute to the complexity of a war whose function in American life should not be finalized or unquestioned. The purpose of the memorial was to give the veterans a place to “meditate” on the war in all of its complexity.²⁷ In short, she was not aiming for consensus or pretending that she could understand the needs of the public well enough to offer them a polarized perspective. Lin properly navigated the plurality of the public sphere, or “publics,” and in this way transgressed the “modernist impasse”²⁸ that we have seen at the source of the public art paradox. Moreover, her preliminary policies involving the targeted demographic illustrate a restructuring of art’s function for the sake of its users. Veterans were involved in the process from beginning to end, so any opposition to the piece would not be met by Lin alone but by the veterans as well. This communal system easily evades the problem Serra encountered where his individual expression and ownership of the piece collided with public interest. In Lin’s case, the use of the First Amendment would be void of meaning. The veterans’ affiliation also serves as an argument in and of itself. If the piece were deemed unpopular enough to receive a legal summons, the argument would be between representative publics, still lending itself to a healthy political discourse.

VI. PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND CONTRACTS

We have explored two pieces that aptly represent the public art paradox in its best and worst cases. Two public art policies were

²⁶ Mitchell, *Public Art Controversy*, 20

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

highlighted: preemptive measures and ex post facto legal reactions. What Hilden Hein has referred to as “publics,” or a plurality of public opinions at odds with one another, is the epitome of a democratic culture. Consensus cannot be met nor expected; analogously, public art will be both accepted and rejected by communities within the public sphere. The importance of the democratic process is that there be a fair and equal representation of the population because the legal methods that come as a response to public art installations haven’t served to target and rectify the source of the issue. The public art paradox of individual expression versus public interest is inseparable from the principles of democracy; the paradox itself is the result of a poorly executed representation.

There are worse cases than Serra and Lin, and they are worse because they lack controversy. These are cases that by measures of political insignificance may not reach the light of national news or debate. The relevant community may not have the voice to bring these pieces into light as we saw for the Lin and Serra cases. Still, they are relevant to the communities they hold in reflection. Asheville, for instance, has a public art venue that is under the demarcation of beautification; that is, the majority of the public art works around Asheville are designated by superficial aesthetics that allow for a photographable event and diminish with the tourists who use them.²⁹ As Gabriel Setright writes in his paper “Public Art: Spectacle and the Aesthetics of Gentrification,” the beautification of Asheville is a part of a long history of wealthy tourists whose attraction to the city was of singular concern. With the onset of Asheville becoming an international art’s destination, public art is beginning to commodify the aesthetics of our community. Setright speaks specifically to the fact that Asheville has no democratic process for creating public dialogue and has witnessed gentrification through the aesthetics of public art works in correlation with the recent decade of economic growth.

Within the time frame of my research, Setright and I went to the Asheville Public Arts Panel to discuss our concerns with

²⁹ Gabriel Setright, “Spectacle and the Aesthetics of Gentrification.” Philosophy Seminar Paper, Warren Wilson College, 2015.

public art. Not only did the panel generally run around the policy questions I had regarding public representation and democratic processes, but they also had welcomed a private artist being hired solely for their own stylistic merits and expertise. In fact, it was their main priority to hire artists to express their own vision and to intentionally beautify a space. Asheville is surely just one example of a city whose representative body is mostly concerned with the merits of art as aesthetically pleasing, tourist-pleasing, and limited to the guidance of local politicians. The need for public art's public representation—or the democratic process by which public art is intentioned, designed, and created—is necessary to avoid the public art paradox. As discussions of public art expand, its function and criteria of value will change. The function of art in the context of public art will find its value in the integration of communities.

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Acknowledgments

Jay Miller: Thesis Advisor, Friend, Enforcer

Gabe Setright: Competition, Support, and Inspiration

Gabriel Setright Response to Anthony Mazza's “Public Art Paradox”

Abstract:

This response explores the tension in Asheville between a traditional conception of Public Art—one that commemorates history, beautifies the city and attracts economic growth—and New Genre of Public Art, which celebrates diversity of at-risk communities and challenges the systems which oppress them. This paper also responds to Tony Mazza’s “Public Art Paradox,” and I claim that strengthening the legal contract will only work to some extent and that some activists and organizers will use public artwork beyond and against the legal system and will refuse to collaborate with the government.

Gabriel Perez Setright | Psychology & Philosophy



Gabe is currently living and working in his homeland of Nicaragua, where he is using his Psychology and Philosophy degree to write for several different political and cultural blogs and to build different community projects like children’s playgrounds, artistic murals, and communal gardens. During his time at Warren Wilson, he worked with the Environmental Justice Crew and in the Center for Gender and

Relationships. Gabe is also a world traveler. Sometimes for business and other times for pleasure, he has explored different countries from Cuba to Ecuador and Nepal to Vietnam. In the future, Gabe hopes to start an educational commune for human and non-human refugees, where people and animals can live and experience alternatives to capitalism.

EDITORIAL: *This essay was commissioned as a response to Tony Mazza's essay "Public Art Paradox: Involving the Public in Public Art" in the hopes of allowing both authors and readers of Auspex to engage in meaningful, critical dialogue with the texts.*

To define public art, both Anthony Mazza and I used the definition provided by the Asheville Public Arts Master Plan (APAMP), a legal document that frames the conditions for public art to be present in Asheville. According to the APAMP, public art is "any work of art or element of design that is created by visual or public context artists which is sited in a public space for people to experience. This can include installations, murals, outdoor sculptures, infrastructure as public fixtures or furniture, and other function elements that are designed and/or built by artists."¹

Both Mazza and I noticed that vague and simplistic definitions like the one above were all over the APAMP. We both asked ourselves: Who decides what artwork goes where? Can only people defined as artists produce public artwork? Is there any conversation between the public and the artists? How does one define the public? The main link between these questions was our mutual concern with people and public. Following these questions, Mazza and I drew heavily from the theories of feminist and aesthetic philosopher Hilda Hein to develop a concept of who the people and public are.

Hein claims that in order to better understand the debate around public art, we must first understand that there is no "public" in the general singular; instead, there are "publics." Hein criticizes any conception of the public sphere as a singular entity. She states, "the public exists today in a fractionated form, dissociated as countless individuals. It is a fiction that has survived through centuries of redefinition."² Here, Hein criticizes any political and social theory around the conception of the public as a singular homogenized

¹ Asheville, North Carolina, United States. Parks and Recreation. "City of Asheville: Public Art Master Plan" (2001)

² Hilda Hein, *Public Art: Thinking Museums Differently* (Lanham, Md.: AltaMira Press, 2006).

group that operates under the same drives, incentives, and behaviors. Furthermore, such a conception of the public is based on a hypothetical “agreement” between the varying populations. She states that the public sphere has “disintegrated into an arena of competing private interests. It has become a rhetorical marketplace presided over by a government bureaucracy that answers to manipulated public opinion.”³ Hein does not shy away from arguing that the public is defined depending on the interests of the person defining the term. This aspect is something that Mazza and I pinpointed as the main issue within the debate over public art in Asheville, something that the APAMP did not sufficiently articulate. It is at this point that Mazza and I took different approaches to study this issue.

In his paper, Mazza proposes a “contract” that would legally articulate a definition of the public based on each individual work of art and therefore clear any vague misconception that could lead to a nationwide scandal as found in Richard Serra’s *Tilted Arc* and Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial—both examples that Mazza uses extensively in his argument. Here, at the crossroads between legality and legitimization, I fundamentally disagree with Mazza. I disagree with the role of the legal system in framing and legitimizing works of public art. First, because these works of art take place in public outdoor spaces, they fall under the inspection of the local government administration and all its legal foundation with it. Whereas Mazza considers reforming the legal foundation a method of forming a better conception of who the public is, I see the legal foundation itself as part of the overall problem that defines the public in order to promote gentrification. Second, I am pessimistic about what kinds of public artworks are legally allowed to be exhibited. Specifically, I think that the legal system is incredibly limiting to the expression of artists and communities because the law would only approve works that are in its own favor and maintain the status quo. How can a work of art that is critical of the legal system work within this same legal system?

The role of public art in Asheville is to serve an econom-

³Ibid., 27.

ic opportunity as it is linked with beautifying the city in order to make it more attractive to the public. In this case, “the public” constitutes new families and tourists. This idea is strongly articulated in the APAMP. I argue that the conception of who public art is for leaves out communities already existing in Asheville. In this context, the way public art is used only benefits a specific public at the expense of another. A clear example of this process can be seen in the use of the public piece called *Freemont Troll* in Seattle, where a statue of a giant troll was placed under a bridge in order to displace the homeless population residing there and make the area more beautiful. This process is what I call the gentrification of speech, in which public art silences the speech of those being displaced.

As we can see with *Freemont Troll*, public art can be used to oppress a specific public. In order to confront this process, I advocate for “new genre public art,” which is used specifically to empower displaced publics. A concept originally envisioned by Suzanne Lacy and later expanded by Hilda Hein, new genre public art keeps in mind the tensions between many publics and sides with the marginalized and oppressed. New genre public art consists of three points: first, it works as a process instead of an object.⁴ New genre public art aims to bring attention to the entire process of conceptualizing and materializing a work of public art instead of focusing on the final piece itself. Second, new genre public art acknowledges, addresses, and adapts to multiple publics by providing the platform where these multiple publics can explore themselves and also articulate their changing needs. These needs can be to celebrate diversity, to build a community, or to address inequality. And third, new genre public art blurs the authority of a single artist by enabling others to collectively participate in the entire process of conceptualizing and materializing the artwork. This characteristic is a direct critique of the idea that an individual artist has the authority and the capacity to articulate the needs of a multiple public. Most importantly, new genre public art challenges us to think of new conceptions of who the public is, and what art looks like.

⁴Hein, *Public Art: Thinking Museums Differently*, 97-9.

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
Rape Myth Acceptance and College Students' Perception of Sexual Assault Prevention

Abstract:

Rape and sexual assault are major issues on college campuses where social misconceptions and myths surrounding such acts often contribute to a climate where rape is seen as justifiable. Previous research has linked the acceptance of such myths to numerous behaviors that lead to the perpetuations of sexual assault; such studies have been used to design prevention programs that aim to lower rape myth acceptance among college students. This research examines the relationship between rape myths and rape prevention programming more closely by assessing the effect that the acceptance of rape myths has on students' perceptions of, and willingness to participate in rape preventions programming at an institutional level. Results indicate that students with a lower level of rape myth acceptance are more likely to react positively to a given sexual assault prevention program and to see themselves as having an individual role in preventing sexual assault. Qualitative analysis also indicated key themes that point to qualities of prevention programs that students are more likely to respond to positively, allowing institutions to better target student populations in the future.

Belle-Pilar Fleming | Psychology

Belle-Pilar Fleming received her BA in Psychology from Warren Wilson College in May 2015, and currently resides in Asheville. While a student she worked on the theater crew, participated in two service learning trips to the Pine Ridge Reservation, served as a peer group leader and an academic tutor, studied abroad, and was a member of the Warren Wilson College Step Team. She has been a member of Psi Chi since 2012 and was a senior scholar award recipient. Since graduation Belle-Pilar has worked with the Autism Society of North Carolina, and most recently as the Assistant Manager for Antioch University's Buddhist Studies Program in Bodh Gaya, India.



I. INTRODUCTION

Rape and sexual assault have long been an issue on college campuses and among college aged individuals. According to a 2012 Center for Disease Control (CDC) report, nearly 1 in 5 women (18.3%) and 1 in 72 men (1.4%) experience rape at some point in their lives. In addition, approximately 1 in 20 women and men (5.6% and 5.3%) reported experiencing some type of sexual assault other than rape in the last 12 months. Although the prevalence of sexual assault seems to be fairly widespread, a large majority of people experience sexual victimization before reaching adulthood (Fischer, Daigle, & Cullen, 2008). According to the CDC report, approximately 42.2% of female victims reported being raped for the first time before the age of 18, and 37.4% between the ages of 18 and 24, the age that most people are when they attend college. Furthermore, 19% of undergraduate women report having experienced some form of attempted or completed sexual assault since entering college (CDC, 2012). For most of these individuals, the perpetrator is someone who they know personally. Among women who had experienced a rape since the age of 18, 62% were raped by a current boyfriend or someone who they had previously been intimate with, and 21% by an acquaintance (Fischer et al. 2008). It is also important to note that rape is one of the most underreported crimes in the country, with 50 to 65% of rapes going unreported (Kahlor & Morrison, 2007). When victims do choose to share their experiences, they often confide in friends or acquaintances rather than police or authority figures (Fischer et. al. 2008; Gonzales, Schofield, & Schmitt, 2005). As a result, it is difficult to get true numbers on the rates of rape and sexual assault; however, such acts are likely more prevalent than what reports show.

Despite the fact that a perpetrator is most often someone who the victim knows personally, many still have a stereotypical image of rape wherein a person is attacked and forcibly assaulted by a stranger (Anderson, 2007). This distorted image of rape is just one example of a rape myth. The term "rape myth" was first defined by Burt (1980) as "prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists" (p. 271). At the time, false perceptions and ideas about rape were first starting to be examined as they per-

tained to the perpetuation of rape culture. Since then, however, the term has been redefined by Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) to more accurately include the definition of a myth. Rape myths are now defined most commonly as “attitudes and beliefs that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression towards women” (p. 143). This definition is limited in that it is restricted only to the perpetuation of sexual violence committed by men against women. It is important to understand that rape is a serious action with many harmful effects even when the victim is not female. Previous research has shown that male victims experience a great deal of psychological upset including post-traumatic stress, depression, sexual dysfunction, aggressive fantasies, and loss of self-esteem. Such symptoms can persist years after an assault takes place (Davies, Gilston, & Rogers, 2012). In addition, males often have difficulty constructing concepts of their own masculinity after being assaulted, given that the forced passivity that comes with being sexually assaulted is often directly contradictory to socially constructed views of masculinity (Baljon, 2011).

Although rape victims include all genders of people, previous researchers have chosen to employ this definition of rape myths based on the knowledge that rape and sexual assault is committed overwhelmingly by males (78%), and that females are victims the majority of the time (Cassel, 2012; Foubert, Godin, & Tatum, 2011; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999; Rand & Robinson, 2011). Rape myths themselves, which reflect a distorted and stereotyped view of sexual assault, focus exclusively on violence perpetrated by men against women, and the theoretical definition is designed to reflect that notion (Payne et al., 1999). Some examples of common rape myths are as follows: men can't be raped; “good girls” are not raped; any healthy woman can resist rape if she really wants to; rapists are sex-starved, insane, or both (Burt 1980).

Such myths did not originate by accident and tend to have a functional role within modern society. First, they aid in justifying rape by switching blame from the perpetrator to the victim, which prevents societies from having to examine the true nature and extent of sexual assault (Kahlor & Morrison, 2007; Lonsway

& Fitzgerald, 1994; Ryan, 2011). The act of putting the blame on the victim supports the notion of a “just world,” where good things happen to good people and bad things only to those who deserve it (Cassel, 2012; Hammond, Berry, & Rodriguez, 2010; Kahlor & Morrison 2007; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; Ryan, 2011). People who endorse rape myths tend to justify the sexual assault of others through the use of this mentality. In doing so they are able to ignore their own role in propagating such actions, while creating a false sense of security that rape is not something that will happen to them (Kahlor & Morrison, 2007; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Once again this helps to create a climate where rape is justifiable, prevents issues of sexual assault from being examined at a societal level, and makes it less likely that individuals will acknowledge their own role in preventing rape and sexual assault. In fact, higher levels of rape myth acceptance (RMA) have correlated with higher levels of homophobia (Davies et al., 2012), increased likelihood of raping based on self-reported measures (Cassel, 2012), victim blaming (Cassel 2012; Kahlor & Eastin, 2011; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994), more aggressive and negative attitudes towards victims (Davies et al. 2012), greater acceptance of traditional gender roles (Aronowitz, Lambert, Davidoff, 2012), and greater sympathy towards the offending male (Cassel, 2012; Davies et al. 2012). In addition, previous research has shown that men with higher levels of RMA also demonstrate higher rape proclivity (Bohner, Jarvis, Eyssel, & Siebler, 2005). In both college and non-college samples, individuals with higher RMA levels were less likely to label a particular scenario as rape even when it met the legal criteria (Cassel, 2012).

Given the fact that rates of sexual assault are high among college aged individuals, many institutions employ a variety of practices designed to increase awareness surrounding sexual assault and encourage more accurate measures of reporting. As announced by the Department of Education, two laws are currently in effect that pertain to such issues. The Jeanne Clery Act, also known as the “Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act” of 1990, states that all colleges and universities that receive federal aid must openly disclose crime statistics—including those pertaining to sexual assault—in and around campuses. The law has been amended

multiple times to expand reporting requirements, make provisions in relation to registered sex offender reporting and campus security, give specific requirements for assault education and prevention, and outline measures for protecting victims and those who report from retaliation. In spite of such legislative acts, many schools are still not doing enough to combat sexual assault on campus. In fact, a 2005 report by the Department of Justice found that although most schools reported crime data to students, only one-third of schools were fully in compliance with federal requirements. Out of schools that offered general education programming, less than one-third included rape prevention as part of their programs. Among four-year institutions, fewer than half included such programs. Overall only 4 out of 10 schools offered any type of sexual assault training, and this was often provided only to those working within campus security or residence life, as opposed to general student populations.

Many of the prevention programs that are designed to be administered within college and university populations have sought to reduce sexual assault by means of RMA reduction (Cassel, 2012; Choate, 2003; Fischer et al. 2008; Kress, Shepherd, Anderson, Petuch, Nolan, & Thiemeke, 2006; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Foubert, Brasfield, Hill, & Shelley-Tremblay, 2011; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000), self-defense training and self-protective strategies (Fischer et al. 2008; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000), and alcohol and drug awareness (Choate, 2003; Fischer et al. 2008; Foubert, Godin, & Tatum, 2010a; Foubert, Tatum, & Godin, 2010b). Overall, such programs have been shown to produce effective yet somewhat limited results. However, research on the effectiveness of specific programs is still somewhat limited.

A review by Fisher et al. (2008) indicates aspects of prevention programs (both in terms of methodology and content) that are most effective for decreasing rape, and offers statistical evidence to guide the development of future prevention programs. The review indicates that programs have the most potential for change when they are implemented at more than one site (for example, at multiple universities as opposed to just one), when they are able to reach a large sample of individuals (for example, when participants are

recruited through methods other than convenience or non-probability sampling), and when they occur in multiple sessions or over extended periods of time, as opposed to a single one hour or 90 minute session. This review also indicates that, while many programs focus mainly on rape awareness, curricula that incorporate additional key concepts would be most beneficial. These concepts include awareness and knowledge about rape, the role of rape myths and rape-supportive attitudes, alcohol consumption, effective self-protective and self-defense strategies, victim supportive responses, and healthcare based interventions (including law enforcement, victim advocates, and forensic nurses). The review also notes that everyone of an appropriate age—including all genders, races, and ethnicities—should be exposed to prevention programming, but that some groups should be more intentionally targeted than others. College-aged males are mentioned as a specific target, given that they are the most likely offenders, as well as young women ages 16-24, since they are most often victims. Suggestions are made for different ways to target these groups, for example working to reduce sexually aggressive behaviors among males and to increase self-defense and re-victimization awareness among women.

It is difficult to make conclusions as to the best way to target students in relation to prevention programs. There is plenty of statistical evidence that pinpoints individuals who are more likely to commit sexual assault or situations in which sexual assault is more likely to take place. There is, however, very little research on how students themselves demonstrate their ideas about sexual assault or their own perceptions of participating in prevention measures. Only a few studies thus far have looked at such ideas, by focusing on male attitudes towards rape prevention and perceptions of their own responsibility in preventing sexual assault (ex. Foubert & Perry, 2007; Rich et al., 2010). These studies demonstrate the importance of understanding students' ideas about sexual assault prevention programs and provide important insight into why many programs have not been more successful in creating lasting change. Such findings are important for institutions to design prevention programs that appeal to students and that are truly effective. These studies also indicate that more research needs to be done in relation

to students' ideas about rape and sexual assault prevention.

The present study aims to add to the limited research pertaining to sexual assault prevention programming by assessing students' ideas about participating in rape and sexual abuse prevention programs at an institutional level and by exploring how these ideas relate to the acceptance of rape myths and commonly held ideas about sexual assault. Given correlations between RMA and other belief systems or behaviors that contribute to rape culture, the following hypotheses are presented:

H1: Students with a higher level of RMA will be more resistant to the idea of institution- wide prevention programming.

H2: Students with a higher level of RMA will be less likely to see themselves as the target audience for prevention programming.

H3: Students with a higher level of RMA will be less likely to indicate that they have an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault.

II. METHODS

Participants

159 college and university students from a variety of institutions participated in the study. The majority of the students (79%) attended a small liberal arts college in Western North Carolina. The remainder of the sample (21%) attended a mixture of schools including private and public schools, state schools, and both large and relatively small institutions. Most of the participants identified as female (76%), with 21% identifying as male and 3% as other, including non-binary, transgender, and multi-sexual. The sample contained limited racial diversity with 91% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian. The remainder of the sample was 3% Black/African American, 3% Hispanic/Latino American, and 3% other. Ninety-four percent of the sample fell between the ages of 18-23, and there was a fairly even distribution across class standing with 18% first year, 23% sophomore, 33% junior, and 26% senior.

Measures and Procedure

Participants were recruited using a combination of emails sent through college directories and web links posted on social media sites including Facebook and Tumblr. In each of these cases participants were redirected to a web page that contained a consent statement and a subsequent survey. Participation was self-selected, and no incentive or reward was given for participation. The survey took about 30 minutes to complete, and answers were completely anonymous, even to the researchers. Participants were informed of their anonymity via the statement of consent that appeared at the start of the survey. This statement outlined the general purpose of the study as well as what the student could expect and any potential costs and benefits of participating. Since the subject matter of the study is sensitive to some individuals, information about institutional counseling facilities and contact information was also provided, and students were encouraged to utilize these resources in the event that participating in the study led to emotional distress. After agreeing to the consent statement, students completed the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale Short Form (IRMA-SF), were given a description of a sexual assault prevention program designed for college aged individuals, and finally completed an open-ended questionnaire given in response to the program description.

The Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale was originally designed as a 45-item scale by Payne et. al. (1999) and has since been shortened and revised to a 22-item scale. The revised form aims to present statements that are clearer and more relevant, while maintaining relatable and up to date language based on college students today. In addition, the revised form was also designed to more accurately measure subtle rape myths, as opposed to just overt prejudices. The scale was also designed to specifically assess rape myths as a means to better understand the effects of prevention programs (McMahon & Farmer, 2011). The revised scale was tested using a series of focus groups, as well as 951 undergraduate participants. The results of these tests indicate that the scale is free of any gender-based differentiations in terms of the function of the items, and the scale is deemed appropriate for males and females, as well as those students who have not been previously exposed to any type

of prevention programming (McMahon & Farmer, 2011). The scale also demonstrates good criterion and construct validity (CFI=.90, NNFI=.97, RMSEA=.07, α =.87) (McMahon & Farmer, 2011).

When completing the scale, participants were presented with 22 statements designed to reflect a commonly held rape myth and were asked to rate their level of agreement with each of the statements on a five-point scale. Examples of included statements were: "If a girl is raped when she is drunk she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things get out of hand"; "A lot of times, girls who claim they were raped have emotional problems"; and "If a girl doesn't physically fight back, you can't say it was rape." Participants received between 1 and 5 points depending on their level of agreement. The highest possible score was 110 points and the lowest possible score was 22 points. For this study, lower scores on the IRMA-SF indicated higher levels of RMA, and higher scores on the IRMA-SF indicated lower levels of RMA.

The program description was created using a variety of pre-existing programs that have been implemented with college and university student populations (Choate, 2003; Foubert, Godin, & Tatum, 2010; Jordan, 2010; Kress et al., 2006; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Foubert, Brasfield, Hill, Shelley-Tremblay, 2011; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Rothman & Silverman, 2007). The most common themes and procedures of these programs were used in the program description. The description was designed to be as detailed as possible without being educational. For example, the description did not provide any definitions, facts, or explicit opinions in relation to sexual assault, although it did mention that these topics were part of the program itself. There were no procedures or activities added to the program description that were not part of one of the previously researched programs, although the order and timing of these procedures and activities were modified. It is also stated in the description that the program included three 90 minute sessions, in order to assess students' willingness to be part of a program that met over a somewhat extended period of time.

The open ended questionnaire that followed the program description contained the following three questions designed to assess H1:

1. How would you feel if your college or university made this program mandatory for all students?
2. Do you think students would attend this program voluntarily? Why or why not?
3. Do you think this program would be beneficial within the context of your college or university?

In addition, one question was designed to assess H2:

1. Do you think you are the target audience for this program? If so, why? If not, then who do you think is the target audience for this program?

And one question was designed to assess H3:

1. Do you feel that you have an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault? If yes, what does that role look like?

In addition, two questions were used to assess whether or not students thought that the program should be designed to include primarily men or primarily women:

1. How would you feel if this program was required of only men? Of only women?
2. Do you think that programming should be targeted towards men and women equally? Why or why not?

Responses from the open ended questionnaire were coded using inductive content analysis, and subsequently quantified. Participants received three points for positive or “yes” answers, two points for neutral answers, and one point for negative or “no” answers. In relation to H1, scores from the three questions were added to produce one number that represented the degree of positivity that students felt towards the program. In addition, the most prevalent themes and explanations from the responses to each question were recorded in order to assess the data in a more complex way and to better understand student responses.

III. RESULTS

The data collection period lasted approximately four months, during which time a total of 344 responses were received. Of those, 159 fit the inclusion criteria of the study (i.e., being enrolled at a college or university, and completing the survey materi-

als in full), and those individuals made up the final sample. Scores on the IRMA-SF scale were compared to the scored open-ended questionnaire responses using a series of Spearman's and Pearson's correlations. A significant positive correlation ($r_s = .224$, $p = .005$; $r = .341$, $p < .01$) was found between IRMA-SF scores ($M = 98.981$, $SD = 12.094$) and positivity towards the program scores ($M = 7.346$, $SD = 1.248$) demonstrating statistical support for H1. No significant relationship was found between IRMA-SF scores and students' answers to the question of whether or not they thought they were the target audience for the program. However, a significant positive correlation ($r_s = .175$, $p = .027$; $r = .257$, $p = .001$) was found between IRMA-SF scores ($M = 98.981$, $SD = 12.094$) and whether or not students saw themselves as having an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault ($M = 2.780$, $SD = .581$). This indicated that students with lower levels of RMA were more likely to see themselves as having an individual role in prevention. These findings support H3.

In terms of demographic differences, male participants did show a higher level of RMA, although the difference between male ($M = 98.324$, $SD = 9.217$) and female ($M = 99.242$, $SD = 12.789$) participants was not enough to be considered significant. This is somewhat contrary to earlier research which has shown that men demonstrate a significantly higher level of RMA. A possible explanation of this difference could be due to the somewhat limited sample (men=21%, women=76%, other/non-identifying= 3%). In addition, the sample did not contain enough racial diversity to reasonably compare RMA levels; therefore, it is unknown whether the sample demonstrated trends that are consistent with previous research on racial differences.

IV. ANALYSIS

Responses to the open-ended questionnaire were further examined to assess percentages of positive, negative, and neutral responses, as well as to identify key themes and points of rationale present in the participants' answers. In response to the first question—of how students would feel if their college or university made the program they read about mandatory for all students—responses

were the most varied. A positive response was the most common with 69.8% of students responding in this way, while 3.8% provided neutral or mixed responses, and 26.4% responded negatively. Concern about a lack of student seriousness was the most notable theme, particularly in relation to negative responses. The general feeling of these responses was that students would be less inclined to take the program seriously or to think that the program applied to them if they were required to go, rather than if they went of their own accord. These feelings were present in both positive and negative responses, but were often used as a reason why the program should not be mandatory. Another dominant theme was that the program could be potentially triggering if it was made mandatory for everyone, including survivors of sexual assault. Together, these themes demonstrated the most common concerns with making a program mandatory and raised a somewhat general critique of this type of model.

In a follow-up question that asked if students would attend voluntarily, about 36.5% indicated that they felt as though students would attend voluntarily, while 27.7% indicated that they wouldn't, and 35.8% gave a mixed response. Concern about the program reaching the target audience was the most dominant theme in the responses to this question, the general idea being that only students who were already interested in these issues would attend the program. Time was a notable theme in this question as well, particularly in relation to "no" responses. Here students indicated that given the choice between attending the program and doing other things, many would opt out of the program. In addition, some participants noted that students wouldn't have time to be a part of the program, given that their schedules are so full already. These themes (trouble reaching the target audience and conflicts with time) were also seen by some as an additional reason why the program should be mandatory. This demonstrates the complexity of reaching a large number of students. Support for a mandatory program was not strong enough to assure its success; however, there also appeared to be the belief that a notable amount of students or the students who need the program most would not attend out of their own volition.

Although there was a lack of certainty about whether or not

students would attend such a program, a high percentage of students (88.1%) indicated that they felt the program they read about would be beneficial within the context of their college or university, 6.3% gave neutral answers, and 5.7% indicated that the program would not be beneficial. This demonstrates the overall receptiveness of students towards such programs and seems to indicate that students are not fully content with the degree of sexual assault prevention that currently exists on their campuses. The most dominant theme underlying these responses was that rape and sexual assault are things that occur on the participants' campuses. Forty participants (25.1%) include this as part of their response. Many of these responses stemmed from having personally experienced, knowing someone who had experienced, or otherwise hearing about such instances of sexual assault on their campus. "Happens here" type responses were not a part of any negative answers (in which students indicated that the program would not be beneficial). Those individuals who indicated that the program would not be beneficial, or who were more skeptical, indicated in part that students were already knowledgeable about these issues or that sexual assault wasn't something that happened on their campus. Many of the participants noted that they were from a small school where such issues were not as prevalent or that their school already had systems in place to educate students or otherwise deal with these issues.

In relation to the question designed to address H2 (which asked students if they were the target audience for the program), about 61% of students demonstrated that they were the target audience for the given program, while 10.7% gave a neutral response and 28.3% indicated that they were not the target audience for the program. The most notable theme, particularly among individuals who indicated that they were not the target audience, was that participants felt as though they were already knowledgeable about these issues. Many of these individuals indicated that they were passionate about sexual assault prevention or demonstrated their support for the program, but felt as though it was designed for an audience that did not necessarily include them. This could help to explain why H2 was not supported. If individuals already had an increased awareness of these issues as a result of previous educa-

tion, it would make sense that they would have relatively low levels of RMA but still might not see themselves as the target audience for the program.

In relation to the question designed to assess H3 (do you feel you have an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault), 86.2% of the students indicated that they felt they had an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault, while 5.7% of students gave a neutral response to this question, and 8.2% indicated that they did not feel they had an individual role in preventing such acts. This indicates that, overall, students are concerned with sexual assault prevention or feel as though they have some personal responsibility. This question also asked what participants felt their individual roles looked like. The main role that students identified was bystander intervention, which included intervening in instances where an assault could take place or generally maintaining awareness when interacting with groups of people. Many individuals included alcohol and drug awareness as part of their answer, for example paying attention to drinking in bars and clubs. Eighty-one participants (50.9%) included bystander intervention as part of their response, making it the most prevalent theme of the entire study.

On a similar note, some students highlighted education as their primary role in sexual assault prevention. Although some individuals mentioned being part of a specific group or organization that promotes education, for most individuals education took the form of general discussion among peers. Similarly, individuals often included themselves in this education, feeling as though they needed to first inform themselves before they could inform others. The third and final role that was highlighted in response to this question was consent. Individuals who responded in this way noted practicing consent with sexual partners. This included obtaining consent from a partner before engaging in sexual acts, as well as the participant themselves articulating what they wanted from a sexual partner or speaking up when they felt uncomfortable. Consent was often included in combination with other types of responses, such as classifying consent as a form of education or bystander intervention.

In addition to questions designed to test H1, H2, and H3, the open-ended questionnaire contained two questions designed to assess whether students felt that sexual assault prevention should in general target one gender more than the others. These questions aimed to get a general feeling for whether students would be more receptive to a program targeted towards their specific gender or towards a more general audience. When asked how students would feel if the program they read about was required of only men or only women, participant response was overwhelmingly negative. Only 1.3% of students indicated requiring one gender more than another would be a positive thing, 89.9% responded negatively, and 8.8% responded in a neutral fashion. On a similar note, when asked whether students felt that programs should be targeted towards men and women equally the responses were almost entirely affirmative (84.9%). Only about 6.3% indicated that one gender should be targeted more than another, and about 8.8% remained neutral. Similar themes arose around both of these questions, with the most common theme being that rape and sexual assault are things that are perpetuated at a societal level, and therefore that such acts affect everyone. These individuals indicated that sexual assault is something that is committed and felt by all genders of people, and therefore all individuals have a role in prevention.

V. DISCUSSION

The present study aimed to shed light on the relationship between RMA and students' perceptions of sexual assault prevention programs. A positive correlation was found between IRMA-SF scores and positivity towards the program scores, as well as IRMA-SF scores and whether or not students felt as though they had an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault. These correlations indicate that students with higher levels of RMA are less likely to respond positively to institution-wide prevention programming, and are less likely to see themselves as having an individual role in the prevention of rape and sexual assault. These findings make sense in the context of current literature, which has demonstrated a connection between RMA and other prejudicial or stereotyped views relating to sexual assault, homosexuality,

and traditional gender roles (Aronowitz et. al., 2012; Cassel, 2012; Davies et al., 2012). Such literature has demonstrated the pervasive nature of RMA and the ways in which rape myths are woven into the discourse of mainstream America through media outlets, news stories, and misinformation about the nature of rape, rapists, and rape victims. The present findings further illustrate the ways in which such misinformation is perpetuated by demonstrating that students with higher levels of RMA are less likely to see sexual assault prevention education as necessary or beneficial. Since participation in such programs is often self-selected and mandatory programs are few and far between, individuals who may need this education the most could be the least likely to receive it. This presents a challenge for those who are working to implement such programs on college campuses, and the open-ended questionnaire responses reflected this challenge. Many students raised criticisms of a prevention model that includes mandatory participation, but also did not express confidence that students would attend voluntarily. Indeed, many researchers have documented the positive changes that result from prevention programming (Cassel, 2012; Choate, 2003; Gidycz1, Orchowskil, & Berkowitz, 2011; Foubert et. al., 2010a; Foubert et. al. 2010b; Foubert & Perry, 2007; Kress et. al., 2006; Langhinrichsen-Rohling et.al., 2011; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Potter, Moynihan, Stapleton, & Banyard, 2009; Rothman & Silverman, 2007), but such studies do little to address the question of how to get students to participate in the first place.

A strong majority of students who participated in the study indicated that the program they read about would be beneficial within the context of their college or university. This shows that there is still a desire for the implementation of these programs and that a large percentage of the student body is receptive to such programs. Currently, student body activities that include sexual assault prevention programs and/or general sex education are only found in a minority of institutions (Gonzales et al., 2005). Participants also indicated that rape and sexual assault were present on their campuses, and often used this presence to explain why such programs would be beneficial. This shows that these acts are still widely occurring on college campuses and that prevention mea-

asures for sexual assault across institutions are not equitable with the amount of sexual assault that is actually present. Because many instances of rape and sexual assault often go unreported or are only discussed among peers, students may have a much better understanding of the amount of sexual assault that is actually occurring on their campuses compared to what is perceived by individuals at an administrative level. Therefore, in implementing prevention programs, it is important to pay attention to what students perceive as the need for their campuses, rather than simply what is statistically reported.

In addition, when asked what their individual role in sexual assault prevention looked like, the most commonly presented roles were bystander intervention, peer education, and practicing consent with sexual partners. Bystander intervention is a clear focus of many existing sexual assault prevention programs (Cassel, 2012; Choate, 2003; Gidycz1, Orchowskil, & Berkowitz, 2011; Foubert et. al., 2010a; Foubert et. al. 2010b; Langhinrichsen-Rohling et.al., 2011; Potter, Moynihan, Stapleton, & Banyard, 2009). There are still, however, few programs that focus on teaching students how to practice consent with sexual partners or on peer education. Since much of the discourse surrounding sexual assault on college campuses occurs at a peer level, and the majority of assaults are committed by individuals with whom the victim has been intimate, including consent and peer education in prevention programs may be beneficial for changing mindsets. Programs that include consent and peer education may also be more relatable for students, since such topics seem to already align with what students feel are solutions that they can easily fit into their lives. Students may therefore be more receptive to such programs and more willing to integrate the material into their peer groups and daily lives.

When speaking about receptivity, it is also important to note that the majority of participants were not in favor of prevention programs geared towards a specific gender; some even called the idea sexist and non-inclusive. Overall, the participants in this study indicated that sexual assault is an issue that occurs at a societal level and therefore that everyone should have a role in abolishing it. Recently, a number of researchers have focused specifically

on changing male attitudes towards these issues (Cassel, 2012; Foubert et al., 2010a; Foubert et al., 2010b; Foubert & Perry, 2007; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2011; O'Byrne, Hansen, & Rapley, 2007; O'Donohue, Yeater, & Fanetti, 2003; Rich et. al., 2010). Such studies often aim to reshape the perception that rape is just a women's issue, or that the responsibility should fall on women to protect themselves, by encouraging men to claim responsibility and see their own role in perpetuating such behaviors. Previous research has also suggested that there is a beneficial aspect to including gender separated groups as part of prevention programs, particularly for male students. Some researchers have shown that all-male programs are more successful for males than mixed gender programs (Foubert & Perry, 2007). Advocates for such programs have argued that a single gender environment decreases defensiveness in men, and allows them to feel more comfortable communicating honestly (Roze & Koss, 2001). Opinions on such matters are mixed, however, with Rich et al. (2010) demonstrating that male students themselves prefer to be in mixed gender groups because of an atmosphere of unity, where men and women take equal responsibility in preventative measures. The present findings fit more with this model. While a small percentage of participants did indicate a desire to be in gender separated groups at some point during the course of the program, students were more likely to endorse a program if it was designed to be gender-inclusive. More research is needed to fully assess the differing success rates between same sex and mixed sex programs, taking into account students' perceptions of what is most beneficial.

VI. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Although steps were taken to use language and examples that were inclusive in nature, heteronormativity was a limitation in this study. The IRMA-SF, and to a smaller extent the program description, focus almost exclusively on rape that is perpetrated by men against women. Some participants demonstrated their dissatisfaction with this trend, calling for a more varied representation of sexual assault. This would include all genders of people as both perpetrators and victims and would give examples of sexual

assault that fall outside of the heterosexual model. Unfortunately, until measures themselves are designed to be more inclusive and to present instances of sexual assault outside of this dominant model, the same heteronormative view of these issues will continue to be perpetuated, and cases that fall outside of this view (for example, between two individuals of the same sex or instances where women are the perpetrators and men are the victims) will continue to be overlooked. Therefore, future research should focus first and foremost on designing scales and measure that account for instances of sexual assault outside of the heteronormative model. In addition to presenting a more inclusive view of these issues, such scales will allow researchers to get a more accurate depiction of RMA and other opinions surrounding all forms of sexual assault, rather than just those concerning sexual assault perpetrated by men against women.

In addition, the sample was somewhat limited in scope. This is especially true in terms of racial and gender identity. The present study did not aim to address racial differences specifically, although this is an important topic for future studies to explore. It is also possible that students who were already concerned with issues of sexual assault prevention were more inclined to participate in the study, given that convenience sampling was the primary means by which participants were recruited. Therefore, although there was significant variability within the sample, it may not fully reflect the larger degree of variability that exists surrounding these issues. Future research should continue to take students' perceptions and opinions into account when examining sexual assault that occurs on college campuses so as to design prevention programs that will be truly effective and well-received among student populations.

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Place Your Roots by the Silo by Morgan Vessel, 2015. Fabric, wood, paper, thread, microfilament, watercolor.

Artist's Statement: Charlie Hayes

My work explores and investigates intersections between aesthetics and materials. I am interested in observing both the material making process, as well as my thought process during the prolonged time of making. The work shown here is from my Undergraduate Research on crystalline glazes.

Although many ceramicists have done work with crystalline glazes, there is no clear documentation of how variation in process effects glaze results. For my work here, I experimented with several different firing cycles and recipe alterations. The original recipe was passed down to me from Steve Loucks, who is a contemporary ceramic artist working out of Alabama, who has done extensive crystalline work himself. I categorized my research into three sections, one dealing with temperature, one with seeding, and one with post-reduction firing of crystalline glazes. Crystalline glazes have relatively simple recipes: zinc oxide makes up 25% of the glaze, and silica makes up almost 20%. During the firing, these two ingredients form zinc silicate crystals, thus making the glaze a crystalline. However, there will be no crystal grow in the glaze unless the piece is put through an extremely precise firing cycle in which controlled cooled and temperature holds are used to grow crystals to a size that is perceivable to the human eye. The glaze recipe and the firing cycle must be very precise to attain desirable results, and there are plenty of small variables with the two that can be altered to produce very noticeable differences in the final glaze result. These variables were the focus of my research on the crystalline glazing process.

In addition to my work in the studio, I documented all my findings to leave behind a detailed book of data for future students and the surrounding ceramics community to utilize as an education tool for the study of crystalline glazes.

Artist Statement: Maya Heubner

I interpreted the theme “control” differently in choosing this piece. In *Spiral of Life*, the hermit crab is choosing and entering a new shell, taking control of its own protection from vulnerability.

Artist's Statement: Peter Constantinou

Memories represented by photographs collect as strata in the crust of time to then be peeled and excavated, revealing fragments and glimpses into thoughts past. But who do we see in the haze? Well the goddess herself, of course, Alexandra! Standing 60 feet tall, a woman of great beauty and precocious feats. She descends from the heavens with the assistance of her divine silks in a soft magenta light. Chaste yet weathered, she is casual but proper. A presence so warm how could one leave her side? The winds of time howl, and the instant is buried only later to resurface in the future, battered and faded, a relic of great elegance. A classic to be cherished with beauty marks so endearing—a new work of art each time.

Let's put this one away for now.

She needs her rest.

Artist Statement: Morgan Vessel

My work explores the idea that, in their lifetimes, houses absorb the energies and personalities of the beings who live and breathe inside of them, as well as the effects of the events that have happened there. The houses stay, see, and hear, even once everything and everyone else leaves and changes. Once the inhabitants have left and the houses are abandoned, memories and secrets are still kept within the walls, and these houses become physical reflections of what once was there.

My automata-inspired objects invite viewers to interact with and manually animate parts of my work, allowing them to reveal the experiences of these houses and the stories they have to tell. As such, my project invites the viewer to become a part of the narrative that lives inside, and to see what influence they may have on the surroundings by means of personal movement and connection. Though I attach my own specific memories and sentiments to each of the settings I have created, I want to keep the meanings open to the personal connections of each viewer, with the idea that our perspectives physically manifest the spaces we inhabit.

I work with forgivable, flexible materials like paper, fabric, and thread to create a sense of fragility and softness. Whether found in our clothes, gifts, or letters, our lives are full of bits and pieces of paper and fabric or other materials we are attached to from our every day life. Using these fiber pieces emphasizes the idea of memory, as fiber is a material deeply rooted in our own personal history and emotion. To create the actual wooden boxes, I mostly used bits of found wood from abandoned houses since they are already worn and full of antiquity. By illustrating houses as animated beings, I hope to tell the second part of the story—what is left once everything else is gone.

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